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10 January 1985

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FOOD SHORTAGES THREATEN ARAB POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE

Beirut AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 29, 19 Nov 84 pp 8, 9

[Text]

Food shortages have long been recognised as the Arab world's Achilles heel and Arab officials have been concerned that it may some day provide the West with political leverage. Huge imports and falling food production in the Arab world in the last two years could make the Arab world even more politically, economically and socially vulnerable than in the past.

That was the warning contained in agricultural expert Hassan Fehmi Juma's opening speech to a Riyadh conference on animal husbandry last week. Mr. Juma, general-director of the Arab Organisation for Agricultural Development, told a gathering of experts from 18 Arab countries that food imports had doubled from \$13bn in 1981 to \$26bn in 1983. Meanwhile, he said, food production had fallen by 7.8 per cent between 1982 and 1983.

Attributing the drop in food production to a decline in investment in the industrial and agricultural sectors, Mr. Juma noted that food consumption and population rates were continuing to rise. He said those trends would have an adverse effect on economic and agricultural development. Rising food imports — which go to cover more than half of the Arab world's food needs — were seen as a potential factor influencing political and economic decisions of various Arab states.

Despite the doubling of the cost of food imports, the bulk of which are meat and wheat products, Mr. Juma noted that 1983 statistics show shortages in meat, eggs and milk. He said an Arab's average daily protein intake was still 10 grams below the 24.5 grams/person world protein average daily intake.

CHEMICALS CONTROVERSY BEHIND EEC-GCC COOPERATION TALKS

Beirut AN-NAHAR ARAB REPOT & MEMO in English No 30, 26 Nov 84 pp 9, 10

[Text]

The continuing row about the terms under which Gulf petrochemicals should enter the European market have prompted informal talks about a cooperation agreement between the EEC and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Reports from Brussels and in the *Gulf Times* said discussions were held recently in Bahrain between an EEC delegation and the GCC Secretariat, and that they have agreed to meet again in January.

A disagreement has recently blown up between the EEC and Saudi Arabia over attempts to impose a 13.5 per cent tariff on imports of Gulf-produced petrochemicals above a certain quota. Europe says the Gulf producers have a commercial advantage because of cheap locally-available feedstock for petrochemical plants. The EEC is coming under pressure from member-governments anxious to protect their own petrochemical industries — many of which are hardly breaking even — and avoid adding to already high unemployment.

Proposals for EEC-GCC cooperation go back to 1980 when the then French president, Valery Giscard d'Estaing, suggested talks in Brussels. But that early enthusiasm met with little response from Gulf states who, according to reports, preferred to develop their European ties bilaterally.

EEC officials are reported to be "surprised" by recent GCC overtures and have linked them to the difficulties over petrochemical exports.

The EEC said duty was imposed on Gulf petrochemicals because the normal quota allowed under the General System of Preferences had been fulfilled. However, with the number of petrochemical plant in the Gulf now growing, the problem is clearly not going to disappear. Indeed, pressures are likely to in-

press's preoccupation with scandals and intrigue among the Al-Saud family, while ignoring economic and political developments in the country.

According to *The Observer*, the King said this is a solution to a problem that threatens to jeopardise the whole range of European-Gulf relations.

EEC officials privately concede that the existing quota is unrealistic, whether in terms of total Gulf production or of foreign sales. Further, the free-trade raison d'être of the Treaty of Rome would be undermined (although not for the first time) if import policy were too restrictive. Indeed, the issue is likely to emerge as yet another in which the interests of the EEC contradict those of its member-states.

In a recent leader, the *Financial Times* pointed out that although European overcapacity in petrochemicals was some 12 to 15 per cent, manufacturers had just gone through a fairly healthy 12 months after a 2½-year slump. The newspaper said that recently rising prices had delayed rationalisation in the industry. But it also said that petrochemicals will probably not have to be cut back as severely as, say, the steel industry, which has been dramatically pruned in recent years.

The debate over Saudi Arabia's trading status should not be allowed to obscure the key element in the controversy, the *Financial Times* declared. This, it says, is that, "Saudi Arabia has built an industry

to convert a natural resource into petrochemicals and now should have the right to sell that product abroad without penalising restrictions. The country imported more than \$20bn of goods last year; its petrochemicals at their peak will account for no more than three billion dollars."

Rejecting suggestions from some European countries and manufacturers to subsidise the cost of feedstocks to their own industries, the FT warns: "The future of the European chemical industry does not lie in preserving existing capacity in commodity chemicals. It lies in uncovering new products, new uses and new markets in the 'downstream' end of the business. For the next decade at least Saudi Arabia will try to compete in this arena."

One manufacturing group showing a less defeatist attitude to Saudi competition is BASF of West Germany. Dr Hans Albers, its chief executive, said there would be "disaster" only if Saudi petrochemical sales were concentrated in certain markets. Marketing should not be distorted by high tariffs or quotas in other industrialised countries, with the effect of channelling all exports into Europe, he said. The current provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade should prevent this, he suggested. He also pointed out that if world consumption were to rise by one to two per cent a year, Saudi production (which will amount to five per cent of world output) would be absorbed in a few years.

GULF AIR TO BUY BOEINGS AND AIRBUSES

Beirut AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 29, 19 Nov 84 p 11

[Text]

Gulf Air plans to buy Airbus-200s and Boeing-747s and 767s as part of an expansion plan for the near future. Gulf Air's chief executive, Ali al-Maliki, who made the announcement, gave no details of how many aircraft the airline planned to buy, or when. The airline, jointly owned by the governments of Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, now operates nine Tristars, eight Boeing-737s and one 747. Gulf Air's profits last year were \$47.9mn, 54 per cent higher than in 1982.

The news was not so good for Kuwait's national air carrier, who announced a 66 per cent fall in net profit for 1983/84. The state-owned Kuwait Airways Corporation's (KAC) net profits dropped to 200,000 Kuwaiti dinars (\$660,000) in the year ending June 30th from 600,000 dinars (\$1.98mn) the previous year.

In order to attract new passengers, after a drop of between seven and 10 per cent last year, a spokeswoman for the airline said KAC is considering a 30 per cent fare cut for flights within the Gulf region. KAC also plans to introduce a weekly flight between Kuwait and Tokyo, and a KOC delegation will visit China next month to study prospects for a flight to Peking.

CSO: 4400/49

ROLE OF ISLAM IN ALGERIA ANALYZED

Paris GEOPOLITIQUE in French No 7, Fall 84 pp 61-66, 68-69

[Article by Henri Sanson: "The Algerian Model"]

[Text] The phrase "political Islam" is rather commonly used to refer to political regimes in Islamic countries. It is short and convenient. A contradiction to some--especially to those who advocate the separation of the religious and political powers--it is suggestive. But it is not without ambiguity.

Indeed, it first implies that the relation existing between Islam and the political power is a necessary relation. Now, looking at things from the point of view of Islam itself, such a necessity is by no means obvious. As El-Shakankiri justly said: "The Koran contains neither a legal nor a political code, but only 200 practical rules. Legal and political Islam is the work of doctors of the Law" (LE MONDE, 1 November 1979).

Deriving a legal and political Islam from the Koran was consistent, but it did not have to be the only operation possible. At any rate, although all Muslims today are referring to the Koran, not all will refer to doctors of the Law. As for those who do, they do not all refer to the same doctors.

Then, the phrase implies that the relation existing between Islam and the political power could be patterned after a single model. But, if we now look at things from the point of view of the political power, this is not so. Indeed, between Islam and Islamic political regimes, the logical link is never exactly the same. Witness the fact that in Islamic land we find political regimes ranging from the caliphate to the sultanate, the monarchy and the republic! Maxime Rodinson is right in stating: "Muslim government does not mean a thing in itself" (LE MONDE, DOSSIERS ET DOCUMENTS, No 61, May 1979).

We must face the fact that political Islam is a "multi-faceted" Islam (Paul Balta, LE MONDE, 22 January 1982). Therefore, for the sake of precision, this article will consider only the model--the "facet"--represented by the Algerian political Islam as it is practised today. We shall also see that, far from being a rigid model, it is indissociable from an "Islamic secularity" that might well give it new forms.

Demonstrating the existence of this Islamic secularity will provide us with a key to understand that the laics of Islam (whom Louis Gardet prefers to call "the men of Islam") enjoy some autonomy within any political Islam, if not always in actual fact, at least by right.

A "People's Democracy" Type of Regime

It is desirable to analyze Algeria's political Islam not only because the Algerian political regime is, structurally, a "people's democracy," but also because this people's democracy--which claims to be a socialist not a communist, proletarian or workers' democracy--has chosen to be an Islamic people's democracy.

It is in the 1976 Algerian Constitution itself that we find the starting point of our analysis of political Islam. Indeed, the first articles of the Constitution paradoxically raise the issue of sovereignty within political Algeria, more precisely within the Algerian political institutions.

- Article 2 provides (as do most Islamic constitutions) that "Islam is the State religion." As such, this article raises a first issue, that of political sovereignty, in that case the sovereignty of Islam. In such a case, this sovereignty is mostly referred to as a theocracy. But, referring to the Koran, some would prefer to speak of logocracy and nomocracy. Maybe we should speak of Islamocracy.

- For its part, Article 5 (imitating in that most republics) provides that "national sovereignty belongs to the people." For all that, this article raises a second issue of political sovereignty, we mean that of the people's sovereignty. In such a case, it is accepted practice to speak of democracy.

- As for Article 1, it provides right away that "Algeria is a democratic and a people's Republic," as specified under Article 98: "The country's overall policy is directed by the Party leadership." The least we can say is that this raises a third issue of political sovereignty, that of the Party's sovereignty. It is all the more relevant to raise the issue as the Party is presented elsewhere as the nation's highest authority, to which even the State has to submit. In such a case, shouldn't we speak of a partycracy, even if that is a neologism?

Sovereignty of Islam, sovereignty of the people, sovereignty of the Party: how do these sovereignties fit in together? Islamocracy, democracy, partycracy: how do these sovereignties come to terms with one another? In an attempt to answer these questions, we have chosen to draw up /the structural blueprint/ [in italics] that presides over the joint exercise of these three sovereignties.

Islam Reigns

Islam reigns. But it does not govern.

First, Islam reigns institutionally. This is stated in the Charter of 1976, the pact that now binds all Algerians together. The charter provides that

"Islam is the State religion" for the excellent reason that "the Algerian people is a Muslim people" (page 21). Confirming this sovereignty, the Charter indicates that political Algeria is revolutionary and that "revolution fits in well with the historical perspective of Islam."

As for socialism, to prevent any confusion the Charter states that it is not "a religion" (therefore, it does not compete with Islam) and that it is exactly "a theoretical and strategic weapon" (page 23) in the service of revolution and therefore Islam.

For its part, the Constitution, which is issued from the Charter, provides not only, as we already said, that "Islam is the State religion" (Article 2), but also that the chief of State must be a Muslim (Articles 107 to 109) and that "no constitutional amendment bill shall interfere (...) with the State religion" (Article 195).

Thus, through the Charter and the Constitution, a law is laid down for the State: Islam. As sovereign and as legislator, the State can take only second place. It is not the Hegelian State, the beginning and end of society. It is a government apparatus.

The reign of Islam has its symbols: the State seal displays the arms of Islam, and the national flag the so-called colors of Islam. It has its implications: Arabic, according to the Constitution, is "the official and national language" (Article 3); the goal of the cultural revolution is "Islamic morals" (Article 19); in its foreign policy, Algeria "endorses the principles and goals (...) of the Arab League" (Article 86).

Some may have wondered whether these provisions of Islamism should not be viewed as more or less formal, all the more so as the Algerian political regime intends to operate as a socialist people's Republic. Today, after publication of the Family Code on 9 June 1984, doubt is no longer possible. Indeed, this Code could not be more in conformity with the provisions of Koranic law in this respect. And by thus regulating the family, it regulates what is commonly referred to in Algeria as "the basic cell of society."

In that case, should we speak of theocracy? In the Charter and in the Constitution of 1976, there is no mention whatsoever of God. Should we then speak of logocracy or nomocracy? No mention is ever made either of the Koran, the Sunna, the Law (Shariah) or the law (fiqh). It might be preferable to keep to Islam as an ideology and to speak of Islamocracy or else--and this sounds better--of the reign of Islam. But what is true of individuals is also true of ideologies: there are several ways of reigning!

Islam, An Institutional and Collective Phenomenon

Then, Islam reigns sociologically: nearly all Algerians choose to be Muslims. Certainly, they are not all Muslims with the same knowledge, practice, piety, faith. But all live with reference to, and as members of Islam. In this case, Islam is not only an institutional, but also a collective phenomenon.

Islamic holidays are observed. Some are public and paid holidays. During Ramadan, working hours are changed. Pigs are no longer raised. Betting is prohibited. The sale of alcohol is regulated. The number of mosks is increasing. Calls to prayer can be heard during the day and even at night. The State has a Ministry of Religious Affairs (Islam is both reigning and regulated). The school system is organized as a single religious school system. Justice is rendered according to the principles of Koranic law: Sunni and especially Malekite law.

The status of religious minorities is in line with the tradition of dominance and tolerance of Islamic societies. The place made to non-Muslims is typical: they are prohibited from marrying Muslim women. The media are widely open to Islamic teaching and preaching. The city is organized to promote the Islamic cult and, as a whole, Islamic law and order.

For us who have always lived in Algeria--like outsiders inside!--a certainty and an impression prevail. A certainty? The reign of Islam, which pervades not only the institutions but also society, makes Algeria a /religious society/ [in italics]: in Algeria, we are on Islamic land. An impression? Here, everything is not only as if we were living in one of the houses of Islam, but also as if Islam was living in us: in Algeria, we are in Islam and we are part of Islam.

But although Islam is reigning, it is not governing. At any rate, it does not govern directly. It does not have any representative with the quality or a mandate to govern.

In Algeria, there is no magisterium like that of the pope or of the synod, whose doctrinal authority would prevail by right for the exegesis of Islam. There are also no bishops or priests with sacramental or pastoral powers with respect to the rest of the faithful. There are no clerics with power over others, except the power they may have as individuals. No one can claim to have been vested from above with an office that would give him religious or political and religious authority.

The Higher Islamic Council itself--as its name shows--is just a council (a council of ministers and, therefore, a government council). There are also no university, no faculty, no chair of Islamology that could claim to have authority, at least teaching authority, in the field of religion or politics!

The People Governs

Algeria is therefore a religious society without any institutional religious hierarchy. In this respect, President Chadli, speaking of some who would impose their particular beliefs and practices on others, was saying: "There is no middleman between God and his creatures. No one has the right to monopolize Islamic thought and the interpretation of the divine will" (EL MOUDJAHID, 27-28 November 1981).

Islam reigns, but without sharing or delegating its power in any way. It is its reign that is the foundation of Islamic egalitarianism. According to a famous hadith: "The blood of any Muslim is equal to the blood of any other Muslim."

Under these conditions, it is clear that the political sovereignty of Islam is the sovereignty not of a government but of a reign. In other words, not a sovereignty of personal power (individual or collective) but of religious reference (moral and legal). More precisely, it is because Islam is not only the first but the only reference in the city that J.-P. Charnay could call it a teleocracy. However, if Islam reigns without governing, the people of Islam govern without reigning.

Sovereignty of the people, too, is an integral part of political sovereignty. However, we should not be mistaken about the type of democracy that results. Indeed, in this case, the sovereignty of the people is exercised in the context of a democracy that is not absolute and the judge of all things, but secondary and subject to the law of Islam. In Islamic land, there is not a single political regime, not even a democratic one--whether a liberal or a people's democracy--that does not have Islam for a religion.

To understand the nature of such an Islamic democracy, we must first specify who are the people on which it is founded.

Certainly, this people is a people of citizens. But the Charter also defines it as a "Muslim" people (page 21); others would prefer speaking of a people of faithful. We chose to say that this people of citizens is a people of laymen. We made this choice to emphasize both its religious character--it is a Muslim people--and, within the reign of Islam, its political autonomy (similar to that of laymen in the Catholic Church).

This people is a people of laymen because it is a people of non-clerics. The characteristic of laymen is, negatively, that they are not vested with any clerical office. Now, Islam is a religion without a clergy. It does have men of religion, some of whom have full-time paid positions, but no special Islamic powers are conferred upon any one of them. The Algerians are laymen in a society that is not a-religious, but religious and non-clerical. Their secularity is an Islamic, not a French type of secularity.

This people is a people of laymen because it is a people of Muslims with bare hands: none of them can claim to possess either the sacred powers of clerics or even the powers of clerics made sacred. In Algeria, no man, even in the government, claims to descend from Muhammad and, as such, to be endowed with outstanding political and religious powers: here, there is no sultan, no sherif by right of descent. Similarly, no man claims to be the successor of Muhammad and, because of that, to be vested with special religious powers, if not to add to the Law, at least to interpret it: there are no caliphs (according to some, the caliphs, at least the first ones, were vested with special religious powers). Finally, no man gives to understand that an hereditary monarchy founded on divine right could be established, much less a Louis-XIV type of monarchy.

An "Islamically" Free People

Generally speaking, it rejects any new prophesying, by descent or by succession, any commandery over good and evil, by right of investiture, and it will not give a sacred character to any power a citizen may have. In principle, therefore, the Algerian is a layman who can govern without being subject to any individual vested with religious powers by virtue of his office. He belongs to a religious society without any religious, clerical or laic hierarchy.

Finally, this people is a people of free laymen who are free with respect to Islam. Indeed, in Algeria (and probably also elsewhere) Islam is man alone face to face with God and his naked word: between man and God, there is no middleman, no mediator, no intercessor; between man and God, there is only the Koran which, not being a creation, is the very word of God as dictated to Muhammad.

In Algeria, again, Islam is a gathering of men that are all equal among themselves, in the face of God and the Koran: any religious privilege, any class messianism, any human-divine hierarchy are rejected; the Islamic faith in God and his word makes any Muslim the equal of any other Muslim, at least as far as religious dignity is concerned (in this respect, the Charter emphasizes "the fundamental egalitarianism of Islam," page 21).

In Algeria, finally, Islam is man accountable to God alone: "When all is said and done, each man is accountable only to God, both in interpreting the Law and in determining what he should do."* The Algerian does not acknowledge any other true judge but God: the judges of this earth can dispose of his body, but God alone can dispose of his soul.

Thus, the people which governs appears to be a people of laymen who, in a religious society subject to the reign of Islam, must rely on their reason alone for anything that is not explicitly prescribed by the Koranic law. The sovereignty of Islam is the reign of the Law; the sovereignty of the people is the reign of reason, more exactly the reign of Islamic reason. In this respect, Houari Boumediene once told Paul Balta: "We, Algerians, are the most Cartesian of all Arabs."

This anthropology provides the basis for a secular religious democracy that is not only egalitarian with respect to religion, but also direct: a democracy that could be governed without having to go through religious or even civilian leaders!

At the same time, all Algerians dream of a unanimous democracy in which all would agree as in a jamaah, so that there would be no chiefs and no one would be excluded! A democracy in which the people could exert its sovereignty without having to go either through elections (based on the discriminating principle of a majority winning over a minority) or the mediation of repre-

* Henri Sanson: "Islamic Secularity," page 57.

sentatives (elected at the expense of other candidates that would then lose). Where there is unanimity, no one is humiliated by others, and we have God's promise that we cannot go wrong!

At this stage of the blueprint whose structures we are revealing, the Algerian society can be compared to a secular religious school, i.e. a school that claims to belong to a given religion but which, on the one hand, is not outwardly subject to any established religious authority and, on the other hand, inwardly consists only of laymen who belong to that religion and are all religious equals.

The Algerian city is a society of the Book. But to organize itself under the Book, it can rely in principle only on laymen.

The Party Directs

Nevertheless, this democracy is actually a people's democracy and the sovereignty of the people implies the sovereignty of the Party.

In practice, the people governs sovereignly "through its representatives." Now, its representatives are of two kinds: statesmen who manage public affairs, including also religious affairs, and Party men who define the political ideology and, as a result, the orientation to be given to public affairs. We shall now take a closer look at the latter: there the Party takes precedence over the State.

Actually, the Algerian Republic is a democracy in which the citizens find themselves organized not within several parties but within a single party, in the name of democratic centralism. In Algeria, the single party is said to be the party of the people, of its profound aspirations, or again the party of the "farmers, workers, soldiers, of the young and of revolutionary intellectuals." As such, the Party must be the outstanding expression of the people and of its most enlightened conscience.

It is worth noting that the statutes of the FLN party are remarkable by their unexpected lack of reference to Islam. Certainly, the 1958 statutes alluded to Islam, at least in a negative manner: "The objective of the FLN," they read, "is the construction of a free, democratic and social Algerian Republic that will not be in contradiction with the principles of Islam." But after independence and until the Fourth Congress of 15-19 June 1980, subsequent Party statutes no longer make any reference to Islam.

As for the 1980 statutes, they refer to it only twice and only in Article 7 (although they consist of 131 articles!): "The mission that the Party is assigning to itself is the construction of socialism in the context of national and Islamic values, which implies (...) the promotion of the citizen and his Arab-Islamic personality."

So much discretion certainly calls for an explanation. All the more so as the Party cannot be suspected of religious indifference or even atheism. It was the Party which caused the adoption of the Charter and Constitution,

proclaiming Islam as a State religion, and which published it under its name. It was also the Party which caused the acceptance of the Family Code of 9 June 1984, whose Islamic character can hardly be denied! The explanation we are looking for lies only in the principle of liberty which specifies the nature of the Party. As President Chadli once said: "The Congress (of the Party) is free and sovereign" (EL MOUDJAHID, 7 November 1983).

As is known, the Party is by definition only the party of the people and its profound aspirations. As such, it must be free with respect to anything that is not the people and does not involve the people's profound aspirations. Therefore, it must, at its own risks, identify, ideologize and orient the political life of the country.

It is also free with respect to itself. It is not bound to anybody, by necessity and forever, either by a Charter (after that of 1964, there was that of 1976), or by a Constitution (after that of 1963, there was that of 1976), or even by its own statutes (Article 131 of the 1980 statutes provides that they can be altered).

Its freedom means that the Party is not necessarily nationalist or socialist... If it has been that in the past and still is, it must have been and still must be to meet adequately, here and now, the profound aspirations of its people. Per se, at any rate, the Party is not Islamic: of the State, the Party took the initiative of saying that Islam is its religion; of the Party, nothing similar or equivalent was ever said. If the Party called itself Islamic--if it said, as it now says of socialism, that Islam is its "ultimate goal" (statutes, Article 1)--that should be to answer aspirations of the people which would have become Islamic after having been essentially nationalist and socialist until now. The Party does not have to have any other ideology, whether nationalist, socialist, Islamic or other, but that which best expresses the profound aspirations of the people.

Like Revolution, the Party Is a Project Without a Model

Thus, the Party is "the crucible of the people's freedom as far as political ideology is concerned." As such, it assigns to itself its own mission and it assigns to the people the mission that, as a result, has to be the people's. "It would no longer be the party of revolution by the people and for the people if it obeyed any other law than that of the sovereign people." In this respect, it is, like revolution, a project without a model. A project? The revolution of all that has to be revolutionized. Without a model? Without a model specified once and for all, or again with no other models than those it draws from day to day from a people that is constantly evolving.

During the liberation war, the Party--as a matter of course--had first chosen to be nationalist: its "ultimate goal" was the nation's independence. With independence and the demands of construction, it first chose to be socialist: its "ultimate goal" was then the construction of a prosperous socioeconomic society from which the exploitation of man by man would be banished.

Since 1980, it has felt the need to explicit even in its statutes, sometimes only in passing, the Islamism it gets from its people. No one can tell whether some day this Islamism will not become its "ultimate goal."

At any rate, already now, it reserves for itself the ideological exegesis of political Islam. This is evidenced by the text of the 1976 Charter: "Islam," it is said, "revealed itself as one of the most powerful bulwarks against all attempts at depersonalization (...). To regenerate itself, the Muslim world has but one way out: to transcend reformism and follow the road to social revolution (...). Islam, when its spirit is well understood, is not bound to any special interest, to any specific clergy, or to any secular power (...). To be credible, the reconstruction of Muslim thought must of necessity refer to an undertaking of far greater scope: the total recasting of society" (pages 21 and 22).

It is from the Party that the State is receiving its political rule. It is even from the Party that the State receives, in particular, its Islamic political rule. Not so long ago, the political rule was primarily nationalist. Yesterday, it was primarily socialist.

In 1980, it still proposes to be primarily socialist, but with the added precision that this must be "in the context of national and Islamic values" (statutes, Article 7). Tomorrow, should the Party then judge so, the political rule could be primarily Islamic and this time "in the context of national and socialist values"!

The Algerian political institution offers the peculiarity that it works within Islamism like a people's democracy: such is the structural blueprint. By virtue of its revolutionary sovereignty, the Party decides on the one hand that Islam must reign because the people are Muslims and, on the other hand, that because of its social aspirations the people must govern and be governed according to the principles of socialism. In other words, by virtue of the people's sovereignty the people recognizes itself in the reign of Islam and in the socialist ideology. Or again: by virtue of its religious sovereignty, Islam defines the context within which the people must exert its sovereign right to govern and the Party its sovereign right to make decisions.

The Dialectic of the People, of Islam and of the Party

There is a reciprocal priority between the sovereignty of Islam, that of the people and that of the Party (between Islamocracy, democracy and partycracy): using the Algerian political language, we would say that there is integration.

It is a mistake when considering political Islam to see things only from the point of view of Islam: we then run the risk of considering only the religious aspects of things. It would also be a mistake, in such a case, to see things only from the point of view of the people: we would then run the risk of considering only the secular aspects of things. Similarly, it would be a mistake in this case to consider things only from the point of view of the Party: we would then run the risk of considering everything, in a contradictory manner, in terms of power.

It seems preferable to us to put Islam, the people and the Party in a dialectic: Islam and its views of society in terms of religion; the people of Muslim laymen and, within Islam, if not the people's independence, at least its autonomy; the Party and, in the name of the (Muslim) people, its (Islamic) freedom.

Certainly, all this was just about the analysis of a model and its structures. It would be the task of others than the anthropologist to study the genesis, practice, effects of such a model.

As it is, the Algerian model is only one possible model for political Islam. Precisely, the plurality of models that can be applied to political Islam demonstrates the existence of an inner Islamic secularity, not only in each Islamic country, but also in Islamic countries as a whole.

Considering first prescriptions and prohibitions and, then, what is to be praised and what is to be blamed, there is room--in Islamic land as well as in all houses of Islam--for a domain encompassing what is lawful (which is all the broader as we are getting further away from private law), which is the privileged domain of Islamic secularity, the foundation on which the city is organized.

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CSO: 4519/52

ARMS INDUSTRY EXPANSION PLANNED

Beirut AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 30, 26 Nov 84 p 8

[Text]

Egypt is embarking upon plans to expand its armaments industry and expects to manufacture tanks, armoured cars and air-defence systems for both domestic needs and export. Announcing the programme, the defence minister, Marshal Abdel Halim Abu Ghazala, said the proposed tank factory — code-named Project-2000 — would cost some £E600mn (about \$700mn) and that the first tanks would roll off the assembly lines in 1988/89. In the meantime, the plant would turn out armoured cars and other military vehicles, he said.

Despite Egypt's now heavy dependence upon the West for modern arms, Marshal Abu Ghazala said his country had already developed a mobile air-defence unit, comprising a vehicle-mounted ground-to-air missile launcher (using a locally-produced version of the Hawkeye) and radar. Military sales last year totalled one billion dollars and put Egypt among the top ten by volume of sales among the world's arms' manufacturers.

While Egypt's principal interest is to increase its reliance on its own armaments, the government is mindful of the opportunities for export to other Arab countries, which are likely to increase as Egypt gradually re-enters the Arab political fold.

Reports from Cairo said that a senior Jordanian army officer had already recommended buying Egyptian equipment. Major-General Ahmed Alaeddin, the inspector-general of the Jordanian armed forces, expressed particular interest in the Fahd range of armoured vehicles and would shortly be testing them in Jordan.

Interest in the Egyptian arms' business has reawakened with the recent visit to Cairo by the British and Italian defence ministers, as well as with the First International Defence Exhibition earlier this month in the capital, where Egyptian products, including a 130-mm field gun and a 122-mm self-

propelled gun, were exhibited for the first time. In all, 177 exhibitors from 18 countries took part, including the surprising number of 37 Egyptian companies.

There is clearly scope for foreign countries to enter into joint-ventures with Egypt, either as co-producers or as sub-contractors. Marshal Abu Ghazala has visited France for talks on co-production of the Mirage-2000, with at least part of the assembly in Egypt. Egypt is also looking for partners to produce the successor generation of armour to replace its ageing T-54s and T-55s, originally supplied by the Soviet Union. Tanks were reported to be high on the agenda when the Italian defence minister, Giovanni Spadolini, was in Cairo.

As part of its campaign to rehabilitate itself politically and commercially, Egypt is particularly interested in promoting military joint-ventures with Arab states, and officials have speculated publicly about Arab co-production of a jet-fighter. Egypt is also expected to urge Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates to resume full cooperation with Egypt in military production under the aegis of the Arab Organisation of Industry, which was partially suspended following Egypt's signing of the Camp David Agreements.

CSO: 4500/32

LIBYA

AL-QADHDHAFI: A PROFILE

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 407, 8 Dec 84 pp 20-24

[Article by 'Abd-al-Karim Abu al-Nasr: "Al-Qadhdhafi: A Self Portrait"]

[Text] No one can actually write about Col Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi but Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi himself.

Al-Qadhdhafi, who is the most controversial leader in the Arab world--he may even be the most controversial leader in the world--and who stirs up intense, conflicting emotions, is a man who lives in his own world. He is a man who lives by his own logic, his own considerations and his various convictions. These sometimes differ considerably from those of many leaders and political officials in the world.

Therefore, al-Qadhdhafi seems to be a mysterious figure to a number of people. They cannot find out what he is planning, and they cannot put a specific label on him. Is he a head of state, a revolutionary commander, the leader of an opposition movement, or the chief of a secret organization that operates in several areas of the world? Is he actually a threat, and to whom is he a threat? Is he a man of peace--according to his own way of reasoning--or is he a trouble-maker and an instigator of disturbances and uprisings in other countries?

I asked an Arab political figure who is acquainted with al-Qadhdhafi [the following question]: "If you wanted to define al-Qadhdhafi in a few words, what would you say?"

The man said, "The best definition of al-Qadhdhafi is what the colonel said about himself in an interview with three journalists who wrote a book about him. He said, 'I am an opposition figure on a worldwide scale. Not only am I the leader of the Arab opposition, but I am also the leader of the opposition worldwide.' I don't believe there is a statement that defines the Libyan leader's character, objectives and aspirations more truthfully and more clearly than that statement."

What does this statement mean?

It means, above all else, that al-Qadhdhafi rejects all currently prevalent ideas that define relations between countries, leaders and individuals in the world. He wants to change these ideas by opposing them.

It also means that al-Qadhdhafi does not limit his opposition activities to one country or to a certain region. Instead, he practices his opposition activities throughout the world. If the borders are defined and if there are barriers or certain ideas that would prevent or restrict al-Qadhdhafi's activities, those borders, barriers or ideas must be brought down or removed.

Al-Qadhdhafi rejects the principles of the political game. He refuses to employ recognized, traditional standards that are established by laws and international rules and treaties in dealing with others. He has, for example, his own idea of what constitutes a homeland. It is a very broad idea that overlooks boundaries which are defined here and elsewhere. In fact, in many cases the Libyan leader does not acknowledge the existence of boundaries between his country and other countries. [His perception is] that of one nation and one world.

A French author who wanted to criticize al-Qadhdhafi once wrote, "Al-Qadhdhafi's empire is a sand empire." What the French author meant was that al-Qadhdhafi saw no boundaries when he viewed the Arab world and the world, just as one sees no boundaries when one views a desert area where sand stretches far and wide. The French author also meant that the empire which the Libyan leader envisioned did not exist. It was merely sand or a mirage in the desert.

When al-Qadhdhafi sees himself as the leader of the worldwide opposition, that also means that his understanding of what is "forbidden," "prohibited," or "permissible" differs from the prevailing interpretations of those ideas in the world at the present time. Although the world is based on a code of laws, principles, traditions, beliefs and guidelines that determine what is prohibited and what is permissible, al-Qadhdhafi's opposition to all that makes him feel that he is neither bound by nor subject to these laws, principles, traditions, beliefs and guidelines. In fact, al-Qadhdhafi's actions and opposition are carried out in accordance with his own ideas, despite other people's objections and feelings of uneasiness. Al-Qadhdhafi may think that the world is actually protecting itself with these notions and laws that it set for itself. Therefore, change cannot be brought about in the world by allowing oneself to be bound by these notions and laws and by accepting their definitions of what is prohibited and what is permissible.

But can one be the leader of the opposition worldwide, take public action and reveal all one's plans? Of course not. To carry out such a mission, one has to resort to secrecy in many of one's actions and in one's business and activities as well. One has to resort to ambiguity, and one has to assume some vague positions. Sometimes, one has to suggest that one is moving in a certain direction when one is actually moving in another. One cannot launch an opposition battle worldwide when all one's cards are laid out on the table. In this regard, one can also not achieve all of one's objectives at once. Sometimes, therefore, one has to take a few steps forward and then move backwards many times.

This is what Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi does.

Therefore, some people occasionally say, "He does not know what he wants." But I believe that in his own mind al-Qadhdhafi tells himself, "I know what I want even though others don't."

At any rate al-Qadhdhafi is here, stirring up intense, conflicting emotions. He makes the biggest country in the world wonder in earnest about how it can get rid of him and remove him from power.

The United States is not asking this question in a cavalier manner and in a fit of anger. The fact is that the Reagan administration is seriously thinking about this matter at the present time. AL-MUSTAQBAL has obtained important information about the United States' plans for al-Qadhdhafi. It obtained this information from well-informed American and European sources in Paris and in London.

But before going into this subject, a question has to be raised.

How does al-Qadhdhafi think? What does he actually want? What is his view of questions that are pending, and what is his view of the world? Why is he different from others, and why does he differ with them?

We found that the best person to define al-Qadhdhafi was al-Qadhdhafi himself. In this regard, we found help in a book that was published some time ago in Paris. The book consists of a lengthy interview that was conducted with al-Qadhdhafi by three journalists: Hamid Barradah, a Moroccan citizen; Mark Kravitz, a French citizen; and Mark Whittaker, a U.S. citizen who works for NEWSWEEK Magazine. The book also includes different testimonials and speeches by al-Qadhdhafi. In addition, we also examined a complete file on the Libyan president, and we chose from that file material that would help us describe the kind of man he is.

Opposition in Libya

The first question that comes to mind when one talks about al-Qadhdhafi at any gathering is this: "Why does al-Qadhdhafi oppose everything? Does he do that because he enjoys being in the opposition, or are there compelling reasons for his opposition?"

Let's hear what al-Qadhdhafi has to say.

"Yes, the Arabs are in a state of decline. Where are the Arabs today? They have no presence."

"It is my opinion that the Arab revolution in its entirety has been aborted. It has suffered an extremely grave historic defeat."

"We are dying. We are in a very grave situation. Nothing comes after that but death or the extinction of the Arab nation."

According to al-Qadhdhafi, it is this gloomy picture of the Arab situation, as he sees it, that compels him to assume those opposition postures. On the other side of this gloomy picture we see al-Qadhdhafi talking with much pride about the Libyan experience and what is taking place in his country. Actually, he regards the Libyan experience to be a model that must be followed by others. Let's listen to him [further].

"The voice of Libya is heard loud and clear in the Arab world. What is happening

in Libya reflects the dreams of the Arab masses. Therefore, there is nothing unusual about secret revolutionary committees being formed, nor is it unusual that they operate and are active throughout the Arab world. I believe that the future of the Arab nation is in the hands of the 1st of September Revolution. We have all the means that would enable us to forge this future. Those who want to establish relations with the Arab world have to take Libya into consideration. They have to deal with the Libyan Revolution whose influence is growing daily."

"The new revolution that is taking place in Libya is the revolution of the future because it has been forged by the masses."

"If 'Abd-al-Nasir had been given the opportunity, he would have done in Egypt what we are doing in Libya: he would have established a 'Jamahiriyah;' that is, he would have established the state of the masses."

Then one asks al-Qadhdhafi, "But is there opposition in Libya?"

He replies, "There is opposition in the people's congresses. At these congresses anyone can express and defend an opposition point of view. If the People's Congress is not persuaded by that point of view, then that opposition opinion remains a personal opinion. However, if someone wanted to do away with the power of the people, all the people will oppose him and he will become the enemy of the Libyan people and will be treated accordingly. Opposition means nothing unless there is one group of citizens in power and another outside power that wants to get to power. But when everyone is in power, as is the case in Libya, how can that be opposed?"

"The only way the masses can actually reach power is through the people's congresses and the popular committees."

Al-Qadhdhafi has his own theory on revolutionary action and on how a regime or a ruler can be overthrown. He once made an appeal to Arab revolutionaries in which he said, "You don't need funds and weapons to fight. Those who ask us for funds and weapons do not wish to fight. I had no money and no weapons when I carried out the revolution."

"When a demonstration is started in Egypt, armed policemen go to the place where the demonstration is taking place, and it is brought to an end. It is a mistake to let this happen. Demonstrations must not be stopped. If you are beaten by policemen, beat them back. You say they will throw the demonstrators in prison. Can they put 1 million persons in prison? Of course not! The Egyptian government cannot put 250,000 persons in prison because it does not have room for them."

"I am not calling for the assassination of the Egyptian president. It would be enough for the Egyptian people to take to the streets. If they take to the streets and lie there, the Egyptian president will have to abrogate the Camp David Accords."

Regaining Palestine in 24 Hours

Does al-Qadhdhafi support terrorism? Does he support international terrorism as the United States and some Arab countries have charged?

Al-Qadhdhafi replies, "We support liberation movements in the world. However, Zionist control of the media portrays this as support for terrorism. It is the United States that is a terrorist state because it does everything to plant fear in people's hearts." Al-Qadhdhafi adds, "Any action that utilizes terror and can only be carried out in darkness and secrecy is a tacit admission of its perpetrators' fear of exposure. Accordingly, that action would not be legitimate." He goes on to say, "I stand alongside the revolutionary opposition. I stand beside the man in the street, the oppressed, the exploited and those who have no power, no money and no weapons anywhere in the world."

Is al-Qadhdhafi an unrealistic and an impractical man, and are some of his positions and opinions equally unrealistic and impractical?

A number of people think that, but the Libyan president does not share their opinion even though his views on certain issues and matters are sometimes totally different from the views and logic of others. He once said, for example, "If we can only change Libya's location so we could turn it into a confrontation state with Israel...! We told them that if they could give us a state adjacent to Israel, we will return Palestine to them. We can return Palestine [to the Palestinians] in a matter of 24 hours. They tell us that war with Israel will be protracted and will last from 30 to 80 years. But what is this Israel? It is 10 cities that we can control with airplanes and missiles in a matter of 24 hours."

After Iraq's nuclear reactor was bombed in June 1981, al-Qadhdhafi contacted President Saddam Husayn and a number of Arab leaders, and he made a provocative suggestion to them. He said, "Since the Israelis dared to bomb the Iraqi nuclear reactor, we have a right to bomb the Israeli nuclear reactor in Dimona. The grounds for such an act would be based on the fact that that reactor threatens the security of the Arab nation, and we must destroy it to defend ourselves." Al-Qadhdhafi suggested that a joint Arab action be undertaken to bring that about. However, that suggestion continued to be merely one of the Libyan president's wishes.

Is al-Qadhdhafi actually the United States' bitter enemy? What is his attitude toward Jews and toward Israel? In this regard the Libyan president also has his own theory. He says, "I expect that Arabs, Jews and Americans will one day form an alliance against Zionism, which is the enemy of the Jews and also the Arabs' deadly enemy. Jews are fighting Arab countries against their wishes. Real Jews do not know why they are fighting the Arabs. It is Zionism that is forcing them to wage wars and to fight wars that are not theirs. The destruction of the Zionist state and its military machine will free the Jews from their nightmare." The colonel goes on to say, "It is in the interests of the American people to establish better relations with the Arab people. But that is not in the interests of Zionism, which is making every effort to arouse the hostility of Americans toward Arabs. The despicable role that the American administration is playing in the Middle East is the product of Zionist domination. Zionism is using the United States to achieve its objectives in the Middle East. But the United States may wake up one day and rebel. It would then save itself from its own downfall. Zionism is the common enemy of humanity, and it must be eliminated to save the world. It is on those grounds that Arabs, Americans and Jews are more concerned with this matter than anyone else is because they have been victimized by Zionism. They are the ones who have been dying and losing every day so that the Zionist state can survive."

Some analysts are saying that al-Qadhdhafi has set for himself many tasks that are beyond the capabilities of any individual. He wants to do away with Israel; he wants to change conditions in the Arab world; and he wants to make changes in the world. Therefore, he is moving in all directions and sometimes moving in all these directions simultaneously. He does not concentrate on one issue or one objective. He uses different kinds of weapons and methods in an attempt to reach his targets and achieve his objectives. He is also obstinate, and he does not admit failure, even though he will sometimes retreat or change "his method" in an attempt to achieve a specific objective in another way.

Perhaps the clearest examples in this regard are these two: al-Qadhdhafi's posture toward Egypt and his posture toward plans to unite with other Arab countries.

--As far as Egypt is concerned, the Libyan president has been trying for years to bring about change in that country. He has been zeroing in on that target and using different means to achieve it. The same holds true for Sudan.

--As far as plans to unite with other Arab countries are concerned, al-Qadhdhafi has not given up on achieving unity with any other Arab country despite the fact that at least seven such attempts have failed. Al-Qadhdhafi got his wish when he signed an agreement to unite with Morocco last August. In this regard Muhammad al-Masmudi, former minister of foreign affairs in Tunisia, one of al-Qadhdhafi's friends and Libya's future ambassador to the United Nations relates [the following]: "I told al-Qadhdhafi once, 'You tried several times and failed to achieve unity with revolutionary regimes. Why don't you try [your luck] with conservative regimes?' The colonel laughed and told me, 'Why not indeed?' He tried to reach such an agreement with King Hasan II, and he signed an agreement to unite with Morocco. This agreement is still in effect despite U.S. pressures on Morocco to abrogate it and despite the fact that there are differences of opinion between King Hasan and al-Qadhdhafi about some Arab political matters."

If al-Qadhdhafi is taking action throughout the world, supporting revolutionary movements or movements for change in a large number of countries, or if he is trying to acquire nuclear weapons at any price, his principal efforts seem to be concentrated in the Arab world and on the African continent. The colonel places considerable importance on his African role. In this regard he says, "What we offered Africa is much greater than what France and the United States offered this continent." Al-Qadhdhafi thinks that he, unlike the United States and France, has a legitimate role to play on the African continent. For example, this is what he says about Chad: "The situation in Chad concerns Libya and its security more than it concerns any other country in the world." This statement may help us understand why al-Qadhdhafi is adamant about his role in Chad.

U.S. Backing for an Egyptian Operation

Are al-Qadhdhafi's convictions and the objectives he has set for himself enough cause for the American administration to consider him "the United States' number one enemy?" Do these convictions and objectives warrant U.S. efforts to overthrow his regime? U.S. sources state that the Reagan administration's opposition to al-Qadhdhafi is greater than that of any other previous American administration. The Reagan administration is fighting al-Qadhdhafi because it considers

him "the prime mover of international terrorism" and because he wants to change a number of Arab and African regimes that are considered "moderate" or "friendly" to the West. The Reagan administration is fighting al-Qadhdhafi because he wants to destabilize the African continent and because he is working against western policy there. It is fighting al-Qadhdhafi because he has tried and is trying to assassinate a number of Arab and western leaders and because he supports revolutionary movements in a large number of countries in the world. This is briefly the American point of view on the Libyan president.

The question that comes up in this regard is this: Are there in fact serious and workable American plans to attempt to change the present Libyan regime?

In this regard AL-MUSTAQBAL reveals an important secret. Well-informed western sources in London told AL-MUSTAQBAL that Egypt had made an official request to the Reagan administration to back a joint Egyptian-Sudanese military operation against al-Qadhdhafi. These sources made it clear to AL-MUSTAQBAL that a few days before al-Sadat was assassinated--he was assassinated on the 6th of October 1981--a high-level Egyptian delegation had visited Washington with an urgent letter from President al-Sadat to President Reagan. Reagan received the chairman of the delegation and al-Sadat's letter was delivered to him. In that letter al-Sadat said that he and Sudan's President Ja'far Numayri had agreed to carry out a major joint military operation in an attempt to overthrow the Libyan regime. The operation would start with a strike against Libyan troops in Chad, and it would include strikes against certain locations on Libyan territory. Al-Sadat expressed concern in his letter that the Soviets may intervene militarily to back Libya, particularly if Libya were to ask for their intervention. Al-Sadat asked Reagan to make an official promise to protect Egypt from any Soviet attack. Informed western sources have assured AL-MUSTAQBAL that Reagan made that official promise to the Egyptian delegation and that he asked that it be relayed to al-Sadat. Reagan also encouraged Egypt to carry out that military operation.

Al-Sadat was assassinated a few days after that visit, and Egypt's military plans were shelved.

Does that American promise which was given to al-Sadat still stand?

AL-MUSTAQBAL posed this question to a prominent American expert on U.S.-Libyan affairs who resides in London. He said that he believed that that promise has recently been "revived" and that the Reagan administration appears to be more willing now than ever before to back an Arab military operation against al-Qadhdhafi.

That expert revealed to AL-MUSTAQBAL that in 1981 Reagan tried to persuade his European allies that al-Qadhdhafi posed a threat to western interests in several areas of the world. Reagan wanted to reach an agreement with his European allies on a unified American-European plan to fight and undermine al-Qadhdhafi and reduce his influence so he can be overthrown. But Reagan was not able to persuade the Europeans of his point of view. At that time the American administration drew up a plan to isolate and undermine al-Qadhdhafi. That plan, which was put into action late in 1981 after al-Sadat's assassination, included the following points:

--Breaking diplomatic relations with Libya by closing the Libyan People's Office in Washington. It is known that U.S. diplomats were pulled out of Libya under the Carter administration.

--Asking all Americans to leave Libya.

--Launching a major media campaign emphasizing the fact that al-Qadhdhafi is a dangerous man, an international outlaw and a backer of international terrorism.

--Backing Arab and African regimes that oppose al-Qadhdhafi.

--Contacting forces and organizations that oppose the Libyan regime and attempting to unify their activities abroad.

--Flexing military muscle more than once to show that the United States is "determined" to use force.

--Imposing economic penalties by banning the importation of Libyan oil and prohibiting the export of advanced U.S. technology to Libya.

In addition, the U.S. administration made several "provisional plans" for military operations against Libya. It also looked into the possibilities of charging U.S. intelligence agencies with the task of attempting to get rid of Libya's present leaders.

This U.S. expert thinks that the Reagan administration's hostility to al-Qadhdhafi has recently resurfaced. That expert says that U.S. officials suggested to the French that they work together to coordinate their activities against al-Qadhdhafi after obstacles regarding Libya's withdrawal from Chad came to the fore. However, the French turned down that proposal and told the Americans that they intended to continue their dialogue with the Libyan president and their attempt to reach a political understanding with him. That expert also made it clear that the Reagan administration has been trying to persuade all the European countries to impose a "unified western economic embargo" on Libya. But that attempt has so far failed. There are, for example, 8,000 British citizens working in Libya even though diplomatic relations between the two countries have been broken.

Would the presence of more than 2,000 U.S. citizens working in Libya, especially in the oil business, discourage the Reagan administration from carrying out a direct or indirect military operation against that country?

Informed American and French sources think that the presence of U.S. citizens in Libya would not discourage the Reagan administration from carrying out some kind of operation--if it wants to. The reason for this is that Washington did ask U.S. citizens to leave Libya several times, but those people declined to leave. This means that they will have to put up with the consequences if a confrontation between the United States and Libya should take place.

At any rate, al-Qadhdhafi is still a controversial figure; he still arouses intense, conflicting emotions. To many people many aspects of his policies will continue to be incomprehensible and baffling.

Indeed, no one can write about Mu'ammār al-Qadhdhafi but Mu'ammār al-Qadhdhafi himself.

REQUEST TO RESCHEDULE DEBTS NOTED

Beirut AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 30, 26 Nov 84 p 12

[Text]

Morocco is to seek a further round of foreign debt rescheduling talks and meanwhile expects to default on a five-billion-dollar repayment due next year, according to reports from Rabat. The finance minister, Abdellatif Jouahari, announced hopes for the new rescheduling during his budget speech last week. After the budget announcement, Mr Jouahari went to Washington to lobby for American government and IMF support for the new repayment schedule.

With total foreign debt estimated at nearly \$13bn, Morocco was expected to repay \$2.5bn in principal and \$2.5bn interest next year under the terms of the existing IMF-agreed repayment programme. However, officials said this would probably be impossible, citing the severe drought, the war in the Western Sahara and a sharp slump in exports as the main causes. Other problems include the high value of the US dollar and protectionist policies by trading partners.

In his budget address, Mr Jouahari said Morocco had "saved" \$1.8bn in foreign exchange by rescheduling official (government-to-government) debt repayment for the 18 months up to December 31st, 1984.

He acknowledged that rescheduling negotiations for more than \$500mn in commercial debts were still held up by foreign banks' insistence on Moroccan central bank guarantees. Morocco has always argued that the central bank's constitution prevents it from offering loan guarantees. Meanwhile, the timetable for negotiations, which were supposed to end by December 1983, has slipped by more than 12 months.

Mr Abdellatif said he would not increase sales taxes, that consumer subsidies on foodstuffs would be continued and that basic salaries would be raised by ten per cent. Estimated expenditure for next year will rise to nearly 50bn dirhams (about \$5.4bn), while the budget deficit will be reduced by four per cent, to 7.3bn dirhams (\$790mn).

CSO: 4500/31

PRESIDENT CHALLENGES ASSUMPTION OF POWER BY ISLAMIC MILITANTS

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 346, 29 Oct 84 pp 14, 15

[Article by 'Umran Muhammad: "The Sudan: A Palace Coup?"]

[Text] Reports received from the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, indicate that the struggle in the republican palace is heating up among the wings competing to be at the head of power, in particular the al-Turabi group and the leaders of the Socialist Union who remained close to power and continued to be connected to it since the coup of 25 May 1969. This struggle was announced, "in part," in the course of the statements President Numayri gave to the local and foreign press. These statements were in effect a reshuffling of the balance of power centers in the Sudanese government so that no side of the scale would outweigh the other and no center would take over all the sources of influence, especially since the political activity against the government has reached its peak most recently.

The details of what one could call the "palace coup" go back to the "advice" which the Socialist Union, the government's political organization, presented to President Numayri, embodied in the gravity of his continued support of the power center represented by Hasan al-Turabi, the president's foreign policy affairs advisor. In explaining the gravity of this support, they based themselves on the success of al-Turabi's group in supporting its position in power and at the same time exploiting this situation in a manner threatening the interests of the other parties sharing power. They also based themselves on a number of occurrences which have taken place, among them attempts to slip arms to al-Turabi's group, which were discovered after the automobile accident which befell a leader of al-Turabi's group, Abu Jundayri; AL-DUSTUR presented the details of this incident in a previous issue.

The date of the second occurrence goes back to when the Islamic conference on the application of Islamic law was held in Khartoum last September, after which the struggle between the long-standing figures in the Socialist Union and the al-Turabi group intensified. The long-standing figures in the Socialist Union consider that al-Turabi's group is planning to take over the Socialist Union, relying, in doing so, on the strength of its position in the union. For this reason, it took over the Islamic conference, with a format which would serve its interests. It sent invitations to attend the

conference to bodies which were linked to al-Turabi's group by special ties, and during the conference dubious meetings took place with some members of the participating delegations, especially with the Pakistani group, Jami'at-e Islami, and the delegations coming from the Arab Gulf; in addition, the group's dominance was asserted over the studies presented to the conference, all of which were made to seem as if they were its achievement, while it obscured the role of the other center in the Socialist Union.

The third of these occurrences was embodied in the al-Turabi group's dominance of Islamic financial organizations in a manner serving the interests of the al-Turabi group, offering no chance to withdraw from them after they had become involved with the group. If Numayri had happened to withdraw from the Islamic financial organizations, that would have the effect of creating a shock which would add to the aggravation of the economic crisis.

For these reasons, President Numayri held the palace coup, in an attempt to create the desired balance in his government. He used the same formulas as those the al-Turabi group had used in its campaign against the other power centers. On the one hand, he made a statement, giving warning, in an interview the French newspaper LE MONDE held with him, that he was aware of the al-Turabi group's attempts to arm itself militarily, and stating, in these words, "I am in the situation of Imam 'Ali ibn Abu Talib, who had a special intuition and knew who was going to kill him, but refrained from arresting him out of respect for Islamic law." He went on to say, "I see people around me who want to assassinate me, or are spreading rumors about the collapse of the regime from close at hand. I have taken adequate measures, but I know that al-Sadat followed the same procedure but was assassinated nonetheless."

He told the Sudanese newspaper AL-SAHAFAH "Charges have been directed against certain organizations, which have been said to be parallel to the Socialist Union." He went on to say, "That is wrong, because by virtue of the law there cannot be any organization parallel to the Socialist Union." Numayri mentioned that he had ordered an investigation into the activity of some organizations, and accused al-Turabi's group, which controls the Islamic financial institutions, of corruption, stating "They gave aid and loans to people who support them, and these loans and aid went in behalf of some persons who in the course of 2 years have turned from nothing into millionaires."

He mentioned that al-Turabi's group had succeeded in crushing big merchants and businessmen who did not belong to the group, with the goal of extending their dominance into the area of the economy. In this respect, they used the emergency courts and created new laws to harrass the owners of local companies who did not cooperate with them, putting many of them into prison and holding onto their property.

These statements which President Numayri made have been followed by other steps aimed at preserving the identity of his regime, creating balance between al-Turabi's center and the other power centers in the Socialist Union that are competing to establish their presence in authority, and at the same time strengthening the center that is opposed to al-Turabi's group. He praised the minister of his personal affairs, Baha'-al-Din Idris, who had

been removed from the palace under allusions from al-Turabi's group, and he brought back the former minister of the interior Kamal Hasan Ahmad after he had been dismissed as a result of a charge the same group had made against him for interfering in the affairs of the emergency courts; he was appointed deputy chief of the State Security Agency and minister of state. Numayri also appointed his former vice president Muhammad Abu-al-Qasim Ibrahim chairman of the Higher Council for Sports and Youth Care, to stand against al-Turabi's group, as a step toward being promoted to a higher position again.

In facing these appointments and statements, al-Turabi's group has preferred to bend before the storm. Its reaction could be summarized in the statement which Ahmad 'Abd-al-Rahman, the secretary of the political and economic affairs committee and a prominent leader of al-Turabi's group, made when he pointed out "The Moslem Brothers, al-Turabi's group, have no organization inside the country, and no such organization would be permitted to emerge alongside the Sudanese Socialist Union." Hasan al-Turabi also confirmed this. Ahmad 'Abd-al-Rahman, in his comment on Numayri's campaign against al-Turabi's group, went on to say, "We in the political organization, from the premise of our interaction with the masses, give complete attention to all observations and criticisms and will remedy them." Ahmad 'Abd-al-Rahman attributed his group's activity to the political organization's encouragement of the presence of a number of ideas and the participation of various elements within it; however, he did not deny the charge of corruption which was directed at the al-Turabi group. The developments in the chapters of the palace coup have not yet been completed, since expectations indicate that the center opposed to al-Turabi's group demands reciprocity and, just as al-Turabi's group accused its competitors of corruption and calumniated them in the past, the opponents have also presented proof of the corruption of al-Turabi's group. This is the proof to which President Numayri referred, but not all aspects of it have been revealed. He just referred to the presence of corruption in the Islamic financial institutions, and the appearance of new rich persons in the ranks of al-Turabi's group. The question remains:

Why hasn't Numayri taken new decisions, in spite of the charges he has directed at al-Turabi's group?

The issue is in essence no more than a "political warning," in Hasan al-Turabi's words. In addition, the issue, as Numayri wills it, amounts to no more than strengthening one power center against another through the formula he followed in the course of the previous years of his regime, since at times he continued to support one of the parties to his regime, then would turn against it to support another one. This has been his style in maintaining equilibrium. The talk about corruption is the common denominator among the parties to power. When it rises up against one party, that is an incentive to the other party to start its counterattack.

RETURN OF MILITARY FIGURE AS COUNTERWEIGHT TO MOSLEM BROTHERS

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 80, 20 Oct 84 pp 22, 23

[Article: "He Was Removed from Power Because of the Moslem Brothers and Is Returning to Power To Cope with Their Increasing Influence: Return of the Non-Prodigal Son"]

[Text] President Ja'far Numayri is indeed a man of surprises.

Analysts hardly finish analyzing a decree or step that surprises them, which had not been part of their calculations or estimates, when they are surprised by a new step which might explain the meaning of the previous one and might overturn the political balance or pave the way for a new series of surprises. Entering into direct negotiations with the rebels in the south and reaching the famous Addis Ababa agreement which put a limit to the civil war in March 1972, holding his "secret" meeting with al-Sadiq al-Mahdi in Port Sudan in early 1977, and declaring the national reconciliation less than a year after al-Sadiq was sentenced to death in absentia for participating in the attempted invasion of July 1976 could be part of his type of historic surprises. There was also his declaration of the series of Islamic acts of legislation by republican orders in September 1983.

While these decrees were among the sorts of "historic" event which have deeply influenced the modern history of the Sudan, there are dozens of stands and decrees which have surprised observers and have had their important repercussions on the game of politics and the realm of "the management of alliances" in the Sudan.

The most recent of President Numayri's decrees, which one could consider of this latter type, was his decree to bring Maj Abu-al-Qasim Muhammad Ibrahim back to the political stage through the gateway of the national sports and youth care council, of which he assigned him to be chairman.

Through this post, Maj Abu-al-Qasim will become a central minister directly subordinate to the president and enjoying membership in the president's council, which includes all the ministers, advisors and leaders of the Sudanese Socialist Union. Through it, as well, the picture of Maj Abu-al-Qasim is once again occupying the pages of the newspapers, especially the sports

pages by which Sudanese are greatly enchanted. His name is also returning to the radio news bulletins and television sets after a break of almost 6 years, in which the veils of deliberate oblivion had dropped over Abu-al-Qasim's name after he had filled people's ears and eyes as first vice president to Numayri, as secretary general of the Sudanese Socialist Union, the chairman of the National Security Council and more important than that a spearhead in all the battles of the 25 May revolution, starting with the events of Aba Island in March 1971 and passing through the Communist coup in July 1972, the coup attempt by Lt Col Hasan Husayn in September 1975 and the attempted invasion in July 1976. After all these attempts, Maj Abu-al-Qasim, whatever his position was, would be seen on the top of a tank or at the head of a detachment of troops, holding a machine gun, since he liked, and probably still likes, to be at the heart of events.

Abu-al-Qasim's departure from all his positions as first vice president, secretary general of the Sudanese Socialist Union and chairman of the National Security Council and the appointment of Lt Gen 'Abd-al-Majid Hamid Khalil, who at that time was chief of staff, in his place, had been expected in many circles, since it occurred in the atmosphere of national reconciliation, the entry of al-Sadiq al-Mahdi and Dr Hasan al-Turabi, leader of the Moslem Brothers, into the political bureau of the Sudanese Socialist Union and the emergence of new variables on the stage of political action in the Sudan which called for a transformation in tendencies and a change in positions of leadership.

Abu-al-Qasim had been destined to leave because he did not seem enthusiastic about the national reconciliation at the beginning, and some people in the Socialist Union who were opposed, or at least cold, to President Numayri's initiative rallied around him in what was known as the struggle between the "old" and "the people coming up." Although Abu-al-Qasim corrected his position after that, to welcome the reconciliation, and took the initiative of visiting al-Sadiq al-Mahdi in his home, then received him in his own home when the latter returned the visit, the Socialist Union continued to be accused of failing to take measures and steps which would result in supporting and developing the national reconciliation.

Conversely, Lt Gen 'Abd-al-Majid was acceptable to the people coming up, because of his moderate positions and lack of connection with the revolution from the beginning, since he had been dismissed from the armed forces at the beginning of the May era then brought back again. It would perhaps have been possible for Abu-al-Qasim to return to the political stage more quickly had he not taken a step which many people held against him, when he ran for the presidency against President Numayri in the second term (1978).

This was the "blunder of a lifetime" for Abu-al-Qasim, since it was interpreted as a reaction to his departure from power and an attempt to weaken President Numayri personally, and he created a state of dissension in the political organization. However, Abu-al-Qasim did not continue for long in this "dangerous game," and withdrew from the election campaign as soon as it began, after he had recorded a position which continued to be held against him for a long time.

Three years ago, Abu-al-Qasim tried again to return to the political stage without the president's decision, since while President Numayri was absent in the United States he ran for the position of secretary of the Sudanese Socialist Union for the Khartoum central region and actually won. Although the area whose command he assumed politically was just one of four areas in Khartoum Province and one of 10 regions in all the areas of the Sudan, it has political importance since it contains most of the ministries, universities and higher institutes and accounts for important political weight in Khartoum Province.

Abu-al-Qasim soon lost his new position, which he had acquired through his own effort, when President Numayri came back from the trip to the United States on convalescence, declared the abrogation of the results of the elections, dissolved all the organizations of the Sudanese Socialist Union in Khartoum Province and removed some of its members on the charge of "forming a bloc."

In spite of the sorrow that decree caused him, Abu-al-Qasim did not cease to engage in political activity at lower levels and in the public meetings the Sudanese Socialist Union organized.

When the Moslem Brothers' activity increased following the recent acts of Islamic legislation, and the trend toward amendment of the constitution gained prominence, Abu-al-Qasim stood up to the new trend at all the meetings held in Khartoum to discuss matters related to the Islamic platform. The peak of his intensified activity came when he volunteered to go to the People's Assembly, which had met in the form of a committee, called on people who were interested in public affairs to take part in its activities, launched a severe attack against the trend to amend the constitution and called on the members to adhere to the current phrasing of the constitution. His statement was received by heated applause, and in fact was very influential in stopping the process of amending the constitution, prompting Yasin 'Umar al-Imam, a leader of the Moslem Brothers and member of the assembly, to pick a fight with Abu-al-Qasim after the session ended and direct invective at him; had the latter not held his nerves, the matter would have ended in a fist fight.

There is no doubt that information on this "quarrel" was conveyed to President Numayri, along with all the movements made by Abu-al-Qasim Muhammad Ibrahim, who had become part of the vanguard of the people resisting the Moslem Brothers' activity.

One can understand the return of the non-prodigal son of the revolution to the political stage as minister in the central government in this overall context, since the position to which Abu-al-Qasim belongs, and a comparison between it and his previous position, which put him directly after President Numayri in the government and the political organization, are not important, at this stage; rather, what is important is the principle of the return and the restoration of prominence to Abu-al-Qasim Muhammad Ibrahim's name in these circumstances specifically.

Abu-al-Qasim was anxious to assert his support for the Islamic platform and took part in the "pledge of allegiance" to President Numayri. He was foremost among the people pledging allegiance in the Sudanese Socialist Union, and thus stressed the distinctiveness of his position on the Moslem Brothers, lest that be interpreted as opposition to the Islamic orientation. Thus President Numayri's decree bringing Abu-al-Qasim back to power could be considered a blow against the Moslem Brothers and a serious warning to them that the "old timers" were present and that the Brothers were not the only ones who could lead the Islamic orientation.

President Numayri's vexation with the Moslem Brothers appeared clearly after the march of "the millions" which greeted the Islamic conference recently held in Khartoum on the occasion of the passage of a year since the application of Islamic legislation. The Brothers tried to steal the efforts others, especially the Socialist Union, had made in organizing the march, attributing it to themselves and portraying the mass mobilization which was united in this march as constituting their base and their supporters, thus creating means for putting pressure on President Numayri on grounds that "the street was on their side."

In press statements which followed the conference and in the proceedings of the central command of the Sudanese Socialist Union on the first of this month, President Numayri asserted that "there are no parties in the Sudan" and said that if the organization of the Moslem Brothers existed, it was an illegal organization and everyone who belonged to it would be subjected to prosecution by the law.

In this sort of atmosphere, Abu-al-Qasim Muhammad Ibrahim is returning as one of the symbols of the 25 May revolution and one of its most provocative leaders, one who has been known for his viciousness in defending it in word and by arms.

There is no doubt that the return of Abu-al-Qasim will be extremely disturbing to the Moslem Brothers, especially since it has occurred in conjunction with the return of Maj Gen M Kamal Hasan Ahmad as deputy chief of the State Security Agency, the position which he occupied for a number of years before being appointed minister of internal affairs -- less than a month after which he was dismissed on the charge of intervening to influence an emergency court.

After the issuance of the decree dismissing him from the ministry, it was established that the charge had not been correct and that he had not interfered in the affairs of the court; however, his innocence was discovered belatedly, and it took 4 months for the mistake to be corrected and for Maj Gen Kamal to return to the security agency at the rank of minister, as deputy to its chief, Maj Gen 'Umar Muhammad al-Tayyib, the first vice president.

Maj Gen Kamal Hasan Ahmad rose gradually through the ranks of the police in the course of more than 20 years. He specialized in security affairs and was responsible for "the security of the republican palace" before 25 May. In the first years following the revolution, he was appointed to the United Arab Emirates, where he helped establish some of its security agencies and went back to the Sudan to work in the State Security Agency.

Maj Gen Kamal has a long history of prosecuting the Moslem Brothers, and there is no doubt that they were happier when he was absent than they have been now that he has come back.

Matters in the Sudan indicate that the influence of the Moslem Brothers is becoming severely reduced. However, will the return of Abu-al-Qasim alone, or the return of Kamal Hasan Ahmad, be enough, or might other symbols of the 25 May revolution return to the political stage, for instance Maj Abu-al-Qasim Hashim, Maj Zayn-al-'Abidin Ahmad 'Abd-al-Qadir, Badr-al-Din Sulayman and other people who had withdrawn into the shadows with the emergence of the Moslem Brothers' star?

Perhaps the months to come will answer this question and many others.

11887

CSO: 4504/99

DISSIDENT JOURNAL UNDERSCORES ABSENCE OF CIVIL LIBERTIES

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 345, 22 Oct 84 pp 59, 60

[Article: "Removal of the State of Emergency and Imposition of a Permanent State of Emergency!"]

[Text] On 29 September, under the pressure of the vengeance of the people, Numayri was compelled to end the state of emergency which had lasted 5 months, since April of this year. His justifications for imposing the state of emergency were most laughable and offensive to reality, since the justification was that the Sudan's enemies domestically and abroad had joined ranks to attack the Sudan and that sloth, chaos and moral corruption had become widespread on the domestic front, while the basic reason for imposing the state of emergency was merely a hopeless attempt to stop the wave of ferocious strikes which had swept over the Sudan, starting with the famous strike in the judiciary and the strike by doctors and accountants.

While the justification for imposing the state of emergency was laughable, the justification for removing it inspired greater ridicule, since Numayri announced that the state of emergency had been lifted because it had realized its goals, which were to end corruption and moral degeneracy, of which Sudanese society had now become cleansed and purged. (Numayri had mentioned in his speech before the members of the Islamic conference "The state of emergency was declared not to kill an incoming enemy or to repel a foreign military invasion but to protect the society from persons scheming within it and people violating its values, morals and security.")

In a conversation he had with the central command, [he said] "Our platform will be to act firmly and deter everyone who is slothful in performing duties and eliminating and extirpating every obstacle and impediment. God is greater than the enemies of the nation and the people who scheme among us through hypocrisy and dissimulation. God is greater than the people who backslide from the purity of the life we are experiencing now."

It has been observed that 'Ali Shamu, the minister of information, in his comment on the elimination of the state of emergency, requested the Arab, African and international media, which had raised a commotion when the state of emergency was declared, to give corresponding attention to the period

following the elimination of the state of emergency. He gave reasons which were different from those Numayri had mentioned for imposing the state of emergency, namely evasion of payment of taxes and customs, enrichment at the expense of the people and the blatant commission of scandalous acts. He then mentioned that he had now rid society of these forms of pollution and that discipline had been preserved, leading to the birth of good conduct, which, in itself, constituted a basis for the application of new legislation.

Numayri followed his statement with the declaration that the elimination of the state of emergency would be followed by the introduction of radical modifications in the judiciary system which would make that a model for the realization of justice while not disregarding people's interests. He followed that declaration with the abrogation of the 1983 law on the judiciary authority, which had been issued last year as part of the series of what was called "the legislative revolution," and the issuance of a new law called the judiciary authority law for the Islamic year 1405, by virtue of which 12 criminal courts were formed in the national capital, Khartoum, along with a court of appeals and criminal contestation. That was followed by the appointment of a number of judges to various judiciary agencies and the appointment of the chief of the judiciary, and for the first time a new ministry of state was created for criminal affairs.

People contemplating the new judiciary appointments will immediately discover the deception in the elimination of the emergency law; the new chief of the judiciary, Fu'ad al-Amin, is the chief of the former emergency court, which is called "the courts of decisive justice," and the judges who head the judiciary agencies and other courts are merely judges of former emergency courts. Indeed, worse than that, the judges of the criminal courts which have been formed are themselves judges of the court of appeals which reviews appeals and criminal contestations against these judges' rulings. Thus, the judges concerned have become the source of rulings and contestations. They issue rulings as they review the contestations raised against them; I swear that this is something amazing and violates the simplest rules of justice and the law.

What truly inspires amazement is that these judges have mostly overstepped the barriers of competence and seniority, outstripping people who are more competent and senior than them; the reasons, without a doubt, are well known.

Thus, the emergency courts and emergency judges have been assimilated into the heart of the judiciary system in a manner which has given the system the coloring of Islamic law.

What is striking in the new law on the judiciary authority is that it has shortened the periods of criminal appeals in an unprecedented manner; there is no doubt that the results of this will be anguish for people who have suffered and people requesting appeals, as is clear from the following provisions:

Anyone may submit an appeal to the court of criminal appeals in the national capital within 3 days of the date of the issuance of any ruling or decree issued against him by any criminal court.

The indictment will have a corresponding right of appeal within 3 days of the date of issuance of the ruling or decree.

The court of appeals may automatically request any ruling issued by any criminal court, in order to examine it and issue any decrees it considers just.

The court of appeals will have all the powers granted to the appeal authorities by virtue of the law on criminal procedures.

The rulings of the court of appeals will be issued by a majority opinion.

The rulings of the court of appeals will be issued in a period not to exceed 10 days of the date on which the papers are presented to it.

The court of appeals will be in charge of making recommendations to the president regarding death sentences and sentences of stoning before they are submitted for approval.

There is no doubt that shortening the appeal periods to just 3 days after the date of the issuance of the ruling is an extremely serious matter and gives proof that people's rights, in respect to the most serious thing that affects them, the right of judiciary contestation, have been manipulated.

The new law on the judiciary authority contains a change in the number of supreme court judges, who now number 35 instead of the 15 under the law which has been abrogated. A higher administrative and administrative appeals court has been formed (the strange thing is that the court of administrative full justice still exists, although it was established in accordance with the emergency bill and it was mandatory that it be abrogated as soon as the state of emergency was lifted and the emergency bill ceased to apply).

It appears obvious that the new law has shown a suspicious concern for the criminal department, specifying, most peculiarly, that the criminal judge of first instance have the rank of judge of the supreme court!

The office of the public prosecutor, and the public prosecutor, have suffered the greatest affront that could be directed against them. The appointment of a minister of state for criminal affairs in the office of the public prosecutor has resulted in stripping the public prosecutor of all his legal powers and made him just an employee, like others, lacking in authority or power, while his powers have been delegated to the minister of state for criminal affairs as follows:

The power to investigate and examine stipulated in the law on the public prosecutor.

Representation of the indictment before the criminal courts.

The provision of advice for government agencies on criminal matters.

The submission of cases to criminal courts upon completion of the investigation.

The effort to reclaim public property which is appropriated in illegal manner by any action in violation of the law.

Supervision of the prosecutors' offices in all regions of the Sudan. In particular, he may:

Form prosecutors' offices in the regions among advisors subordinate to the public prosecutor or officers of the military forces, by delegation from their units.

Delegate heads of legal departments in the regions and the national capital to engage in criminal matters before the courts.

Seek the aid of any body or person in order to do his job as thoroughly as possible.

Coordinate with other agencies.

The minister of state in the office of the public prosecutor will, in coordination with the other competent agencies, conduct investigations, provided that he have superior authority regarding all criminal matters, except for the courts' decrees.

All the cases and summonses with which the offices of the prosecutor of full justice became involved before 21 June 1985 will come into the possession of the minister of state in the office of the public prosecutor in all areas of the Sudan, including the summonses which are before the court of administrative full justice, and he will immediately submit them to the competent courts.

Until members are appointed to the offices of the public prosecutor in the national capital and the regions, all people who were working in the offices of the prosecutor of full justice in the national capital before 21 June 1985 will proceed to work as aides to the minister of state in the court of the public prosecutor as if they had been appointed in this capacity.

Stripping the public prosecutor of his powers in this manner is only [acknowledgment of] a fait accompli; the public prosecutor and his office have become just an empty structure and because they have lost their courage no longer have opinions on the laws which are issued. A contemptuous order has been conveyed to the prosecutor and his office to the effect that laws will be issued by advisors to the office of the president and no attention will be given to the public prosecutor's role regarding this. However, this has been a natural result of the reduction and diminution of the position of the public prosecutor and the people who occupied it to the point where it has become a model of lack of courage and the failure to defend the rulings of the law.

The law has long been degraded, laws detrimental to and repressive of people's freedoms have long been issued by that office, and it has not had a credible voice.

In conclusion, the abuse of the judiciary system and manipulation of laws which are taking place now strike at the heart of everyone who feels compassion and concern for the law, and it is clear that the game of changing the laws and changing the judges and everyone who stands up to the [courts of] full justice will not stop at any limit. As Numayri said, addressing the Islamic conference in Khartoum, 20 articles of legislation were issued in the first year of the application of Islamic law and the rest will undoubtedly come. This is only a small part of the game of contemptuous conduct toward the law and the judiciary.

11887

CS0: 4504/99

REPORT ON JORDANIAN-SOVIET TRADE

JN130819 Amman THE JERUSALEM STAR in English 13-19 Dec 84 p 18

[Mideast Report: "Soviet-Jordanian Trade Improves"]

[Text] More than 21 years have passed since the day the USSR and the Hashe-mite Kingdom of Jordan established diplomatic relations.

According to King Husayn and many other Arab leaders, the Soviet Union's approach to attaining a comprehensive peaceful settlement in the Middle East and the principles of such a settlement approved by the Arab summit conference in Fes in 1982 essentially coincide.

The comprehensive and just settlement can be provided by an international conference on the Middle East, mentioned in a new Soviet proposal of last July 29. The idea of such a conference was supported by the Jordanian leadership.

Stronger friendship and better mutual understanding between the Soviet and Jordanian peoples are greatly promoted by sound and ever-deepening mutual contacts in the field of culture, art, science and sports. Special mention must be made of bilateral trade and economic relations. The best results have been achieved in the establishment of a power grid in some regions of Jordan, and the construction of vocational training centers with Soviet technical assistance. Experience in cooperation would enable the two sides to diversify its forms and even sign agreements on the construction of economic projects in Jordan on a buy-back basis.

Trade between the USSR and Jordan has a lengthy record. In January 1969, the two countries signed a trade agreement thereby laying a sound basis under their trade contacts. In 1971, the USSR opened its trade mission in Jordan. The two sides have granted each other most-favored-nation status.

The Soviet Union exports a broad range of commodities to Jordan. In addition to traditional exports, it delivers lumber and timber, ferrous metal and rolling stock, glass and cables, machines and equipment, electrotechnical instruments, and household appliances. It should be said, however, that the level of trade and economic relations between the two countries is lagging far below the potentials of the partners.

CSO: 4400/46

FINANCE MINISTER'S BUDGET STATEMENT

JN132010 Amman Television Service in Arabic 1830 GMT 13 Dec 84

[Draft budget law for 1985 read by Finance Minister Hanna 'Awdah at House of Representatives in Amman on 13 December--video recorded]

[Text] In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate.

Mr Speaker, esteemed house members: I am honored to submit to your esteemed house the draft budget law for the 1985 fiscal year, which represents this government's working program for the coming year. In preparing this program, the government bases its action on firmly established facts and principles and the directives on whose bases it assumed its constitutional responsibilities and to which it was committed before your house.

The year 1985 is characterized by being the final stage of the current 5-year plan, which has contributed to strengthening and expanding the economic structure of the national economy. Moreover, 1985 will witness intensive efforts to draw up the third 5-year plan for economic and social development for 1986-1990.

The preparation of this budget comes at a time of fluctuating and unstable economic and monetary circumstances in the world. Some major industrialized countries are witnessing economic revival while others continue to suffer from low growth rates and increasing unemployment. Meanwhile, the majority of the developing countries continues to suffer from difficult economic conditions due to a deterioration in their international trade conditions and a decline in the demand for their products and in the flow of money into these countries. Subsequently, these countries are suffering from a chronic deficit in their balance of payments and from a sharp rise in their foreign debts. The position of these countries was further aggravated by the increase in the dollar exchange rates while interest rates also remained high.

The Jordanian economy was inevitably affected by these world economic conditions because of its varied relations with the rest of the world countries, whether with regard to import, export, or money flow and because of its relations with the Arab oil exporting countries that were affected by a reduction in their revenues and the international economic recession. If we also consider the regional circumstances represented in the Israeli invasion and the Iraq-Iran war, we realize the magnitude of the challenge which the economy has to face as a result of unavoidable circumstances.

Jordan's firm stand along the longest line of confrontation with the Israeli enemy, because of its geographical position and its historical and emotional affiliation with the Palestinian issue, imposes on it increasing burdens in order to bolster the Palestinian people's steadfastness on their national soil and in their confrontation of the occupation authorities' repressive practices, [word indistinct] are represented by expulsion, colonization, and usurpation of land and natural resources. Despite the limited means available to this country under these conditions and circumstances, the Jordanian economy managed to adapt to the new developments and to achieve satisfactory growth and relative stability during 1984. Preliminary figures available indicate that the overall growth rate of local produce reached 4 percent at fixed prices during 1984. This rate was arrived at after deducting the slight increase in the record cost of living, which amounted to only 3 percent.

The value of Jordanian exports significantly increased while the value of exports remained at the 1983 level. This led to a decrease in the trade budget deficit. Moreover, remittances from Jordanians working abroad showed a marked growth, which helped these remittances retain a significant role in bolstering the balance of payments. Moreover, the dinar maintained a relatively stable exchange rate in comparison with the prices of other major foreign currencies.

The sharp reduction in Arab aid that resulted from some Arab countries' non-fulfillment of their obligations or other countries' fulfillment of only a part of these obligations has compelled the government to get foreign loans despite our reduction of expenditure as much as possible. At the same time, efforts were exerted to improve ways to collect local revenues, which exceeded those of last year by 9.5 percent and which covered about 90 percent of current expenditures.

It is my duty here to refer with appreciation and pride to the Jordanian citizens' awareness, their fulfillment of their patriotic duties, and their contribution to narrowing the gap between domestic revenues and current expenditure, a fact that will enable us to depend on our intrinsic capabilities. Paying off the general foreign debt, in proportion to total exports of commodities and services, is within acceptable limits because most of that debt was acquired on easy conditions from national, regional, and international as well as from Arab and foreign sources. Most of that debt was used to fund development and productive projects, some of which began to contribute to the national economy with renewed financial revenues.

Mr Speaker, esteemed House members, in preparing the draft budget of the 1985 fiscal year, the government depended on a number of facts and objectives, foremost of which are:

1. Maintaining the high level attained by our armed forces, reinforcing their strength, and developing their armament capabilities in order to enable them to continue to carry out their national and pan-Arab role. The organs of public security and civil defense will also be supported to maintain security and stability in the kingdom.

Here we should show that necessary measures were taken to put the Popular Army law into effect in order to allow the citizens to defend the homeland and to back our armed forces. A contract was concluded regarding some necessary weapons for the first stage of the formation of that army. The necessary sums were also allocated for that purpose within the armed forces' budget.

2. Jordan's continued fulfilling of its national duties toward the kinfolk in the occupied land to strengthen their presence on their lands and preserve their Arab identities.
3. Paying off internal and external financial obligations on their fixed dates to preserve the trust and good reputation that Jordan has acquired in Arab and international financial markets.
4. Developing the national economy's productive capabilities, especially projects and activities that depend on the elements of local production, using modern technology and increasing self-reliance in meeting local needs.
5. Increasing local revenues for the budget to cover current expenditures and the increasing proportion of capital expenditures and continuing efforts at the same time to control public expenditures and improve efficiency.
6. Distributing development gains through the completion of the infrastructure projects and supplying the various parts of the kingdom with basic and public services.
7. Paying special attention to encouraging domestic and Arab investments and continuing efforts to strengthen and broaden the bases of the joint Arab economic work.

Mr Speaker, esteemed House members, the coming years will witness the beginning of a new economic phase, a fact that makes it incumbent on us to deal with our national economy on the basis of scarce available revenues and the high cost of supply. Defining priorities should take into account these two points. Therefore, the government is determined to adopt a balanced financial and monetary policy aimed at activating the development elements and maintaining economic stability. It will also take a number of measures to increase local revenues and improve ways to collect them on the basis of social justice, to rationalize public expenditure, to develop the efficiency of the administrative apparatus and strengthen its abilities, and to improve the efficiency of public institutions and control their expenditure to enable them to depend on their intrinsic revenues.

The government will encourage local savings, attract Arab capital for investment in keeping with the priorities of economic and social development, and modernize the companies law and other legislation on savings and investment. The government will continue its efforts to develop the banking apparatus, the financial market, and capital, while concentrating on activating the role of the specialized credit corporations and both bolstering and diversifying their resources. In this regard, it must be pointed out that the government gives special attention to coordinating and developing national efforts

in the field of science and technology in order to expedite the absorption of technologies and modern scientific methods and to employ them intensively in various development activities.

In view of the basic role of the administrative apparatus in the process of comprehensive development and the implementation of the development programs and policies, His Majesty King Husayn has ordered the formation of a royal committee for administrative development, which commenced its work by conducting a detailed study of the existing administrative apparatus, its departments, legislation, and ways to develop it. The government intends to adopt and implement its recommendations so that the administrative apparatus will remain the effective means to activate and push ahead the wheel of progress and development in the kingdom.

Out of our belief in the need to back the judiciary because of the special importance it has in the life of our society, the government is in the process of adopting practical steps aimed at supplying the judiciary with an independent cadre and a comfortable atmosphere that can constantly improve. To deepen ties with the outside world and assert Jordan's international status politically, culturally, and economically, the government has expanded its contacts with several countries, particularly Arab, African, and South-east Asian states. It will open new embassies in countries to which we are linked by relations likely to develop and grow.

The following are the most important directives for the principal sectors as contained in the draft budget law for the 1985 fiscal year:

1. The agricultural sector occupies an advanced place in the priorities of this government because it is a basic sector of production that concerns a large stratum of the society and is closely linked to food security, which is considered one of the pillars of the comprehensive pan-Arab security. Accordingly, the government has adopted several measures aimed at increasing and developing agricultural production. The most important among them are:

1. Completing steps related to the establishment of a company for marketing and industrializing agricultural produce. The means that enable this company to achieve the purposes for which it was established will also be made available.

2. Applying suitable agricultural patterns to overcome the marketing difficulties encountered in this sector yearly, taking into consideration the balance between production on the one hand and local consumption and exportation possibilities on the other.

3. Backing the production of some basic agricultural products. The government has for the first time set satisfactory prices for the purchase of wheat, barley, and other cereals before their season at higher than world prices. In order to expand this backing so that it will include other essential agricultural and animal products, 7 million dinars are allocated in the 1985 draft budget for this purpose. A fund will be set up to back the basic agricultural produce. These allocations, in addition to the profits made by selling imported cigarettes, will be deposited in this fund.

4. Increasing agricultural and animal output by carrying out agricultural projects in the kingdom's eastern and central areas, depending entirely or partially on available subterranean water. Moreover, a pioneering project was implemented in the Al-Sawwan plain within the Al-Disi basin for the cultivation of wheat and fodder in an area of 14,000 donums. The necessary measures were also taken to carry out an integrated program on water studies in these areas with the aim of exploiting them agriculturally.

5. Developing the exploitation of unirrigated lands in high areas, encouraging their cultivation in fruit trees, and expanding forestation programs in them.

6. Promoting basic development projects. The necessary appropriations have been allocated to establish a fodder plant in Al-Juwaydah, a poultry slaughterhouse in Al-Dulayl, and additional warehouses. Four million dinars have also been allocated to cover part of the subsidy needed to preserve the current price of bread. The deposit estimated at 10 million dinars will be covered by the expected surplus in the Supply Ministry's trading account.

II. The successive development plans paid great importance to water. These plans emphasized the importance of searching for water sources through digging wells to reach underground water, building dams to trap surface water that would otherwise flow into the sea, and extending water channels from the places where it is available to the places where it is needed. However, water remains a challenge to us not in the building and development process, but in population distribution, establishing food security, and promoting industrialization. The government is in the process of crystallizing an integrated water policy based on accumulating information and collecting, modernizing, and completing the studies. The government is embarking on this water policy not merely for the sake of knowledge, but in order to draw up an integrated plan for water sources and uses on definite scientific principles. This plan is based on three principles:

1. Potable water receives the most attention because the water that is used in houses can be redirected for use in industry and growing fodder.

2. Completing the building of the infra- and ultra-structure of wells and dams. The government will take extreme care in this regard in order to lessen the massive cost as much as possible. The government is also in the process of completing the sewage projects in the major cities despite rising costs, but this is extremely important in safeguarding the health and security of the citizens.

3. Drawing up an integrated national program based on clear and rehearsed steps in order to reduce the consumption of water. This program, which will be implemented during 1985, will take into consideration making water available to the areas whose consumption is still below the average and maintaining the impetus of agricultural and industrial production. However, the program will differentiate between those who use water properly and those who misuse water.

III. The industrial sector receives great attention by the government because appropriate industrial investment is regarded as the natural channel to attract capital and local and foreign savings. In order to achieve this, the government was eager to adopt the legislative measures and amendments to encourage industrial investment and protect, support, and give priority to local production, guarantee local and foreign loans that are backed by the government, and simplify registration measures and the temporary entry of raw materials.

Realizing the great volume of investment in the major production industries and its importance in backing the national economy with additional income, foreign currencies, and job opportunities, the government is endeavoring to overcome the difficulties in the production and export operations. Moreover, the government encourages, in principle, the idea of mixing homogenous industries because of the real savings in the production and operation processes and the economy of having larger industries. Since external marketing of industrial products constituted a major obstacle facing the development of Jordanian industries, particularly under the current regional and international economic circumstances, the government signed several trade agreements with Arab and friendly countries in order to increase trade exchange and to market Jordanian products which will have a positive impact on local investors on the one hand, and on the trade balance on the other.

IV. In light of the possibilities that the kingdom enjoys and the volume of investment during recent years in this sector, the government is determined to adopt measures to allow effective participation with the public sector in order to complete tourist facilities and services and activate and support advertisement programs to increase the number of tourists and extend their stay, and to also develop internal tourism by developing the necessary services within a reasonable cost.

V. The energy sector assumes a prominent and influential role in the national economy. Public and private investments for oil refining and power generation and distribution have attained more than 250 million dinars during the past 8 years. The bill for imported crude oil has increased from 34.4 million dinars in 1976 to 234 million dinars in 1984. Thus, the percentage of increase of this material with respect to the overall exports has been from around 50 percent in 1976 to around 90 percent in 1984. It currently represents more than one-fifth of the value of imports.

Since the price structure of oil byproducts and the assigned electricity tariffs have not provided the necessary revenues for covering the cost of production or distribution, the government has offset the difference in the form of a direct annual subsidy. The total amount of this subsidy from 1976 to 1984 has reached 223 million dinars. In view of this increasing burden on the national economy and on the treasury, the government is intent on adopting an integrated national program to redress the situation in the sphere of energy. This program will seek new local sources and ways for rationalizing energy use. From this premise, the government gave priority to oil exploration.

In light of the promising signs at the experimental oil wells in the Hamza basin in Al-Azraq, experimental oil well drilling has been stepped up in this basin to determine its dimensions and the volume and specifications of its oil reserves. Seismological surveys in various areas in the kingdom have also been accelerated to pinpoint the existence of oil. In implementation of this goal, the government allotted the sum of 14.3 million dinars in the draft budget law for fiscal year 1985. This intensive oil exploration effort is accompanied by an emphasis on economizing energy consumption through state and popular commitment to the mentioned program.

In view of the drop in the prices of some basic oil byproducts and electrical power, the increase in the price of the dollar, and the increase of the cost of pumping oil through the TAPLINE pipeline by more than 80 U.S. cents a barrel, the subsidy to energy reached 36.9 million dinars in 1984. If we adopt the same bases, this subsidy is expected to reach more than 40 million dinars in 1985. Therefore, the government has revised prices of some oil byproducts and some elements of the electricity tariffs in a manner that would be within the financial capabilities of those benefiting from energy subsidies, would not affect production costs of goods and services, or reduce their competitive and export opportunities so that this subsidy would remain within the limit of the sum allocated in the draft budget law for fiscal year 1985. In addition to all this, this decision is in line with the comprehensive plan for rationalizing energy consumption and contributes to the exploitation of resources in a manner that would reflect real costs. On this occasion, the government decided to use the subsidies saved as a result of the amendment of energy tariffs to improving the standard of living of those working in civil and military services as well as pensioners. The government is in the process of completing the necessary studies for implementing this decision early in 1985.

VI. Out of the government's belief that the economic and social development process can only be completed through a solid infrastructure and the provision of public services, the draft budget law for fiscal year 1985 has reflected the government's concern to establish, develop, improve, and generalize these services and public utilities in all governorates to achieve qualitative and quantitative strides in these areas as they are the real measure of any society's progress. The government will continue to expand these services and utilities by completing national water, sewage, and electricity networks, as well as telecommunications and road projects, particularly village and agricultural roads; and by increasing the number of schools, institutes, multipurpose training centers, hospitals, health centers, and clinics to generalize the idea of joint services whenever this is possible.

At the same time, the government will adopt measures to introduce new concepts to improve the quality of services and to achieve better distribution. It will do so by supplying educational institutions at all levels with the necessary qualified cadres; introducing modern educational means such as computer science in schools; entrenching the concept of preventive medical care; modernizing and developing hospitals, medical centers, and clinics, and providing them with modern medical equipment; introducing mechanization

to improve and speed up postal performance; focusing on rural development projects and popular housing units, as well as building housing units for workers to permanently relocate these workers near production locations outside the major cities; and generalizing social security so that it will cover most of the workers in the kingdom.

The government intends to pay attention to road transport and to meet the increasing demands on our roads inside and outside towns in order to reduce traffic jams, to conserve energy, and to reduce accidents and their woes. The road intersection projects in Amman and the encouragement of using public transport and purchasing small cars are among the practical steps being taken. The government has also paid special attention to the transport sector and took measures to operate all kinds of buses in 1985.

The government is determined to back the Ministry of Awqaf, Religious Affairs, and Holy Places to help it carry out construction work on lands belonging to the religious trust so the ministry will be able to develop its resources and to pay complete attention to and improve the standard of preaching and guidance.

The government pays special attention to everything related to youth--their schools, institutes, universities, clubs, and centers inside and outside the kingdom--in order to deepen their sense of national affiliation and national pride and to entrench the spirit of responsibility and participation among these youth, who constitute the nation's future manpower and backbone of the general economy.

The budget reflected interest in stimulating cultural activities in the kingdom. This is illustrated by the allocation of funds for state meritorious awards in the various fields of culture and creativity.

The government has paid attention to the care for physically and mentally handicapped people by carrying out projects and programs and establishing centers that serve them, look after their welfare, and educate them through complete coordination with humanitarian role in this field and to develop the spirit of collective volunteer work.

Out of its recognition of the role played by our expatriate citizens working abroad in reflecting a true, good image of Jordan and Jordanians and maintains a firm intuitive link to the homeland, the government has taken practical steps to deepen the contact with them wherever they may be and to encourage their participation in the process of reconstruction and progress. The government is now considering the necessary legislation to include expatriates in the social security system on a voluntary basis in order to ensure an atmosphere of security for them and to maintain their future ties with the homeland. The government is also determined to open all channels of contact with them and to provide them with all data, studies, and new opportunities for investment to help them invest their savings in the kingdom for their benefit and that of the entire national economy. The government is making the necessary arrangements to help convene the first expatriates conference next summer in Amman. The purpose of this conference will be to get acquainted with the expatriates' problems and needs and to help find

solutions to them and to discuss with the expatriates the best means of their increased participation in Jordanian economic activities.

Mr Speaker, honorable members: Allow me to review the general features of the 1985 draft budget.

First, the 1985 budget is estimated at 811.2 million dinars, compared to 770.2 million dinars in 1984, an increase of 41 million dinars or 5.3 percent.

Second, the sum for Chapter I is estimated at 724.6 million dinars, compared to 664.2 million dinars in 1984, an increase of 60.4 million dinars or 9.1 percent.

A. Revenues: 707.9 million dinars, compared to 653 million dinars in 1984, an increase of 54.9 million dinars or 8.4 percent.

1. Local revenues: 479.9 million dinars, compared to 449 million dinars in 1984, an increase of 30.9 million dinars or 6.9 percent.

2. Arab aid: 183 million dinars, compared to 183 million dinars in 1984. In other words, there is no change.

3. Interest and installments of redeemable bonds and foreign loans: 45 million dinars compared to 21 million dinars in 1984, an increase of 24 million dinars or 114.3 percent.

B. Expenditures: 724.6 million dinars, compared to 664.2 million dinars in 1984, an increase of 60.4 million dinars or 9.1 percent.

1. Current expenditures: 487.5 million dinars, compared to 452.5 million dinars in 1984, an increase of 35 million dinars or 7.7 percent.

2. Capital expenditures: 237.1 million dinars, compared to 211.7 million dinars in 1984, an increase of 25.4 million dinars or 12 percent.

Third, the sum for Chapter II--revenues and expenditures of projects that are financed by foreign loans and aid--is estimated at 68.6 million dinars, compared to 106 million dinars in 1984, a decrease of 19.4 million dinars or a decrease of 18.3 percent.

Fourth, the deficit is 16.7 million dinars, compared to 112. million dinars in 1984, an increase of 5.5 million dinars or 49.1 percent.

All this shows that local revenue estimates for 1985 will increase by 6.9 percent, compared to local revenue estimates for 1984, and by 9.6 percent compared to the revenues that were reestimated for the same year. Thus, local revenues will cover 98.4 percent of current expenditure estimates for 1985 while the reestimated local revenues have covered 89.9 percent of the reestimated current expenditures for 1984. We must not forget to take into account that current expenditure allocations increased from 452.5 million dinars in the 1984 budget to 487.5 million dinars in the draft budget law for fiscal year 1985, or a 7.7 percent increase.

It is worth noting that local and foreign public debt servicing estimates for 1984 have increased by 2.1 percent from what had been originally estimated, and by 22.5 percent from the 1984 reestimation.

Capital investment allocations for 1985 have increased by 2.3 percent over the allocations set for them, and by 24 percent over the reestimated allocations for 1984.

The deficit is estimated at 16.7 million dinars, or 3.5 percent of local revenue estimates. This deficit will be covered by reducing general expenditures, improving local revenues, and by local and external credits.

Chapter I of the draft budget law for fiscal year 1985 also includes allocations worth 87.8 million dinars to bolster capital and current expenditures of the universities and independent public institutions which deal with transportation, electricity, water, housing, awqaf, cooperative, and vocational and other kinds of training. The expenditures of these institutions is expected to reach about 500 million dinars in 1985. If we add all this to the aggregate expenditures estimates in the draft budget law, general state expenditure for fiscal year 1985 will be around 1,311 million dinars.

Mr Speaker, honorable members: Since the draft budget law for the next fiscal year largely depends on Arab aid that fraternal countries provide Jordan to enable it to carry out its pan-Arab duty and to stand fast in the face of the aggression, and out of Jordan's gratitude to its Arab brothers, I offer thanks and appreciation on behalf of the government to Saudi Arabia as it has completely and regularly fulfilled its commitments, and to fraternal Kuwait, which this year has paid part of its obligations in view of the difficult financial circumstances it is experiencing. We are confident that it will overcome these circumstances and will resume the fulfillment of its obligations.

While we understand the circumstances which prevented brothers in some Arab countries from supporting us--they who never had hesitated in aiding and supporting Jordan and its steadfastness--we pin high hopes on the brother in the UAE and Qatar that they will be able to overcome their transient circumstances and fulfill their obligations.

Mr Speaker, honorable members: By submitting the draft budget law for fiscal year 1985, the government hopes that your esteemed House will study all its aspects in a manner that will reflect the aspirations of the sons of our noble people, and that will assist the government in shouldering its responsibilities and pursuing the efforts for achieving more good in our beloved Jordan under the guidance and directives of His Majesty King Husayn. May God protect him and guide his steps. May God's peace and blessings be upon you.

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DETAILS OF 1985 DRAFT BUDGET PUBLISHED

JN131351 Amman THE JERUSALEM STAR in English 13-19 Dec 84 p 1

[By Ahmad Shakir, special to THE STAR]

[Text] Amman--The state budget for the year 1985 will be around JD811 million, while the deficit is expected to be around JD16.735 million.

The cabinet approved the proposed budget law in a session held on Wednesday headed by Prime Minister Mr Ahmad 'Ubaydat. The law project will be presented today (Thursday) before the Lower House of the Parliament, which will hear the budget speech to be delivered by Minister of Finance, Dr Hanna 'Awdah. The proposed budget will then be referred to the financial committee of the Lower House to be studied and then discussed later this month.

According to the proposed budget law the general revenue in 1985 is expected to reach JD794 million while expenditures are expected to reach JD811 million with a deficit of about JD16 million to be covered through surplus in general expenditures and expected improvement in revenue and local and external credits.

Revenue details are expected to be as follows:

Income tax revenue JD52 million, social services taxes JD2.5 million, customs taxes JD182 million, additional taxes JD 19 million, real estate taxes JD 12 million, airport taxes JD9 million, vehicles licenses, import and television taxes and others JD 34 million.

Internal revenue is expected to reach JD480 million, Arab aid JD183 million, outside loans JD18 million while current expenditures are expected to be as follows:

The military JD206 million, the civil cadre JD154 million, others JD126 million, capital expenditures JD237 million and the cost of projects to be financed through technical and economic aid to be about JD86 million.

As for the grants and loans for technical and economic projects, THE STAR has learned that the cabinet has approved a JD116.5 million figure in the proposed budget, but then accepted a minimum of JD86 million, a decrease of over JD30 million.

Such outside loans are divided as follows:

Kuwaiti Fund for Arab Economic Development loans (JD16.5 million) to finance electricity projects in the north and south, the raising of King Talal Dam, irrigation of South Jordan Valley areas, Dayr 'Alla irrigation project and other projects.

Iraqi Credit Fund loans (JD14 million) to finance the completion of the new Aqaba highway and the Al-Zarqa' ring road and others.

Saudi Development Fund loans (JD14.4 million) to include finance the Aqaba Thermal Power Station units, South Jordan Valley irrigation, increase the transportation capacity of the railroad and the purchasing of new locomotives and wagons.

Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development loans (JD7.2 million) to finance two units at the Aqaba Thermal Stations, Middle Ghor irrigations, the Arab Sat earth station project and projects of the Agricultural Credit Corp.

German Construction Bank loans (JD5.6 million) to finance two units of the Aqaba Thermal Station, the Cooperative Corp projects, South Ghor irrigation canal and others.

The United States International Development Agency loans (JD7 million) to finance the Amman sewerage system, the Aqaba and the south and Irbid sewerage systems, Wadi al-'Arabah irrigation project, Dayr 'Alla irrigation project and potash projects.

British government loans (JD2 million) to finance the electrification of Jordan's rural areas and various electricity and water projects.

World Bank (JD22.6 million) to finance two units of the Aqaba Thermal Power Station projects, various electricity projects, expansion of transportation capacity of Jordan railroad, third, fourth, fifth and sixth Education Ministry projects, Amman municipality projects, Aqaba sewerage system, Al-Zarqa' and Al-Rusayfah sewerage and water systems, north cities' sewerage and water systems, south cities' sewerage and water systems, urban development projects, potash projects and road maintenance projects.

Japanese Government loans (JD11.6 million) to finance telecommunications projects, Wadi al-'Arabah dam and Wadi al-'Arabah irrigation canals.

French Government loan (JD2 million) to finance the development and expansion of Jordan telephone systems in cities and rural areas.

EEC loans (JD3 million) to finance Agricultural Credit Corp and Industrial Development Bank projects.

International Fund for Agricultural Development loans (JD3.4 million) to finance Cooperative Organization and Agricultural Credit Corp projects.

Islamic Development Bank loans (JD3 million) to finance the expansion of transportation capacity of Jordan railroad network and the purchase of new locomotives and wagons.

Italian loans (JD4.1 million) to finance the irrigation of southern Ghor projects and the purchase of two units at the Aqaba Thermal Station.

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SUBSIDY ON OIL PRODUCTS, ELECTRICITY TO BE CUT

JN120745 Amman JORDAN TIMES in English 12 Dec 84 p 1, 3

[By Salamah B. Ni'mat, JORDAN TIMES staff reporter]

[Text] Amman--Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Hisham al-Khatib said Tuesday the government has decided to reduce its subsidy on a number of petroleum products and electricity within a rationalization policy aimed at reducing the heavy burden shouldered by the government which imports all of Jordan's needs of crude oil.

Speaking at his first press conference since taking office at the newly-created ministry in November, Dr al-Khatib said the Jordanian Government has spent \$600 million on imports of crude oil in 1984, representing some 90 percent of its total export revenues. He said in this year, the government paid \$92 million as subsidy for imported crude oil, the highest ever amount of subsidy money paid in the country's history.

Dr al-Khatib said the reduction of the government subsidy, which will reflect in an immediate rise in prices of petroleum products, "would not affect citizens with poor or moderate income but citizens with a large income who consume more petroleum and electricity."

However, he said, the industrial sector would be exempted from the burden of a higher cost for petroleum and electricity, mainly heavy export industries "which for the first time in its history, is beginning to aid the kingdom's balance of payments."

Dr al-Khatib said Jordan's exports in 1984 increased by 60 percent from 1983 --"a quantitative and qualitative jump that should be encouraged." He said the "pricing policy" of petroleum products and electricity which will be implemented after approval by the cabinet, would not affect trade activities in the kingdom.

Dr al-Khatib said the most important national project to be pursued in 1985 will be drilling for oil in the Jordanian desert. He said the government has allocated JD14 million for oil prospecting and for drilling 10 new wells.

Jordan so far has struck oil in two wells in the Al-Azraq area in the north-eastern desert with an estimated output of 1,300 barrels per day (b/d). Oil experts working on the site had told the JORDAN TIMES the Kingdom can increase this quantity--through a chemical treatment, to meet up to one third of the country's needs for oil in a matter of two years.

Director General of the Natural Resources Authority (NRA) Yusuf al-Nimri, attending Tuesday's press conference held at the headquarters of the Jordan Electricity Authority (JEA), said the government has doubled its budget for oil exploration in the kingdom. He said that initial results of the search for oil has encouraged the government to continue exploration next year, but he gave no details.

Dr al-Khatib said the government hoped to find oil in commercial quantities by 1987 to help meet part of Jordan's petroleum needs, at present imported from Saudi Arabia and Iraq.

Meanwhile, oil pumped from the two wells in Al-Azraq is being stored in special tanks to be transported by trucks to the Jordan Petroleum Refinery Company in Al-Zarqa'. The process started three weeks ago, Dr al-Khatib said.

A study has been finalized to utilize black coal instead of petroleum to generate electricity, thereby reducing the cost of activating generators, Dr al-Khatib revealed. He said there are also plans to start implementing the project in 1985 to be able to reduce cost by one third by 1990.

By 1986, the Aqaba Thermal Power Station will become operational, reducing electricity cost for citizens there. There is also a plan to utilize solar power as another source of energy, Dr al-Khatib said.

CSO: 4400/46

PAPER REPORTS PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE ON BRIBERY

[Editorial Report] Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic on 12 December 1984 on pages 4 and 5 carries an approximately 4,000-word report by 'Abd al-Kraim 'Abu Khadra on the Kuwaiti National Assembly debate on 11 December. The report quotes assembly deputies discussing housing, irregularities in local club elections, and bribery in national elections.

In referring to election bribes, Deputy Khalid al-Sultan said that vote-buying in the elections for the Kuwaiti National Assembly has become known to the public and that names are being mentioned in connection with who pays and how much he pays. He wondered whether it was possible that the government did not know even though the public knew. "Or does the government bless this action! Where is the role of the Interior Ministry and the role of the Justice Ministry in this?" he asked.

Deputy Al-Sultan cautioned against the dangers of election bribery and the favors that a deputy who is elected in this way is expected to do for those who helped him win a seat. He said the whole country will suffer as a result and that deputies elected through bribery will be exposed to be in the service of certain parties, including foreign embassies. He said that the role of the National Assembly is to keep watch on the government, which makes many mistakes, and the National Assembly cannot carry out this role unless all its members are elected in an honest way and are answerable to their voters. He accused the government of acquiescence regarding vote-buying and urged the public to expose such transactions, so that the government will be forced to adopt reforms.

The justice minister spoke for the government and criticized Deputy al-Sultan for clearly insinuating that the government knew of election bribery and acquiesced in it. He referred to absurd press reports on the same subject and said the government cannot interfere unless a complaint is made. Otherwise, the government will be accused of meddling with the elections. He said: "Acquiescence is not acceptable and we cannot possibly remain silent. Such talk is not acceptable. How can it be said that the embassies can buy candidates? We do not accept such talk. Does this mean that Kuwait has reached such a stage? If Brother Khalid al-Sultan has evidence of certain instances, then let him bring it forward, but general talk is not acceptable."

Although several deputies supported the charges made by Deputy Khalid al-Sultan, one or two deputies, notably 'Abd al-Muhsin Jamal, supported the government stance that such a charge must be substantiated by evidence, and said the talk about this matter had gone too far and that the press also had gone too far.

Two other deputies, Hadi al-Huwaylah and 'Adnan 'Abd al-Samad, said that there was a basis in fact for the talk about election bribery and the discussion of the subject at any rate served to educate the public in this matter with a view to fighting it.

Five deputies made a move to end discussion of the subject and the assembly adopted it.

CSO: 4400/46

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

RESULTS OF PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL MEETING ANALYZED

Difficulties To Follow Successful Meeting

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic 1-7 Dec 84 pp 9-11

[Article by Bakr 'Uwaydah]

[Text] The 17th session of the PNC is convened in Amman 20 years after the first session was convened in Jerusalem.

Quorum makes PNC meeting legitimate; 'Arafat to face a long and difficult "honeymoon."

The legitimate Palestinian movement takes off, leaving behind a number of reserved seats for those who will join it later when conditions and the time are right.

Despite Fatah's skill in convening the meeting successfully, some people think the session was a one-way session and the meeting not a full-fledged meeting.

On 22 November 1967 the UN Security Council issued its well-known Resolution 242. The resolution came to be known by the name of its author, Lord Carradon who was Britain's representative in the council at that time.

Seventeen years later, on 22 November 1984, the 17th session of the Palestine National Council [PNC] was held in Amman amidst circumstances about which the least that can be said is that they were critical for Arabs and very critical for Palestinians.

Is it a mere coincidence that the meetings took place on the same date?

Is it also mere coincidence that the opening day for the 17th session of the PNC meeting was also the day on which King Husayn, Jordan's monarch, made a candid appeal to save the Palestinian cause from the inertia that has been enveloping it? The king made that appeal in the context of three choices he set forth. The most salient of these is the one that calls for the adoption of Resolution 242 as the basis for a joint Jordanian-Palestinian formula.

Those who were following the PNC's activities in Amman may not have paid much

attention to this coincidence; consequently, they may not have placed much importance on it. They were preoccupied with what may be called "a wedding ceremony for the legitimate Palestinian organization" and with the fact that the bridegroom on this occasion, Yasir 'Arafat, took off with his organization after succeeding with Fatah leaders in firmly proving that the PLO is an organization that is capable of making decisions.

Accordingly, "the wedding ceremony for the legitimate Palestinian organization" provided an occasion for expressing more than one congratulatory remark.

Congratulations were expressed because the congress was convened and because the Palestinians had returned to Amman. The fact that the council was convened in the Jordanian capital provided an opportunity for several hundred Palestinians to come to Amman where they had not gone since the events of September 1970. All those people warmly embraced each other as they chanted, "We've returned, and that is the best thing for us." None of this takes anything away from the fact that some aspects of "the wedding ceremony" appeared to be missing or lacking because some of "the relatives" had stayed away. Some people even described what had taken place as "an unconsummated wedding."

Hence arise the [following] questions: How did matters go? What was the climate like? How did "the wedding ceremony" for the legitimate Palestinian organization which took place in Amman end, 20 years after the first PNC was convened in Jerusalem?

The distance between occupied Jerusalem and Amman is not more than 85 kilometers; between Amman and Damascus, the distance is 250 kilometers. Although it is farther away from those who were meeting in Amman, Damascus was more on their minds than occupied Jerusalem was simply because convening this session of the PNC will bring nothing new regarding the liberation of Jerusalem. However, it does reflect a new dimension in the way in which leaders of the Palestinian organization are dealing with those who are in power in Syria. This new dimension was summarized to AL-TADAMUN by a Palestinian official as follows:

"By convening this session, the airplane carrying the Palestinian organization would have taken off and soared in the skies after having stayed on the ground with its engines running for quite some time. That airplane had stayed on the ground without taking off in the hope that some kind of understanding could be reached with those who were delaying its takeoff. We used to seek those people out, but now they have to seek us out."

After the opening session was over, those who are close to Yasir 'Arafat and his colleagues in the Palestinian command, the leaders of the Fatah Movement, did not hesitate to make the following remark: "Congratulations! Half the session is over."

Those people were not exaggerating, and they were not off base. In fact, they reflected quite briefly and simply what was being sought from this session. "Damascus was to understand that leaders of the Fatah Movement can make decisions and can carry them out. They can also take effective action on the Palestinian scene."

It would seem that merely implanting this notion in the minds of people in the government of Syria was costly and expensive, both financially--convening the council cost about 6 million dollars--and politically. It seemed from King Husayn's opening address that Palestinian leaders were being called upon to make a crucial decision in a situation where more risk taking would be intolerable. That is, if we concede that the mere act of convening the council without the participation of the remaining resistance organizations was in itself a risk that could have hardened the division among Palestinians.

Therefore, it seemed to more than one observer of the business that was conducted at the meeting that there was more than one observation to be made and pondered. Some of these observers were observing the meeting from the observers' seats in the conference room at the Husayn Sports Complex, and some were observing the meetings that were being held on the side lines in the rooms and hallways of the Regency Hotel which had been designated for PNC members and Fatah leaders. The most notable of these observations may be related as follows:

First, Damascus was more evident in the council's meetings simply because there was opposition to its attempts to block that session and to keep "the Palestinian airplane" from taking off. That was the primary and principal concern of those who addressed the council from the platform or those who took part in its debates. In fact, the political report that was presented by the Palestinian diplomatic corps, represented by Mr Faruq Qadumi, reviewed in documentary fashion the events that happened between the 16th session of the PNC, in February 1983 in Algeria, and the 17th session. Most of the report concentrated on analyzing and explaining the reasons for what happened on the Palestinian scene from May 10, 1983, which is the date the split was announced, to the date this council was convened.

Because of the principal role it played in what happened on the Palestinian scene, Damascus received the larger share of this analysis and explanation.

Second, if Abu 'Ammar's close associates considered the first half of the council's session to have been over and its main objective accomplished after the opening session was over, there were others who regarded the second half of the council's session to have ended with the removal of Mr Khalid al-Fahum as chairman. That session was broadcast live on television and was therefore watched by people in the Syrian government and by the Palestinian opposition in Damascus since Jordanian television may be seen clearly in Syria and Syrian television may also be seen clearly in Jordan. Mr al-Fahum had served as the chairman of the council for many years. Keeping him in that position was part of a clearly understood formula designed to keep Syria satisfied. Mr al-Fahum was replaced by al-Shaykh 'Abd-al-Hamid al-Sa'ih.

In the course of making this observation, another one may be assumed. By nominating al-Shaykh 'Abd-al-Hamid al-Sa'ih chairman of the council, Fatah leaders will have scored a political victory whose glaring effects its most bitter enemies would find difficult to deny. Al-Shaykh al-Sa'ih's political legacy is well-known to the public inside and outside the occupied land. His religious and social standing is also well-known. He had served as judge in the religious courts in Nablus and Jerusalem; he had chaired the Islamic Board in Jerusalem; he had presided over the religious court of appeals in Palestine and Jordan; and

he had served as chief judge. He also served as minister of religious trusts in Jordan and chairman of the Jerusalem Rescue Committee. Besides being organizationally independent, he is known for his rigorous legal discipline. It would be difficult for anyone opposed to Fatah leaders or to 'Arafat personally to blame or criticize the new chairman of the council. In fact, there are those who spoke in this regard behind the scenes at the congress and said that Fatah leaders who nominated him to chair the PNC will have a hard time with him because he is staunchly independent. However, Fatah leaders most certainly gained a basic point against their opponents who proclaim themselves to be the opposition in Damascus.

Third, it was noticeable that the Palestinian leaders' defiance of Damascus went beyond the mere fact of convening the PNC in Amman. It was suggested that the PLO could become involved with the Syrian opposition just as Damascus was involved with the Palestinian opposition. For the first time in the history of the Palestine National Councils--the first one was convened in Jerusalem on 28 May 1964--an opposition Arab organization that is not allowed to operate in its country was attending the council officially and publicly. That precedent was set by the presence at the meeting of Mr Jasim 'Ulwan, a Syrian figure well-known for his opposition to the regime of President Hafiz al-Asad. Mr 'Ulwan attended the council and delivered a sharp speech against the Syrian regime. The same principle applied to the Palestinian leaders' dealings with the regime in Libya. One of the PNC's guests was Dr Mahmud al-Maghrabi, the first prime minister of Libya after the revolution of 1 September 1969. Dr al-Maghrabi joined the ranks of the Libyan opposition when he was his country's ambassador in Britain.

Fourth, it was noticed that Fatah's leaders stressed the fact that convening the council did not mean that all doors would be closed to the remaining factions of the Resistance that did not take part in the business of this session, particularly the Popular National Alliance, the Democratic National Alliance, the Palestine Liberation Front and the communists. Quite the contrary, continued dialogue with these factions was stressed. Two observations may be made in this regard. First, PNC members who represent the Democratic Alliance and who reside in Amman maintained continuous contact with Fatah leaders while the council was in session, even though they did not participate in the meetings. Thus, they managed to maintain a dialogue with Fatah leaders, and they asked them not to have the council come out with a political recommendation to adopt King Husayn's proposal. This was the proposal which the king made in his speech to formulate a Jordanian-Palestinian initiative based on Resolution 242.

The second observation has to do with the fact that Mr Yasir 'Abd-Rabbuh, Mr Salih Ra'fat and Mr Abu Layla, members of the Political Office of the Democratic Front, are in Tunisia. It was said during the meetings of the council that they did not intend to go back to Syria. This indicates quite clearly that matters are not going according to the wishes of Damascus, inasmuch as circumstances are not forcing the Palestinian ship and its captain, Abu 'Ammar into those ports [or positions] that are designated by Damascus. After making these four observations and others that were derived from them, one question remains: What is the future of the coexistence formula in the PLO?

In answering this question, the following points ought to be made.

1. Many members of the PNC, including those who represent Fatah, did not conceal their feelings that the 17th session of the PNC was the least lively and the least heated session as far as the give and take on Palestinian issues was concerned. In fact, some people went so far as to describe the session as "incomplete." That was a reference to the fact that representatives of the remaining organizations had stayed away from the meeting.

2. The fact that the council was convened was tantamount to twisting the arm of the Palestinian opposition. It reminded some leaders who had counted on Fatah being weak that Fatah was still the backbone--as it has been called--of the organization. However, this deliberate arm twisting was not intended to reach the point of breaking bones.

3. Although more than one Palestinian official did rule out that an emergency meeting of the PNC would be held in 2, 3 or even 6 months, there are those who said the following behind the scenes of the council:

"The PNC will be convened in an emergency session in 2 to 6 months. This will be a national unity session, and it will be attended by factions of the Democratic Alliance, by alternative leaders to the Popular Front--the General Command, and by al-Sa'iqah. Convening this session depends on arranging the affairs of one specific faction: the Popular Front, which is led by Dr George Habash. The Popular Front wants to have some time before determining its final position on its relationship with Damascus."

It might thus be said, in light of these three points, that the clouds of an impending Palestinian division--a split dividing the PLO into two organizations and the PNC into two councils--have been dispelled by Fatah's skill in convening the 17th session of the PNC so successfully. The importance of this success is not diminished by the fact that the meeting was not a full-fledged meeting and that it was a one-way session that came out with one resolution and one voice. If the clouds of division have been dispelled, then it may be assumed that optimism about the strength of the PLO is no longer to be frowned upon. Therefore, "the Palestinian airplane," which took off with the man of the hour of the legitimate Palestinian organization when the 17th session was convened, will have room for more than one opposition organization which will wait for a suitable opportunity and for the right time and the right place to board that airplane.

One does not overstate the case when one says that 'Arafat has a long and difficult honeymoon ahead of him. This period of time may prove that the celebration was not for 'Arafat alone, but that it was rather for all Palestinians.

Cairo's Support Deemed Desirable

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 86, 1-7 Dec 84 pp 12-13

[Article by Najih Khalil]

[Text] As Palestinians' concerns find their way into the homes of Jordanians, the alliance with Amman needs Cairo's [support] and the king's initiative is not rejected.

It is hoped that 'Arafat will get Egypt's endorsement, Iraq's support and Palestinians' consent to formulate a joint initiative with Jordan to be presented to the summit meeting in Riyadh.

If an international conference were to be convened, there will be four centers at that conference: Moscow and the Brezhnev initiative, Beijing and its condition to participate, London-Paris and the European initiative, and Washington and Reagan's amended initiative.

During the 7 days of the meetings of the 17th session of the PNC, from 22 to 29 November, Amman experienced a state of political activity that it had not known for many years.

In connection with these 7 days, 'Amman experienced all the particulars, ramifications, concerns and complexities of the Palestinian situation. All council activists found their way into almost every home in Amman via Jordanian television, which reported on the most important activities of the council while it was in session. At the same time most homes in Amman also received those interviews that were conducted by Damascus television with leaders of the Palestinian opposition who were almost unanimous on three points.

1. The Palestinian opposition in Damascus was almost unanimous that the council which was convened in Amman was not legal and that it did not have a proper legal quorum.
2. They totally rejected the organization's relationship with Amman, and they cast doubts on the implications and significance of the initiative that was proposed to the council by King Husayn.
3. They affirmed Syria's role in supporting the Palestinian struggle.

While Damascus television reiterated the same principles that were articulated by numerous leaders of the Palestinian opposition in an organized propaganda campaign that was begun some days before the council was convened, almost all those who took part in the meetings of the council stressed several principal and crucial points.

1. They affirmed their rejection of all Syrian attempts to set themselves up as their guardians and to contain them.
2. They refuted Syria's allegations about what was taking place on the Palestinian scene.

3. They affirmed that the council was legal, that its quorum was legal and that its resolutions were therefore legal.

A senior Palestinian official who took part in the meetings of the council responded to the campaign on Syrian television and to statements made by some leaders of the Palestinian opposition on Syrian television by saying, "If we were to assume for the sake of argument that Syria's statements about 'Arafat's opposition to the armed struggle and about his eagerness to find any solution were true, why then don't the Syrians and those leaders take it upon themselves to carry out the functions of the armed revolution? Why don't they turn those functions into actions on the field?"

When we asked this official to tell us what he meant by that statement, he said, "I do not believe that those who have adopted the al-Naqrurah talks and declared the Golan off limits to guerilla activity for more than 12 years can lend a hand to the course of armed struggle. If they could, why didn't they lend a helping hand to the Revolution when it was fighting the Israeli invasion of Beirut in 1982?"

This official went on to say, "It is our right to ask about that when we hear what Damascus has been saying.

"They are saying that 'Arafat has sold out everything; that he is eager to come up with solutions, and that he has joined King Husayn. Let's assume that what they are saying is true, why don't they allow Abu Musa's guerillas, for example, to operate in the Golan? Why don't they stop receiving Richard Murphy in Damascus? We challenge them to do something like that.

"Thus, their dispute with 'Arafat did not stem from their concern for the armed struggle, nor did it stem from their quest for an armed revolution. It is more a dispute over who will act on behalf of the Palestinians and who would legally represent them. The Syrians want Palestinian action and representation to be part of their tactical policy so they can improve their conditions in a settlement."

Although statements made by that Palestinian official demonstrated considerable bitterness, they also reflected the bitterness that many council members felt in this regard. Council members expressed those feelings in the words they spoke and in the positions they took during the meetings.

If this were one part of the picture, there were many others that came to the fore in connection with the 17th session of the PNC. King Husayn's address, which was delivered in the opening session of the PNC and which included an appeal for a joint Palestinian-Jordanian initiative based on UN Resolution 242, indicated that the PNC was convened in Amman on political grounds that call for blending Palestinian and Jordanian interests. That would cause both parties to proceed together on a common course to a common future.

Despite the fact that Abu Iyad came out the following day declaring that the organization still rejected Resolution 242, the actual facts would allow an observer to put matters in the following sequence, whether or not the council adopts this appeal for a joint Palestinian-Jordanian initiative:

1. As AL-TADAMUN was going to press, it was hoped that the council would issue an unequivocal resolution defining the essence and importance of relations between Jordanians and Palestinians. It was also hoped that the council would issue another ambiguous resolution calling for an international conference that would be based on Palestinian approval of all UN resolutions. Such approval has already been declared in the McCloskey paper, which was adopted and signed by 'Arafat during Israel's invasion of Beirut.

2. Again, as AL-TADAMUN was going to press, it was hoped that the council would issue a resolution calling for the restoration of Palestinian-Egyptian relations because the organization will need Egypt in case it forms an alliance with Jordan. To put it more clearly, 'Arafat needs Cairo and perhaps even Baghdad as well to go to 'Amman. In this regard it was noticed for the first time that the organization, represented by Yasir 'Arafat, had sided with Iraq and had condemned Iran's position in the Gulf war.

3. It was noticed that while council meetings were underway, other meetings were being held at the Regency Hotel, which was designated for member delegations. These meetings were held between members of the Democratic Alliance and members of Fatah's Central Committee. It was obvious that the implications of that dialogue on the Palestinian scene were highly significant. In this regard one of the leaders of the Democratic Alliance said, "It is very important to us to be on board 'Arafat's airplane when it takes off. In fact, it has already taken off."

If that statement expresses anything, it gives the impression that many leaders who oppose 'Arafat on the Palestinian scene will soon find themselves compelled to join forces with him. That will give 'Arafat considerable momentum to continue his political activity.

4. In light of all that, if 'Arafat gets Egypt's endorsement, Iraq's support and the Palestinians' approval, he will be able to join Jordan on an equal footing and he will be able to go to the Arab summit when it is convened in Riyadh, filled with enthusiasm about his joint initiative with Jordan. That initiative may become the center of discussion at that summit. After that initiative is adopted by the Arabs, the summit meeting may form a five, six or perhaps seven member committee in which both King Husayn and 'Arafat would take part. That committee would travel to the five countries that are permanent members of the UN Security Council to promote the idea of an international conference.

It is natural that this committee will hear statements in these capitals that would be considered extensions of those statements that were heard by the seven-member committee that was formed after the Fes Summit Conference.

If Moscow and Beijing demand that they be active participants in that international conference, then France and Britain will ask that the European initiative be sanctioned. In Washington, however, it will be the Reagan initiative or the amended version of that initiative that will be the center of discussion.

Thus, each one of these parties will come to the international conference with its own ideas.

Moscow will come with the Brezhnev initiative and the condition that it play an active part in the conference.

Beijing will come with the condition that it play an active part in the conference.

London and Paris will come with the European initiative.

Washington will come with the Reagan initiative or the amended version of that initiative.

Amidst this strange mixture of proposals, which are quite homogeneous and not much different from each other, the Palestinian-Jordanian initiative will have its full effect. But will Damascus be able to delay or abort this course?

The answer to that question may be no, and it may be yes. In an area like the Middle East political formulas are not arranged according to fixed laws.

It is most likely, however, that Damascus will become more vocal when it is convinced that the al-Naqurah talks will not form the basis for a solution to the Golan problem. But if the opposite is true, Damascus will have to go along with 'Arafat.

Syria's Possible Reactions Analyzed

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 86, 1-7 Dec 84 pp 14-15

[Article by Ihsan Bakr]

[Text] A question on the minds of observers in Amman: Will Syria circumvent 'Arafat to foil his partnership with Jordan?

Usamah al-Baz met with Yasir 'Arafat in Tunisia hours before the PNC meeting in Amman was convened; observers are affirming Cairo's support for King Husayn's initiative.

A Palestinian official tells AL-TADAMUN, "King Husayn gave the Resistance one choice: to work with Jordan. If not, each party will go its own way."

If Yasir 'Arafat came out of the meetings in Amman with a reaffirmation from the PNC that he is still the legitimate leader who is still being charged to continue his efforts [on their behalf], then the Jordanian monarch, King Husayn, came out of those meetings with more trustworthy relations with Palestinians.

This may have been the first time in the history of the Palestine National Council that council meetings were watched live by three Palestinian communities: people on the occupied West Bank, Palestinians living in Jordan and Palestinian communities in Damascus.

With all these people there were more than 400 journalists who came from all over the world to watch the event that was preceded by many rumors, all of which

revolved around one question: Will there be a legal quorum and will the differences be patched up? The critical hour came, and the man of the hour was Yasir 'Arafat. A smile never left his face, and he never doubted that there would be a legal quorum.

In his first meeting with the Egyptian delegation 'Arafat made a point of saying that Egypt's delegation should have been the largest delegation because of Egypt's position. 'Arafat added, "This time we corrected some of the mistakes that were made in the Algeria Congress. We made sure that the Egyptian delegation included all political parties and forces and all trade unions and professional associations. Chief among those is the delegation of the ruling National Party." When we asked him about the legal quorum, he spoke in specific terms and said, "When I wrote to Khalid al-Fahum to ask that the council be convened, I had assurances that two thirds of the members would attend the council."

Besides the attention that was given to the role that Yasir 'Arafat played in convening this congress, different media agencies that were closely watching the business of the conference placed emphasis on the surprise address that was delivered by King Husayn when he inaugurated the council's meetings. It seemed to different observers that the initiative which King Husayn had proposed in his address would continue to be the topic of discussion and the center of Palestinian action for many months because King Husayn's initiative gave the PLO three specific choices.

1. The PLO could abandon the Rabat resolutions with conviction so that Jordan could assume its legal responsibilities toward the West Bank, and Egypt could assume its toward Gaza. The two parties would take action on the international scene through Resolution 242 for the purpose of bringing about an Israeli withdrawal.
2. The PLO's second choice is to take up this matter by itself, armed with a Jordanian promise of support. Jordan's role, however, would be like that of any other Arab country.
3. The PLO's third choice is a joint Jordanian-Palestinian action that would be carried out through a Jordanian-Palestinian initiative based on Resolution 242 and under the clause of "Land for peace."

Right after the Jordanian monarch finished delivering his address, a senior Palestinian official told AL-TADAMUN that King Husayn had actually given the organization one choice only: it could either work with Jordan, or each party would go its own way.

Besides, more than one observer thinks that the Jordanian monarch played more than one hand in the initiative he proposed. He was making the Americans happy by adopting Resolution 242 as the basis for a settlement, and he was making the Soviets happy by stipulating that an international conference attended by all permanent members of the UN Security Council was necessary. Besides, the king removed from his proposal some of the points that Palestinians were wary of by stipulating that the organization be a principal party in the negotiations.

But the question is this: Will Palestinians accept this Jordanian proposal? Did

it take them by surprise, and did it take other Arab parties, especially Cairo, by surprise?

What more than one observer are convinced of is that ever since King Husayn decided to resume diplomatic relations with Egypt, Cairo and Amman have shared the same point of view on many matters. In fact, some Palestinian officials are saying that King Husayn's initiative as well as the talks that 'Arafat had in Jordan before the meetings of the council began were not exactly unknown to Cairo. In addition, there was an important meeting in Amman between the Jordanian monarch and Palestinian officials, Ayyub al-Khatib and Abu al-Lutf. That meeting took place at the personal request of King Husayn. All this affirmed that King Husayn had clearly placed his cards on the table in front of Palestinian officials. It is true that he may not have told them of his intention to propose his initiative in the opening session of the council, but he most certainly did review all the ideas with them. If this initiative came as a surprise to Palestinian leaders, the surprise was not in the substance of what the King proposed, but rather in the fact that King Husayn made his proposal directly to representatives of the Palestinian people from the platform of the PNC. The king asked those representatives to assume their responsibilities and decide on an answer to his proposal without wasting any time.

A reference to the meeting that took place in Tunisia 5 days before the congress in Amman was convened is worth noting here. This was a meeting between Yasir 'Arafat, Faruq Qadumi, Abu Mazin and President Husni Mubarak's envoy, Dr Usamah al-Baz. The reference to this meeting means that Cairo and the organization were not exactly unaware of King Husayn's ideas.

Regarding the part that has to do with the Palestinians' acceptance of King Husayn's proposal, all indications that were available at the time this analysis was being written--the council has not been adjourned yet--affirm that the council will neither reject nor accept the formula that was proposed by King Husayn. Therefore, it is most likely that the general political communique that will be issued by the council will include a clear reference to the need to continue coordination between Jordanians and Palestinians. The communique will charge the Executive Committee of the PLO with the task of dealing with the formula that was proposed by King Husayn and with any other formulas so that the aspirations of Palestinians can be realized.

Moreover, reference must be made to the fact that Palestinian leaders hastened to affirm that Palestinian action based on Resolution 242 was irrelevant. AL-TADAMUN has learned that Mr Nayif Hawatimah wrote to Mr Yasir 'Arafat to ask him to have the PNC withhold its political resolutions so that there can be more dialogue. Some observers here expect that Damascus will induce leaders of the Democratic Alliance to initiate a new dialogue with Yasir 'Arafat for the purpose of achieving national unity. Damascus could do that if it feels that Fatah will go along with King Husayn all the way.

Those people think that Damascus will yield on that matter, not out of affection for Yasir 'Arafat, but rather because it would not like to see cooperation between Jordanians and Palestinians. Such cooperation would isolate Syria and keep it out of the solutions that are being proposed.

It remains to be said that everything is possible and that more than one formula will likely emerge on the scene. The only thing we have to do is wait and see what the next few days will bring.

Crisis Averted

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 86, 1-7 Dec 84 p 15

[Text] What happened between Egypt and the PLO on 5 March 1983 as a result of the resolutions that were issued then in Algeria by the Palestine National Council was almost repeated on Sunday, 25 November 1984 when the PNC was convened in Amman.

The political classification that was issued by the Algeria Congress had divided Egyptian political activists into national and non-national forces. That caused President Husni Mubarak to react sternly to this allegation. In a meeting he held with members of the parliamentary body he affirmed that Egypt's national movement had 45 million Egyptian citizens from the majority and the opposition. He affirmed that Egypt's national course and the efforts Egypt did make during Israel's invasion of Lebanon were made to help the Palestinian people and not to go after the PLO or take advantage of a situation. Egypt did what it did out of its sense of commitment to the people of Palestine.

At that time that crisis did cast a heavy shadow on Palestinian-Egyptian relations. Developments almost caused the crisis to get worse, had it not been for the commendable efforts of both parties.

The same crisis was almost repeated when the PNC was in session in Amman. Matters could have gotten worse when the political report of the PLO's Executive Committee, which was delivered by Faruq Qadumi, referred to the PLO's relationship with "Egypt's national movement." That expression had been used previously to mean that opposition parties were, in the organization's eyes, members of the national movement. That caused President Husni Mubarak to contact King Husayn and to ask what was meant by that term.

Yasir 'Arafat immediately announced that the PLO made no distinctions between the Egyptian people. To the PLO all Egyptians were nationalists who believed in the Arab character of their country and supported the cause of Palestine.

'Arafat emphasized his considerable appreciation for the principal role that was played by Egyptian authorities to support the organization.

Thus, prompt and rapid communications between Mubarak, Husayn and 'Arafat made it possible to avoid a new crisis between the two parties.

AL-TADAMUN noticed that the causes for the crisis were similar, but that it was a change in intentions--the intentions of both parties to be specific--that aggravated the first crisis and made containment of the second crisis possible.

It remains to be said that it was not only intentions that changed, but that alliances also changed. This was helpful in having understanding and tolerance replace intractability and crises.

Strategy for Egypt's Delegation

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 86, 1-7 Dec 84 p 16

[Article by Ahmad Hamrush]

[Text] Egyptians and the Palestine National Council agree to support the legitimate Palestinian organization and to refrain from criticizing Syrian positions.

The 150-member Egyptian delegation affirmed that the Camp David Accords did not constitute a barrier to an agreement between Egypt and Arab countries.

This question is being asked in Amman: Why did such a large number of Egyptians participate in the meetings of the Palestine National Council? What is the significance of that fact, particularly when other Arab countries sent smaller delegations ?

The question stems from the fact that over 150 politicians, journalists and professionals came from Egypt. An entire hotel, the Middle East Hotel, was designated for them. They were also given more than one opportunity to speak during the open meetings of the congress.

The question arose out of some people's desire to know; others asked because they did not support the idea of convening the PNC in Amman.

Egypt's delegation included representatives of various political parties. It included representatives of the Egyptian Solidarity Committee; it included trade union figures, professionals, labor leaders and independent politicians.

The nature of political activity in Egypt is such that broad representation is required because all forces, parties and political organizations compete with each other to declare their positions on the Palestinian Revolution.

These forces' attitudes toward the Palestinian Revolution are considered sensitive instruments for measuring their acceptability by the public in Egypt and outside Egypt in the Arab homeland.

Although many Arab countries are still living under a one party system, Egypt is going through a democratic stage in which there are multiple parties and conflicting opinions, and that requires broad representation.

It has been noticed, however, that despite the increase in the number of participating Egyptians, there is consensus that the PLO is to be supported as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Members of the Egyptian delegation agree that convening the PNC is to be endorsed. While all forces have agreed on that position, they have also agreed that they are not to get involved in the conflict between Syria and the organization. Not one word of criticism or attack was directed against any other Arab country.

That semblance of unity was not based on previous common discussions. It was

rather based on a general popular wish to assume a position supporting the PLO and opposing U.S. policy which supports the Israeli government. It was also based on a passionate Egyptian feeling that the Camp David Accords were not to constitute restraints imposing on Egypt normalization with Israel or setting up barriers that would prevent Egypt from reaching agreements with Arab countries.

The manifestation of such a position required Egypt to have a large delegation in which each political force--the Democratic National Party, the Socialist Labor Party, the Unionist Progressive National Grouping Party, the New Wafd Party and the Egyptian Solidarity Committee--would have an opportunity to present its views to members of the PNC and after that to the Arab nation or rather to world public opinion.

Broad Egyptian representation and a large number of Egyptians were therefore necessary to show Egypt's position--the position of its government and its people. That position is that the Camp David Accords no longer constituted a barrier preventing Egypt from taking action and moving toward a proper pan-Arab and national position.

Does this [explanation] answer the question of those who wanted to know or those who were worried?

Demonstrations, Public Reaction in Amman

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic No 86, 1-7 Dec 84 p 17

[Article by 'Ali al-Khalili, Jerusalem]

[Text] In the occupied land: two people die and demonstrations are held in Amman to support the legitimate Palestinian organization.

Residents of the occupied land followed the meetings of the congress in newspapers and on television; demonstrations of support were staged on the first day of the congress.

At 5 p.m. on Thursday, 22 November 1984 the streets and roads of the cities, villages and camps on the occupied West Bank and Gaza were deserted. No one was walking in the streets, and no taxicabs were available. All stores and shops were closed, and silence reigned everywhere. The only sounds that broke the silence were those of Israeli military vehicles that were roaming everywhere in anticipation of an impending danger.

If anyone had observed the scene at that hour last Thursday, he would have thought that everyone in the occupied land had converged on a bomb shelter in anticipation of a decisive battle that was about to take place.

The fact was, however, that residents of the occupied land were staying at home at this early hour to devote their undivided attention to Jordanian television. They were awaiting the opening of the first meeting of the 17th session of the Palestine National Council in Amman's Culture Palace.

No one was going to miss that historic moment. Although a lengthy debate had been going on for many months up to this moment that Thursday evening in local national newspapers and magazines, in trade union halls, clubs and associations and at family gatherings as well, people's eyes and hearts were all turned [to their television screens]. They were awaiting that unique moment to watch all those revolutionaries and fighters assembled together on Jordanian territory under the umbrella of the legitimate Palestinian organization.

As this historic session began, a new spirit was actually born on the occupied land. This was the first time for all citizens of the West Bank--citizens from all classes and walks of life--to feel that they were taking part in what was happening in the highest legitimate Palestinian organization, even though their participation was via television. Although in the past some newspapers, magazines and Arab television programs had conveyed segments of such scenes as those that were taking place in front of them, they were now watching directly in the most minute details the democratic process by which independent Palestinian decisions were made. They were watching that process along with their leaders and legitimate representatives.

National newspapers and magazines such as AL-FAJR, AL-SHA'B, AL-BADIR AL-SIYASI and AL-'AWDAH were showered with telegrams, advertisements and congratulatory statements from the vast majority of the organizations and institutions on the occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip. They all endorsed the fact that this session of the council was being convened. On the other side, AL-MITHAQ published some statements and advertisements opposing the convening of the PNC.

Although its position is generally close to that of Jordan, the newspaper, AL-QUDS authorized an almost neutral approach to the news, but communist newspapers like AL-ITTIHAD, and AL-TALI'AH warned against dealing with Jordan.

Opposition in the occupied land remained very limited, particularly since Karim Khalaf, the elected mayor of Ramallah; Ibrahim al-Tawil, the elected mayor of al-Bayrah; Samihah Khalil, president of the Family Rehabilitation Society and other figures affirmed publicly that they supported the legitimate leaders and fully endorsed the notion of convening the council in Amman. The names of these people had been published by AL-MITHAQ along with statements the newspaper had published to oppose holding the session or to ask that it be postponed.

The popular tide, however, was considerable in its absolute support for the legitimate leaders, chief among whom is Abu 'Ammar. The public endorsed the notion of holding the meeting to confront all challenges and to come out with a Palestinian initiative that would confront all the rapid political changes in the area.

That unequivocal position was manifested in the demonstrations of support that were staged on the first day of the meetings. Two people lost their lives to consolidate that position. They are the late Sharaf Khalil al-Taybi, a student; and the late Bakr 'Abdallah al-Tamimi, a young man.

Although various media agencies did relay to the whole world what had happened, there was another situation that has not yet become widely known. That is the Israeli position on the PNC meeting in Amman.

What is that position, and how did Israeli newspapers deal with it?

Israeli newspapers wondered about the consequences that Israel was to expect from the first addresses that were delivered at the congress. In an editorial devoted to that subject HA'ARETZ, like other Israeli newspapers, stated that under current conditions King Husayn's proposal to the PLO to reach a settlement by negotiating with Israel on the basis of Resolution 242 constituted a major challenge for the Palestinians. The newspaper added, "If we were to base our judgment on 'Arafat's statements, [we would conclude] that the PLO was not likely to accept King Husayn's ideas. Therefore, there is no reason for Yitzhaq Shamir to be affected by what the king said."

On the other side, DAVAR's reaction was slightly different. That newspaper stated that if we had compelling reasons to state that until today there were no new developments in the directions the organization was pursuing during the meetings of the council, the fact that the organization did convene its parliament against Syria's wishes is a phenomenon in itself. And there is also King Husayn's formula of peace for land.

THE JERUSALEM POST explained that reactions to the proposal that King Husayn made simultaneously to the organization and to Israel seem to ignore that the PNC is not the forum that is prescribed for the presentation of such an initiative.

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CSO: 4404/106

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

KUWAITI DAILY INTERVIEWS PALESTINIAN OFFICIAL

GF211800 Kuwait AL-ANBA' in Arabic 21 Nov 84

[Interview with Ahmad 'Abd al-Rahman, PLO and PNC official spokesman, by AL-ANBA' correspondent Mahmud Khalil in Amman--date not given]

[Excerpts] [Mahmud Khalil] What are the latest developments concerning the convocation of the PNC?

[Ahmad 'Abd al-Rahman] The PNC will convene in the place and on the date agreed according to the decisions adopted by the PLO Executive Committee. Based on this, preparations are now under way to convene the PNC 22 November in Amman. The PNC administrative organs have begun to arrive in Amman. The special committees of the PNC have held a number of meetings with the Jordanian side and among themselves so as to form a number of committees--media, administrative, security, and financial--which will supervise the operations of the PNC.

PNC members have also begun to arrive in Amman. As usual during such meetings of the PNC, a great number of our Palestinian sons will participate in the PNC meetings as observers. The PNC will be a Palestinian demonstration which will announce to the whole world that playing with Palestinian blood has failed, the intrigues among the Palestinian ranks, and the destruction of the PLO have been buried. The organization is alive because the Palestinian people will stay alive and will achieve victories.

[Khalil] It is reported that if the PNC is convened in Amman, the Democratic Alliance will hold another PNC in Damascus. What is your comment on this?

['Abd al-Rahman] It is not unexpected although I denounce them because they do not represent the Palestinian people. Those who played with Palestinian blood are under indictment. They are not part of the leadership. Our PNC represents our people. It will convene in Amman and will convict those who were mere tools of destruction in the progress of the Palestinian revolution.

The battle now is for the representation of the Palestinian people which must stay in Palestinian hands. The conspiracy is continuing to force

cancellation of the PNC so as to undermine a solution of the Palestinian issue. Those who boast in Damascus have taken part in this conspiracy.

[Khalil] What is the truth behind the strong Syrian stand on the convocation of the PNC?

['Abd al-Rahman] There are many reasons for the Syrian stand. I can point out one political reason: Syria is against the establishment of a Palestinian state. To date the Syrian leadership has not supported the presence of an independent Palestinian state.

Another thing is that Syria has opposed the revolution and the establishment of a state as the goal of the revolution. Syria views this as a natural way to continue the armed struggle for liberation and the homeland of the revolution or Lebanon. Syria does not approve of the armed struggle and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. Accordingly, Syria opposes the convocation of the PNC because it represents an answer to the Syrian role in cancelling the political and military role of the PLO. The PLO will resume its military role. It will guide the Palestinian stand according to the national Palestinian program which implies the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

[Khalil] Previously, Syria attacked the Palestinian resistance at Tal al-Za'tar because there was a peace plan presented to Syria. Finally Syria attacked the Palestinian resistance in Tripoli, and it encouraged some Palestinian parties to attack their brothers-in-arms. Is there a new peace plan presented to Syria?

['Abd al-Rahman] As the foreign press has said, and as it is known from the tours of Richard Murphy, the Americans are persuading Syria that it is a powerful party which respects agreements in the Middle East, and consequently Syria is the party which is qualified to negotiate. Syrian media never tire about saying that all roads lead to Damascus.

I remember an amusing comment in a Syrian newspaper which--on Reagan's reelection--said that Reagan must understand the negotiations in the Middle East must pass by Damascus, through Damascus, and via Damascus and not with other parties.

The Syrian leadership tries to suggest to international organs that it is capable of playing a principal role in the Middle East, in Lebanon, Syria itself, Jordan, and Palestine.

From here it becomes clear that there are verbal briberies for the Syrian leadership. There was a verbal bribery in 1967 when they talked about greater Syria, and now they say that Syria is the party which respects agreements. Consequently, Murphy had a plan when he was touring southern Lebanon. Do not be astonished if I tell you that Murphy's plan includes two basic points which Syria has to adhere to. They are:

1. Preventing the return of PLO fighters to southern Lebanon.
2. Preventing infiltration by Palestinian fighters again into southern Lebanon. This represents an agreement and consequently we oppose "Camp Murphy."

I want to correct a mistake made by many when they believed the rumors which claim that the PNC meeting aims at drawing closer to Reagan's initiative and other initiatives. We are against Reagan's initiative and we will fight it until it fails. We are again returning to the arena of conflict, organizationally, militarily, and politically. It is a PNC of steadfastness in the face of the conspiracy aimed at changing [our people's] representation, and in the face of the conspiracy to abolish the military role of the PLO.

[Khalil] In light of convening the PNC in Amman, how do you see the future of Palestinian-Palestinian relations?

['Abd al-Rahman] Our doors are open for all independent forces which are not dependent on the organs of any Arab intelligence agency. We appreciate the difficult circumstances which some forces are going through, and which some persons and independent factions are going through. In the meetings of the PNC we will take care to keep the door open, on the organizational side, for the participation of our brothers in the future.

[Khalil] Can we say that 1984 is the year of the return of the Palestinian resistance to Jordan. Circumstances have changed, and many things have also changed. There is an understanding and a maturity regarding the relationship after all these long years.

Now, within the PLO, we understand that the Jordanian-Palestinian relations are close relations in accordance with the circumstances of the current situation. The current situation allows for the establishment of mutual relations between the PLO and Jordan, on the level of the PLO which has the say as far as the Palestinian decision is concerned, and on the level of Jordan which remains an independent and sovereign party. There is between us a mutual interest, a life interest, which brings us together toward the future.

[Khalil] There have been reports recently that the intention exists to form a federal joint Palestinian-Jordanian government, in order to face the amendment which will be made to Reagan's plan.

['Abd al-Rahman] There is no intention to form a federal joint Palestinian-Jordanian government. There is no intention to form a Palestinian government-in-exile. I personally do not believe that the U.S. Administration intends to make any amendment to the Reagan plan because the current situation in the Middle East favors U.S. interests. Israel's strength lies in Arab division and in striking at the PLO. This is the essence of U.S. strategy in the Middle East.

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

KUWAITI PAPER: NAMELIST OF PNC SESSION ABSENTEES

GF251509 Kuwait AL-ANBA' in Arabic 24 Nov 84 pp 1, 26

[Text] Amman--AL-ANBA' has obtained from officials organizing the 17th PNC session a list of PNC members who are absent from the 17th session. They are: Ibrahim Qubba'ah, 'Azmi Marar, Samih Kuwayk [alias Qadri, one of the leaders of the Fatah dissidents], Yusuf Abu al-Ni'aj, Darwish al-Abuyad, Zafir al-Khadra, Jamil Hilal, Ahmad Salih Muslih, 'Ali 'Aziz, Fayiz Murtaja, Hamad Matar, Sa'adat Hasan, Ahmad Yusuf Hasan, 'Umar al-Shihabi, Dawud Talhami, Subhi Ghawshah, Ahmad Gibril [leader of PFLP-General Command], Talal Naji [PFLP-GC representative on PLO Executive Committee], Fadl Shurur, Kayid Sulayman (deceased), Mustafa Khamis, Muhammad Salih, Zaki al-Dhayl, Riyadh Sa'id, Mustafa al-Zubari, Ahmad al-Yamani [alias Abu Mahir of the PFLP], George Habash, Taysir Qubba'ah, 'Azmi al-Khawajah, Sharif Maluhah, Adib 'abd Rabbuh, Salih Ra'fat, 'Isam 'Abd al-Latif, 'Abd al-Karim Hamad, 'Ali 'Ayid, Muhammad 'Awdah, 'Abd al-Hamid Abu Ghawsh, Taysir al-Zubari, Isma'il al-Sunнар, 'Ablah Abu 'Ulbah, Majid Muhsin, 'Isam al-Qadi, Radi Qandil, Muhammad Nasir, Salah Ma'ani [of Al-Sa'iqah], Farhan Abu al-Hayja, Hatim Ka'wash, Nabil Hamid, Fu'ad Dabbur, Ibrahim al-Atrash, Dawud al-Salti, Samir Ghawshah [of the Palestinian Popular Struggle Front], Khalid 'Abd al-Majid, Ibrahim Muslih, Salih Zaydani, Ibrahim al-Shihabi, Mahmud 'Azzam, Nazim Fa'ur, Mustafah Radwan, Jamil Maraqah, Rushdi Shahin, 'Abd al-Rahman Marar, Muhammad Zuhdi al-Nashashibi [PLO Executive Committee member], Rif'at al-Nimr, Shawkat al-Hindi, Fa'iq Wiraq, Jamil al-Tabari, Muhammad 'Ali 'Awdah, Yusuf al-Bandak, 'Uthman Abu Hashiyah, Sa'id Hammud, 'Abd al-Rahman Jabarah, As'ad [surname left blank], Ibrahim Bakr, Sabri Jiryis, Hisham al-Khatib, Yusuf al-Khatib, Salah al-Dabbagh, 'Abd al-Jawad Salih [PLO Executive Committee member], 'Arabi 'Awwad, 'Abd al-Muhsin Abu Mayzar [PLO Executive Committee member], Ishaq al-Khatib, Sulayman al-Najjab, Bahjat Abu Gharbiyah [of the Palestinian Popular Struggle Front], Ilyas Shufani, Ahmad Qahwaji, Ahmad Hamzah al-Natshah, Yusuf al-Sayih, Nimr al-Masri, Sa'id 'Aziz, Yasir 'Amr, Khalid al-Fahum, Khadr 'Abdallah, Sami Salamah, Hanna Qahhat, 'Adnan Dirbas, As'ad 'Abd al-Rahman, Ibrahim al-Khatib, 'Abdallah al-Danna, and 'Ali 'Abd al-Rahman.

CSO: 4400/46

FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSSES GULF, ARAB ISSUES

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 406, 1 Dec 84 pp 16-22

[Interview with Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal, Saudi foreign minister, by Riyadh Najib al-Rayyis: "The Age of Petroleum Has Not Yet Ended; the Arabs' Strength Is In Their Potentials, Not In Their Resources; The Only Thing We Want From America Is Justice and Evenhandedness; We Know Nothing Of a New American Initiative; We Appreciate the Soviet Union's Role and We Are In Constant Contact With It; We Are For the Unity and the Legitimacy of the PLO and Will Accept No Fragmentation of Palestinian Ranks"]

[Text] Throughout my long professional career, no press interview has worn me out the way this one with Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal did, not because Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal is a man of few words, or because it is difficult to talk with him, but because time was short and the discussion was so enjoyable that you wish time would stand still so that you could finish the interview.

While the Saudi foreign minister is very sparing in granting press interviews, time was even scantier. The journalist who wants to interview him has to be patient and long-suffering if he wants to surprise this diplomatic prince in a moment of candor. The struggle is not between journalist and prince, but between the prince and time, and between time and the journalist. However, in the time span allotted to get acquainted with Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal and begin interviewing him, you have to compress time in order to get in as many ideas as possible. The man does not balk at any question, shows no reserve in his answers, and has no mental blocks. You do sense, however, the short time separating question and answer.

Whereas under ordinary circumstances the struggle is between journalist and time, during the fifth Gulf summit conference in Kuwait this struggle became a struggle with rigorous security measures, which added to the race with time an element of taking your chances with the police. But the journalist forgets the thirsty hours, the pressure of waiting, the doubts of the security men surrounding him, and the suspicious looks thrown at him by everyone who notices his presence in an unusual place at an unusual hour, as

soon as he gets in to see Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal, standing tall and smiling welcomingly, asking the journalist, "Where shall we begin?" But it is the Saudi foreign minister himself who begins by reviewing general daily and political events. The journalist wants to relax, but he is afraid that time will get away from him. The situation is saved by the serving of coffee, and the journalist seizes this opportunity to begin the interview.

This interview lasted about 2 hours, sandwiched in between last week's meetings of the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] foreign ministers' conference, which was preparing for the fifth Gulf summit conference in Kuwait. Without a doubt, this interview was the fullest, most comprehensive and frankest interview with the Saudi foreign minister for a long time, since not a single idea was left unexplored. There were no questions prepared in advance, and there was no specific order to the ideas which were discussed. The prince's brilliant mind, the magic of his speech, and his diplomatic frankness determined the interview's main topics and the divisions between them. Let's stop talking and get down to the interview.

[Question] Let's start with the fifth Gulf summit. What makes the Kuwait summit different from others?

[Answer] One thing distinguishes this Gulf summit from others: something which we might call tireless work to achieve results. Our meetings are remarkable for their constant emphasis on building the foundations which will allow joint Gulf action to achieve the desired results and which will grant it success. If there is one distinguishing feature of the Kuwait summit, it is the completion of the groundwork and the main guidelines.

Work on the economic agreement, or the "umbrella agreement for Gulf action," has been completed, and it is beginning to be implemented. There has also been good progress on the strategic agreement. Agreement on various aspects of political cooperation was reached in previous summits and meetings. Once this summit makes a decision on military strategy and comes to an agreement in principle on applying the economic agreement, we will be able to say that the basic preparations for Gulf action will have been completed and can be carried out.

[Question] Is it possible to consider what you termed the "basic preparations" for the GCC, such as the military strategy agreement, a practical matter and not a theoretical issue?

[Answer] The real purpose of military strategy is for us to protect our region ourselves; i.e. for us to rely on each other, with the help of God, and not on anyone else. But how can we attain this goal without sacrificing the security of the Gulf states? For this reason, we must concentrate on building up the GCC states according to a common concept, in order to give each one a military capability. We have sensed--even before the completion of the military strategy--the many benefits which this approach will have in combining and raising the efficiency of each state's military performance without exception, as was apparent during the maneuvers of the First and Second Peninsula Armored Corps. This is a positive development benefitting the area as a whole.

The GCC states are certainly the enemy of no one, and they have no foreign ambitions. Their goal is self-protection through self-reliance. The principle of self-reliance in self-defense will inevitably put our states and surrounding ones at ease, and will play a positive role in imparting security and stability to our international policy.

[Question] Some people say that the GCC's achievements over the last 4 years have been purely formal, not in-depth or fundamental.

[Answer] Naturally, my reply to such a statement is characterized by a sense of injury, because of my belief in the GCC. In the final analysis, the deciding factor is the practical results and the socio-economic benefits which the Gulf people feel across the board, from the ability to travel from one country to another to the easing of restrictions and the opening up of joint economic action.

As for the military and political aspects, you must not forget that there is a war going on in our area, which has not yet extended to the Gulf states. No doubt God has been merciful to us, but nevertheless our joint efforts within the GCC have led to this result, in view of the defensive measures we have taken to protect our security, which in turn have led to regional stability.

It may be the very nature, and even the most important feature, of the GCC meetings that there are no surprises. Work goes on between summits in an effort to build firm bases that will achieve gains for the Gulf citizens.

A New Strategy To Face the War

[Question] Do the firm bases you just spoke of include a new strategy vis-a-vis the Iraq-Iran war?

[Answer] The basic principle on which we non-participants in the war are operating is to prevent it from spreading. But in order to bring this war to an end, both warring parties have to stop fighting. Wars usually end with either the victory of one side and the defeat of the other, or with a peaceful solution agreed to by both combatants. Nobody wants a victor-vanquished situation, because Iraq and Iran are neighboring Muslim countries whose resources can hopefully be employed for Arab and Islamic causes.

Iraq has repeatedly expressed its desire and willingness to end the war in such a way as to preserve Iran's basic, essential interests. We are happy with this and appreciate Iraq's stand, and we hope that the Iranians will show the same positive spirit, so that all the Gulf states can share in ending the war--something they have tried to do ever since it began, because they appreciate just how harmful and dangerous it is.

[Question] Has the Kuwait summit been able to see any response on the part of the Iranians at this stage?

[Answer] So far, we are just hoping, and we hope that this will be justified and that our brothers in Iran will respond to the desires of all the Islamic countries, because the tragedy has exceeded all bounds. Therefore, there are no excuses, because we remember who is at fault, who is the cause, and who is guilty.

This psychological, social and economic war has negatively affected our region, in addition to opening it up to possible foreign intervention. The combatant Gulf states have to gauge the importance of this danger. For this reason, the circumstances oblige all of us to re-evaluate our position, and we hope that Iran will re-evaluate its stand as well and agree to the desired peaceful solution.

[Question] Is there actually a Gulf initiative which the fifth summit might discuss or announce?

[Answer] At any given moment, the GCC states are aware of Iran's desire for a peaceful solution. There is no initiative which we have not tried. We are prepared to launch any initiative with Iran, as long as that initiative also coincides with Iraq's desires.

[Question] What is Syria's part in this initiative? Syrian Vice President 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam and Syrian Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shar' visited Tehran last week, and then Shar' went on to Riyadh. Was this part of the Gulf efforts with Iran?

[Answer] There is no connection between the Syrian visit and the Gulf initiative. I cannot speak for Syria, but we hope that everyone who has firm relations with Iran will play their part in convincing our brothers in Tehran to end this war quickly and peacefully.

Sovereign Reaction to Violations of Airspace

[Question] The Iranian stand on last month's hijacking of a Saudi airplane was noticeably positive. Are there signs of improvement in Saudi-Iranian air space?

[Answer] We were openly grateful to the Iranian government for this stand and happy with its positive attitude, and we hope that it will be a good beginning. I would like to emphasize here that we and the other GCC states will seize any opportunity to improve relations and stop the war. It is in our interest to end this war in such a way as to preserve two neighboring Muslim countries which are basic pillars of the Islamic nation.

[Question] Can the ball now be considered to be in the Iranian court?

[Answer] I don't look at the matter this way. I look at it from the point of view that the states of the region--Iraq, the GCC states or Iran--are a single body working jointly. The responsibility for regional security and

peace is a joint responsibility. Every one of these countries has a part to play here, which cannot be fulfilled except through everyone's cooperation. I am not placing particular responsibility on any party, for the responsibility is collective, if we consider the well-being of our area and desire its stability and development, which naturally cannot be achieved unless the war ends. Therefore, the GCC states will remain in a state of perplexity as long as the conflict between two neighboring Muslim states continues. We don't sacrifice one eye for the sake of the other eye.

[Question] Preventing the expansion of the war is one of the political, strategic and military goals we are speaking of. Does that mean that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will continue to react to any Iranian violation of Saudi air space, as happened last summer?

[Answer] This matter has no connection with military circumstances. It is any state's sovereign right to react to a violation of its airspace at any time. Reacting to any violation of Saudi airspace is a natural thing governed by the kingdom's sovereignty, not by the circumstances of the Iraq-Iran war.

[Question] What would the GCC states do if the war lasted another 1, 2, or 3 years? Can the Gulf bear up under the continuation of this long war?

[Answer] There is no doubt that the continuation of the Iraq-Iran war imposes all sorts of contradictions, negative aspects and dangers for the Gulf states. The war might possibly spread and expand, or it might open the field to foreign intervention, the chances of which inevitably increase as the war drags on. This is why you will find this issue on the agenda of the fifth Gulf summit and every other summit and meeting being held.

For this reason, we are constantly, tirelessly trying to find firm ground which will give both warring sides the chance for peace.

[Question] Is the standardization of weapons sources, training and GCC defense infrastructure one of the foundations of the new military strategy?

[Answer] The basic guideline here is self-development by the GCC states according to a common concept. You speak of standardizing armament sources; the answer to that is more military than political or strategic. If there are advantages to a specific weapon, we will no doubt try to get it. If one weapon is better than another, we will also try to get it. Every country looks for better weapons. Standardizing or diversifying weapons sources is part of strategy, but is not a goal in itself. In reality, it is part of the creation of a Gulf capability which can move under any circumstance.

Has the Petroleum Age Ended?

[Question] Has the petroleum age ended? Has oil lost its importance as a effective political weapon on the world scene?

[Answer] I am not one of those who look upon natural and economic resources as weapons. If they are exploited properly, they are only potentials for benefitting these countries, raising their standard of living, and making them more capable of looking after their interests. In my view, oil is not a weapon but a potential.

It is a mistake to say that petroleum's role in the world economy has ended, and that this strategic substance has become useless. This is a mistaken point of view with no basis in fact.

The price of and demand for oil dropped as a result of an economic catastrophe in the principal oil-consuming countries. The growth rate in some of these countries dropped to zero, which naturally led to convulsions in the world economy because of the infrastructure of the industrial states which have a great demand for petroleum, and because of economic considerations going to the very heart of the Western economic system. This basic factor must be emphasized as the basic reason for the international economic sickness. As for the statement that oil is no longer a strategic commodity and has become unimportant to the international economy, this has been refuted.

[Question] This convulsion in the world economy that you speak of has deprived us of a forceful political tool which we, as producer and exporter of this energy source, had possessed.

[Answer] This is a pessimistic view of the Arab world--to say that the Arabs are nothing without their oil, and are everything with their oil. The Arabs survived before oil, and they will survive after it. They came out of this arid Arabian Peninsula carrying nothing but a waterskin and some dates, and in spite of everything came to play a major world role.

It is unfortunate that this pessimistic theory has been applied to the Arab nation as well, for its capabilities and resources are not founded on a natural resource like oil. Without the slightest doubt, the existence of oil gives the Arab world the resources and capabilities to build itself up economically, socially and militarily in order to acquire the international weight which will help it protect its interests and defend itself. But oil is no substitute for the Arab man and his innate ability to protect his interests and gains.

[Question] Apart from the oil weapon, we are obviously not considered an active or effective force in international politics, in this era of Arab disunity and fragmentation.

[Answer] I want to ask you this: is the reason for our lack of world influence the drop in demand for oil or Arab splintering and fragmentation? I remember that when the tripartite aggression against Egypt occurred in 1956, the Arab states in general were nothing in the petroleum field, or even militarily; that is to say, they had no economic or military weight. But because they were a single force, a single hand, a single heart, they forced Israel, along with Britain and France, two states which were at the time military superpowers, to withdraw from Arab territory.

To say that the Arabs have lost their significance because the demand for their petroleum has dropped belittles the Arabs and their will. As an Arab, I am disgusted with this attitude. The Arab nation is built on its individual members, not on the price of oil or how many gallons an individual in France or America consumes.

No New American Initiative

[Question] Now that President Reagan has won the election, what is your opinion of Arab-American relations? Is there anything new?

[Answer] As for relations with the United States, I believe that there is no inconsistency in the Arab attitude towards establishing good relations founded on common interests between ourselves and Washington. If there is any such inconsistency, it lies in United States policy towards the region and the Palestinian cause. What we are hoping for from the United States, especially since it is a superpower with weight as well as responsibility for international peace and security, is to be just and even-handed in its attitude towards the Middle East issue and towards solving the Arab-Israeli conflict in a manner which will protect the human rights of the Palestinian people. We are not asking America to be on our side, and we are not asking it to go any further than the international stand, which has outlined a just, comprehensive peace for the region.

Now that the elections are over, we hope to turn over a new leaf with the United States. The American administration is capable of taking new action, and we hope that it will move in the direction of a just, equitable solution.

[Question] Is there a new American initiative? If so, how will it differ from previous initiatives?

[Answer] We are not seeking a new American initiative. The problem with the Palestinian cause and the Arab-Israeli struggle does not lie in re-analyzing the situation and what ought to be done. These things are known. We only want to elucidate the matters which have been agreed on and which lie at the heart of the world's desire to solve the Palestinian cause and put an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict. We hope that the United States will take an active part in reaching a solution.

As for a new American initiative, we have certainly not seen anything so far.

We have heard that the United States is adhering to President Reagan's September 1982 statement, which represents the United States' viewpoint about how to reach a solution to the Palestinian problem. We likewise have our stand on this matter, as expressed in the Fez Conference resolutions. I don't imagine that there are any new factors which would impel the Arab states to seek or expect any basis other than the resolutions of the Fez conference.

[Question] Does the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia support the call for an international conference to discuss the Middle East issue, with the Soviet Union attending?

[Answer] The idea of an international conference was mentioned in the Fez resolutions. The framework is not important; as we see it, what is important is the content, whatever form it might take--an international conference, the Security Council, or any other form--as long as there can be negotiations. I do not believe that there is any particular purpose in determining a particular framework. As I said, the important thing is the content.

In the future, the world will not be asked to expect the Arab states to change their stand or point of view regarding a peaceful solution. The Arab states will never change their point of view, which was put forth at the Fez summit. The obstacle to a peaceful solution is not that the Arab states have an obscure stand on how to reach a peaceful solution; the obstacle is Israel's refusal. Israel has rejected the Fez resolutions, the Reagan initiative, and all related European initiatives without even considering them. The world must come to grips with the insurmountable obstacle, which is not the Arab states but Israel.

Calling On Eastern Europe to Intervene

[Question] A certain Arab and Saudi openness towards Europe has been observed. Is that due to a desire to create another Western power to counterbalance the United States, since these Arab-European relations are considerable?

[Answer] The European continent has many interests linking it to the Arab world. The Kingdom, as part of the Arab world, also has many interests in common with the European countries. Our relations are characterized by geographic and historical proximity. Quite often this history has been negative, but past negatives must be an incentive for better relations in the future, in view of the existence of interests common to both parties.

From the standpoint of geographic closeness and common interests, our openness towards Europe is only natural. I believe that Europe is concerned only about itself, without being taken as a balance between one bloc and another. In addition, Europe's international weight is also very important. Modern times have taught us that looking to a larger bloc must not obscure our view of other issues unrelated to the international superpowers or cause us to ignore them.

Our cooperation with Europe must not be viewed from the standpoint of balance of powers, since it is the spontaneous result of basic, personal interests in cooperating with Europe. We see the same thing among the European countries themselves, in their cooperation with us or with one another. The European states have a certain independence in their dealings with the Arab world, and the Eastern European countries have a certain independence from the Western European bloc. This is only correct, in my opinion, and will inevitably have its effect on the two superpowers by creating a kind of balance in the way the two superpowers view issues which arise in various parts of the world. For example, the Western European countries will inevitably influence how the

United States views the Palestinian cause. We hope that the Eastern European countries, the allies of the Soviet Union, will have a similar effect in convincing the Soviet Union to moderate its stand towards Afghanistan. This is another issue which we are concerned about.

Relations With the Soviet Union

[Question] Why are there no diplomatic relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Soviet Union? What are the requirements or conditions for establishing relations between Riyadh and Moscow?

[Answer] First of all, diplomatic relations must not be given undue weight. The absence of diplomatic relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Soviet Union does not mean that the Kingdom ignores the Soviet Union. The Kingdom is recognized by the Soviet Union, and at one time there were diplomatic relations between them. It was not the Kingdom which terminated these relations; the Soviet Union terminated them itself when it withdrew its mission from Jiddah in the 1930's. Without a doubt, the Soviet decision was not caused by any hostility towards the Kingdom; what led to it was the lack of any bilateral dealings. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia does not have relations with many other countries, not just the Soviet Union; some are developing countries and some developed countries. This is not because we do not recognize these states or disregard them, but merely because there have been no dealings between us in the past which would justify diplomatic relations.

Second, the absence of diplomatic relations between Riyadh and Moscow does not mean that the Kingdom does not fully appreciate the Soviet Union's stand on the Palestinian cause and the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular. We fully appreciate the Soviet Union's stand on this matter at this moment in history, and the Kingdom's officials and His Highness King Fahd have expressed this appreciation. We have not forgotten that in the course of defending ourselves, Arab countries have relied on Soviet weapons to counter Israeli aggression in the region, and we appreciate that. The presence or absence of diplomatic relations does not express any disregard or lack of appreciation. Diplomatic relations are a means of communications, governed by definite circumstances which in the past have never come about with the Soviet Union, but which we hope can be achieved in the future.

Third, more important than all this is the Soviet role in the region. Because of our appreciation for this positive role, which we hope will become even more supportive of rights and justice, we hope that the Soviet Union will remove the contradictions in its regional policy and will reconsider the Afghanistan issue from the standpoint of truth and justice. We believe that the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, and the Afghani people's deprivation of their right to self-determination, injects a negative element into how the countries of the region view the Soviet Union. Therefore, the Soviet Union must show the world that it acknowledges the rights of the Afghani people just as much as it acknowledges the rights of the Palestinian people.

[Question] Does this mean that Afghanistan is the obstacle preventing the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Kingdom and the Soviet Union?

[Answer] The diplomatic situation must be isolated from the political role. As I mentioned, the diplomatic situation is the result of relations as a tool for contacts between states, and is governed by circumstances. If relations expand, and it becomes advantageous to establish relations in order to supervise these contacts, then such relations will be established.

Therefore, I believe that in the view of independent countries, the situation in Afghanistan reflects negatively on the Soviet Union, for these circumstances overturn the picture of a superpower responsible for world security and stability. In the final analysis, these countries see that the Soviet Union has invaded a region, occupied a country, and deprived a people of its self-determination, all of which is negative. But this does not mean that there are no contacts between us and the Soviet Union. Messages are constantly being exchanged, and there is ongoing consultation. There is no problem here.

[Question] We have noticed a certain disparity among the GCC countries when it comes to diplomatic relations. Kuwait has relations with the Soviet Union, and Oman and Kuwait both have relations with Communist China, and the United Arab Emirates joined them last month. Doesn't this create an imbalance in the GCC states' foreign policy?

[Answer] It is the sovereign right of any state to have relations with whomever it wants. I don't believe that this creates any disparity in GCC foreign policy, because the concept of cooperation among the Arab Gulf states does not impinge on the sovereignty of these states at all. We all cooperate, and our stands on diplomatic relations do not have to coincide.

[Question] What is the obstacle to Saudi relations with Communist China? Isn't the problem with China similar to the Afghanistan problem?

[Answer] The absence of diplomatic relations between Communist China and the Kingdom is due to a problem which originated in China. The occasional schisms in China (which we hope will be solved soon) have prevented the establishment of relations between Riyadh and Peking. Let me also reiterate here that the absence of relations between the two countries does not mean that we ignore China's presence. The schism in China did not result from anything the Kingdom did, but it is an established fact which we hope will come to an end.

The matter is governed not by Arab but by Chinese circumstances. When these circumstances change, the circumstances governing the establishment of diplomatic relations with China will inevitably change as well. We note with appreciation that efforts are now being made to solve this problem.

When and How Will Egypt Return?

[Question] What is the future outlook for relations with Egypt? Some people say that the Kingdom is not eager to resume relations with Egypt. If this is so, how did matters take this turn?

[Answer] How could you imagine that? Everyone who says that today was reproaching the Kingdom yesterday for hesitating to agree to Egypt's separation from the Arab world. It was the Kingdom which tried everything to mend the breach, because of its belief that Egypt and its people had a natural role in supporting Arab and Islamic causes, especially the Palestine cause, and because of its appreciation for the huge sacrifices which Egypt made for these causes. At that time, the Kingdom's desire that Egypt not be ostracized was plain, and we were blamed for our desire that Egypt remain in the Arab fold.

This desire has not changed, but has increased. We believe that the Arabs' main problem is their tendency to break up into cliques. It is abnormal for there to be a breach between Egypt, the largest Arab country, and the rest of the Arab world, especially when it comes to issues affecting Arab destiny, like the Palestinian cause and the Arab-Israeli conflict. For this reason, we have been motivated by a desire for Egypt's return.

But we also believe it our responsibility to say that Egypt's return must unite the Arab world, not create new splinter groups; we want Egypt's return to result in Arab solidarity, not more schism. Since the decision to kick Egypt out was a collective one, we are hoping for another collective decision restoring it to the Arab fold. I do not believe that the Kingdom's clearly-stated stand is at all obscure.

[Question] But what would be the context for adopting the necessary decision for Egypt's return to the Arabs?

[Answer] This cannot be determined unilaterally by Saudi Arabia or the Arab states, for it depends on both sides--Egypt and the Arab states. Naturally, the purpose behind bringing Egypt back into the Arab fold is restoring it to membership in the Arab League. In this respect, certain legal points must be brought up: is Egypt committed to the joint defense agreement, or the economic agreement, or any of the other Arab agreements that are the criteria for membership in the Arab League? We cannot answer these questions ourselves; Egypt must answer. We cannot make decisions for Egypt. The answer will come from Egypt and the other Arab states as soon as both sides come up with an idea as to how to get out of this situation.

[Question] Does the resumption of relations between Jordan and Egypt mean a return to the policy of Arab axes? Does the GCC have a unified stand on the resumption of relations with Egypt?

[Answer] We hope not, for we don't want Egypt's return to make a new crack in the Arab ranks. Since I am being asked to judge the GCC states according to their official stands, I must say that I see a great similarity in their positions on this issue. All the GCC states have the same basic view of the issue: that Egypt is very important; that it should have excellent relations with other Arab states; that it should be brought back into the Arab League along with all its resources and abilities; and that this return must not bring about a new crack in the Arab ranks.

No Saudi Absence in Lebanon

[Question] The Saudis seem to have been staying away from the Lebanese scene. Is there anything new in the Kingdom's stand on Lebanon?

[Answer] I definitely do not believe that the Saudis have been staying away from the Lebanese scene. The Kingdom has helped draw up solutions for the Lebanese problem ever since it began, and it will continue to make every effort to help Lebanon to the best of its abilities. The Kingdom has been one of the most effective contributors in this regard.

When the Arab peacekeeping forces were set up at the beginning of the Lebanese crisis, the Kingdom took part in them and provided political, military, economic and social support. Ever since the Riyadh conference, we have given whatever the legitimate Lebanese governments have asked for.

The absence of a Saudi embassy in Beirut is due to domestic Lebanese security factors, and not to any Saudi desire. I do not believe that cooperation between ourselves and Lebanon is governed solely by the presence or absence of an embassy in Beirut. The absence of an embassy no doubt disrupts person-to-person cooperation with Lebanon, a fact which we regret very much. But Lebanon has its own internal security factors and problems, which we understand.

Naturally, we are happy at how cohesively the Lebanese have been facing up to Israel in an attempt to get it to leave Lebanon. But we find Lebanon's internal security situation painful, for it sets one Lebanese group against another, which weakens both the Lebanese position and the Arab states' ability to help Lebanon solve its problems. All we can hope for is the achievement of accord and harmony among the various Lebanese groups, so that all the Arab states, including the Kingdom, will be able to help Lebanon escape from its ordeal.

For Palestinian Legitimacy And Against Splinter Groups

[Question] Where does the Kingdom stand with respect to the crisis within the PLO and the convening of the Palestine National Council?

[Answer] Ever since 1967, the Arab nation has followed a strategy, resolved upon at the Khartoum summit and reconfirmed at the Algeria summit, consisting of supporting the PLO as the legitimate representative and spokesman for the Palestinian people's desire to return to their homeland and determine their own destiny, and as the body entrusted with protecting the interests of the Palestinian people. This strategy is disrupted whenever there are any splits within the organization. Therefore, the Kingdom's greatest desire has always been that no divisions occur within the PLO to split its ranks, because that would upset the entire Arab strategy followed since 1967.

Therefore, we hope that our Palestinian brothers, who are ultimately responsible for their own actions, will re-examine and avoid this serious

situation so dangerous in our view, because they are charged with the well-being of the Palestinian people, and because the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Arab nation's struggle for survival, is at the heart of the Palestinian cause.

But the Kingdom is not a party to the Palestinian-Palestinian dispute. I sincerely believe that the Arab states should not intervene on either side of this dispute either, and that they should categorically reject any Palestinian splintering. The Palestinians must face up to their responsibilities, and must be aware of the danger threatening them.

The Kingdom supports Palestinian legitimacy and its consolidation, and our Palestinian brothers' rapid, urgent efforts to become a single force. There is no reason to forfeit the cause at this decisive time in the history of the Arab-Israeli struggle. The situation is dangerous, very much so, especially since the catastrophic crack in the PLO, which has sapped Palestinian legitimacy, occurred with Palestinian support and approval. The issue is not one of individuals, but of substance.

Iran and Turkey: The Substitute and the Original

[Question] Could you outline the Kingdom's policy towards Iran?

[Answer] The Kingdom's policy towards Iran is based on the principles of mutual respect for independence and non-interference in internal affairs, regardless of the type of regime. We expect our Iranian brothers to treat us the same way. We want not just normal, but excellent relations with Iran, because Iran is an Islamic country. The Kingdom, the source of Islam and the starting point of Muhammad's mission, with its unequivocal commitment to Islam, its application of the Islamic Shari'ah, and its desire for Islamic solidarity, also desires better relations with Iran.

This stand will result in improved relations as long as Iran has a similar stand. Therefore, we hope that we and Iran have a mutual desire for relations on this level. We believe that Iran has an important part to play in the Gulf area in particular and western Asia in general. Geographically, of all the Islamic countries it has the longest borders with the Soviet Union in a pivotal area. In addition to bordering on the Soviet Union, Iran is the neighbor of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Turkey and the Gulf states. Because of Iran's extremely important geographic and strategic location, it is in our interest that this neighboring country be stable, its interests be maintained, and its situation be secure.

[Question] Do you share the opinion that Turkey's new role in the region is that of a substitute or stand-in for America?

[Answer] Many commentators believe in the conspiracy theory of foreign policy; i.e. that every action has a plot behind it. Consequently, they view Turkey as nothing more than a tool, which belittles the rights of the Turkish people and Turkey itself. We must remember that for hundreds of years this

state was the Islamic world's fortress, confronting the Crusades and defending Islam. All empires, at one time or another in their history, fall into decay. Therefore, we must not forget the many Turkish contributions to Islamic causes.

Over the last 2 years, the basic change in Turkey has been its openness to the Islamic world and the East in general. We must not forget Turkey's problems during the First World War, which resulted in the dismemberment of the empire, and during later wars, and the problems it has experienced in economic development. But the negative factors which had governed its relations with the Arab world have now disappeared, and the situation in Turkey has stabilized and its relations with its Arab neighbors have improved. On the basis of these healthy developments benefitting both Turkey and the Arab countries, we can establish balanced relations which preserve the interests of both. Together we can face the problems of the region as an integral part of it.

For this reason, we must deal with Turkey as Turkey, not as a replacement for America. Turkey is very important in its own right, because of the Turkish people's regional geographic and historic importance as a bridge between East and West.

[Question] Do you believe that the Kingdom is giving enough attention to African affairs? Hasn't the Kingdom's concern for African affairs been greater in the past than it is now?

[Answer] From working in the Foreign Ministry, I know that we have opened at least 10 embassies in Africa recently. Cooperation between the Kingdom and the African countries, be it economic, social or political, has grown rapidly, as has the scope of cultural cooperation between ourselves and the African states.

But when you say that the Kingdom's concern for African affairs was greater in the past than it is now, you must not forget that our openness towards Africa started from scratch during the reign of the late King Faysal, since most of the African states just recently gained their independence in the sixties. At that time, King Faysal toured the newly independent African countries, which were antagonistic towards the Arabs. In those days, most African countries had relations with Israel, and did not perceive Arab issues clearly. The result of the trip was that the African states came to understand the facts about the Arab-Israeli conflict.

As I mentioned, bilateral relations between the Kingdom and the African countries have grown tremendously in the last 7 years. There are, for example, so many visits by Saudi and African officials that delegations come and go every week. Relations between ourselves and Africa have grown tremendously.

[Question] The Kingdom has basic, organic ties to the Islamic world. But how can relations with the Islamic world help the Arabs?

[Answer] Our relations with the Islamic world are ones of belonging, and it is a mistake to look upon them as being merely utilitarian. As an Islamic country, we cannot accept the idea of developing relations with another Islamic country in order to exploit them for the sake of a certain cause. We are one nation, the Islamic nation, and therefore we have relations with the Islamic world because of the intrinsic value we see in these relations themselves, not just to exploit them. As an Arab country, we are grateful to the Islamic world for supporting our Arab causes, and in turn we Arabs support the Islamic countries on matters which affect them. Islamic cooperation and solidarity is fundamental to the Kingdom's policy, in view of our sense of membership in this nation, and because we feel that the Islamic nation's interests can be achieved through such cooperation.

The concept of Islamic solidarity is embodied in the organizational structure of the Islamic Conference Organization [ICO], and in its subsidiary organizations which look after various Islamic affairs. We must not forget that working within a group of this size is bound to be either difficult or exhausting, but the goal is to consolidate relations among Islamic countries, no matter how difficult or thorny the path. The mere fact that 44 countries belong to the ICO makes things difficult. But it has been politically effective in dealing with the fundamental issues of the Islamic nation, such as Palestine, Afghanistan, and Islamic minorities throughout the world.

In the economic context, the results of the comprehensive economic agreement signed so far by half the member countries, which created the Islamic Bank and its subsidiaries, have made us very happy, because this is automatically in the interest of all the Islamic countries. Broader interests also derive from the Islamic countries' geographic importance and their huge populations.

If, through cooperation and harmony, the Islamic world can solve its own problems and thereby alleviate world problems, this will be a great thing. If this cooperation leads to raising the Islamic people's standard of living and solving economic problems, this will also be a great thing. It is important for this cooperation to lead not to dependence on others, but to self-reliance, which will no doubt have a significant effect on this nation.

The sword of time descends upon the journalist, and the interview with Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal ends just as the doorbell announces that the time has come for the foreign ministers' session. The journalist stands up, shaking hands, taking his leave, and declaring his thanks.

While this interview did not need a preface, it definitely does not need an epilogue, for its story will become journalistic history, although this is not the time to tell that story. There will definitely have to be another interview, no matter how long the journey or how difficult the wait.

SAUDIS DESCRIBE FOURTH DEVELOPMENT PLAN

GF251325 Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 24 Nov 84 p 1

[Text] The organs of the Saudi Ministry of Planning are preparing to complete all the programs, projects, measures, and detailed operation outlines for the execution of the fourth development plan as of 1 Rajab 1405 Hegira, corresponding to 22 March 1985, when the new budget comes into effect.

The outlines of this plan are represented by the turning over to the private sector the Saudi airline company, the telecommunications network, and even the electricity and water companies.

The years of the development plan will also see the rationalization of present government subsidies; the application of compulsory military service; and the establishment of consultative, political institutions to participate in governing the country within the Islamic system, for which the kingdom is known, and in accordance with the rulings of Islamic canon law, which lays down the basic outlines for any action, regulation, or programs for administering the country.

The development plan also provides for the possibility of permitting private sector investors to purchase a share in some principal government institutions, such as Sabik Company, and Petromin and its companies. These companies are owned by the foreign corporations. These companies are owned by the Saudi Government either wholly or by sharing ownership with foreign corporations. Among others, indications of the development plan policy are:

1. A reduction in the controls on fees charged by private hospitals.
2. Developing commercial courts and offices of public notaries.
3. Establishing a system of trading in shares under government supervision.
4. Encouraging the establishment of national financial institutions for the investment of private capital inside the kingdom.
5. Compulsory education for all children, which at present is voluntary, even though most families send their children to school.

6. Limiting scholarships to exceptional students and to those who concentrate on using advanced technology in the middle and higher education levels.

The development plan reemphasizes the aim of reducing dependence on oil exports; the continued development of industry and agriculture; and the making of real, structural changes in the Saudi economy, through continual change, in order to create a diversified economic foundation, while stressing profitable projects that are export oriented. The development plan also devotes attention to investment in mining and further mineral discoveries by modern remote-sensing methods.

CSO: 4400/46

ANGER AT BRITISH MIDEAST POLICY MAY STOP ARMS SALES

Beirut AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 30, 26 Nov 84 pp 8, 9

[Text]

Saudi Arabia, angered by British policy in the Middle East and its press coverage of Saudi affairs, is threatening to halt negotiations on a one-billion-pound arms' deal for Tornado and Hawk aircraft. *The Observer* newspaper claims that King Fahd has intervened personally to suspend the deal and there are British fears that the contract may now be awarded to France.

Britain's defence minister, Michael Heseltine, was in Saudi Arabia last week in a bid to save the contract. He is said to have been given a severe "dressing down" at what the Saudi regard as the UK's poor record in the Middle East, which King Fahd contrasted unfavourably with France's, and the British press's preoccupation with scandals and intrigue among the Al-Saud family, while ignoring economic and political developments in the country.

According to *The Observer*, the King said that Britain had done nothing for the Arabs since Lord Carrington (then foreign secretary) sponsored the EEC's Venice Declaration, which called for an even-handed approach to the problems of the region and the recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organisation. Nor, say the Saudis, does Britain appreciate Riyadh's behind-the-scenes diplomatic efforts for peace in the region.

Both Saudi Arabia and Jordan, fearing the new political hegemony of Syria as well as the threat from Iran, have presented the United States and Britain with long lists of urgently required military hardware. The arms' requests are likely to meet strong opposition from the Israeli lobby in Washington and Britain, who will point out the threat to Israel's security and demand compensatory military aid to counter it.

Saudi Arabia is reported to have asked the US for up to 60 F-15 fighter aircraft, as well as MER-200 multiple-ejection bomb racks for the F-15s and additional fuel tanks to extend their range. The Saudis also want additional AWACS surveillance aircraft and up to 3,000 Stinger surface-to-air and Sidewinder air-to-air missiles. Washington will also be asked to replenish and upgrade existing military equipment.

King Hussein of Jordan, who recently told an Egyptian newspaper that he was looking elsewhere for military equipment because of the "unacceptable and humiliating conditions imposed by Washington", has a request for six Hawk surface-to-air missiles and up to 72 F-16 or F-20 aircraft already under consideration by the Reagan administration. The king has also asked for TPS-43 and TPS-63 air-defence radars, Stinger shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles, M-1 Abrams tanks and Hercules C-130 transport aircraft.

Despite the standing Israeli objection to military sales to Arab states, the Reagan administration, with the presidential elections successfully negotiated, might be more willing to agree to military supplies as a way of toughening up pro-Western states in the Middle East, such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia, as well as improving relations with them.

However, the administration may balk at supplying Jordan with F-16s, preferring to offer the less-advanced F-20— instead. Furthermore, the secretary of state, George Shultz, is also likely to object to selling high-performance aircraft as a way of "punishing" Jordan for King Hussein's criticism of President

Reagan's policy in the Middle East.

Israel has also pointed out that she may have to spend more money on defence and apply for more military aid to counter the improved Arab military technology. Israel's prime minister, Shimon Peres, is also likely to make the point that his own survival will be at risk and the possibility of a negotiated settlement of the West Bank and Palestinian issues made more difficult if a harder-line government takes office in the face of a new "Arab military threat".

Saudi requests for military sales from Britain, however, are likely to be well received and the Beirut *Daily Star* reports that contracts are in the offing for the supply of 40 Tornado IDS long-range strike aircraft, up to 60 Hawk trainer and ground-attack aircraft and some 800 state-of-the-art Challenger tanks.

A Royal Saudi Air Force evaluation team is reported to have been at RAF Honington recently and long-withheld West German approval for the sale of Tornados, has now been given. The Tornado deal could be worth up to £1,200mn and aircraft earmarked for RAF service might be diverted to the Saudis. Any agreement would also include training and maintenance support. The Challenger tank contract is reported to be worth a further £1,200mn and that for the Hawks about £300mn.

Britain's defence minister, Michael Heseltine, was in Saudi Arabia last week for talks with his counterpart, Prince Sultan, on the possible sale of military aircraft, including Tornados and Rapier jets, according to reports from Riyadh.

CSO: 4400/47

WHEAT PROGRAM SUCCESSFUL BUT EXPENSIVE

Beirut AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 29, 19 Nov 84 p 9

[Text]

The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) has nominated Saudi Arabia for a certificate of merit to mark the country's efforts towards self-sufficiency in wheat production. The task that now faces the Kingdom is to broaden the success story of wheat to other agricultural products.

The success in boosting production from a meagre 3,000 tonnes in 1975 to 1.3mn tonnes in 1984 is primarily due to government incentives, such as paying \$1,000 per tonne of wheat — six times the world market price. Other government incentives to help develop agriculture include free distribution of cultivable land and free vaccines to protect livestock, long-term interest-free loans, financial grants covering up to 50 per cent of the cost of agricultural machinery and improvements in road, irrigation and drainage systems.

Despite this progress, Saudi Arabia's wheat production is still small by world standards. In the Middle East alone, Egypt, Morocco, Turkey and Syria each produce more than Saudi Arabia. This year, Turkey's production will be the largest of the group at 17mn tonnes and Syria's, because of drought, the smallest, producing only one million tonnes (50 per cent of the 1982 level). Saudi Arabia continues to import more than 100,000 tonnes of "soft" wheat (80 per cent of which comes from the US) to make Western style bread and pastries.

Critics of the government programme argue that the efforts towards self-sufficiency in wheat production have cost the country too much. They point out that the price subsidies will cost \$1.3bn this year alone, while saving the country only about \$300mn a year in decreased wheat imports. They also claim that government subsidies have created lopsided development in wheat at the expense of other crops, causing increased costs in storing the grain for both

the farmer and the government. The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) estimates that about 275,000 hectares are now under wheat, or roughly 60 per cent of all of the Kingdom's arable land in 1982. In the meantime the area devoted to barley production, necessary for fodder to feed livestock, continues to decline. Critics also attribute the fall in the water table to the increased production because most of the wheat is grown using expensive irrigation systems that tap underground water. What is needed, they say, is a cut in the price of wheat, more incentives for the production of different agricultural products and more investment for research into rainfed farming and other cropping techniques to decrease the Kingdom's dependence on foreign expertise that is often inappropriate to Saudi conditions.

The proponents of the wheat programme say that slightly over one per cent of public spending is a small price to pay for wheat self-sufficiency. More importantly, subsidies allow the farmer to improve his land, which will benefit any crop the government chooses to target for development.

As evidence of the commitment to agricultural improvement, Dr Abdul-Rahman al-Sheikh, minister of agriculture and animal husbandry last week approved seven projects worth \$17.97mn. They include three ventures worth \$5.64mn to produce an additional 1,886 tonnes of wheat and 5,784 tonnes of fodder annually. Two greenhouse projects, costing \$2.89mn, will boost vegetable production by 1,025 tonnes/year. Two other projects, costing \$4.73mn each, are for sheep-fattening and for increasing broiler-chicken production to 1.3mn a year.

In total, Saudi Arabia's five-year development plan (1980-1985) allocated \$1.5bn for agricultural loans and \$75mn for farm subsidies. Experts say the government will probably continue to back its winning formula for increased wheat production.

EUROPE REITERATES DEMAND FOR PROTECTION AGAINST PETROCHEMICALS

Beirut AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 29, 19 Nov 84 pp 9, 10

[Text]

The much-heralded trade talks between members of the European Economic Community and the Gulf Cooperation Council predicted for this fall have yet been held, but the war of words between European and Arab petrochemical producers continues. The recent flurry of articles in the Western press on the threat of the Saudi Arabian petrochemical industry prompted the Kingdom's Minister of Industry and Electricity, Mr. Abdel-Aziz Al-Zamil, to condemn the "alarmist" nature of the media campaign.

But the latest clamour on the European side over the competitive threat posed by foreign (particularly Saudi Arabian) petrochemical industries comes from the United Kingdom. Its National Economic Development Office (Nedo) called on the British government to impose tariffs on foreign producers who do not voluntarily place price and volume restraints on their petrochemical shipments.

In a report published two weeks ago, Nedo said Saudi Arabia's industry posed the most immediate threat but also blamed France and Italy for encouraging output increases in inefficient plants. The author of the report, Professor Gordon Beveridge, said at least one-fifth of the 50,000 jobs in the UK petrochemical and plastics industry would be lost by 1990 unless radical steps are taken by the hitherto indifferent British government.

Nedo favours forcing foreign producers to accept voluntary restraints on the volumes they ship as well as on prices and, failing that, placing EEC tariffs on petrochemical imports. Nedo also called on the government to pressure France and Italy to shut plants and cut output. More importantly, Nedo wants the government to reduce the petroleum revenue tax levied on naphta, the feedstock used by British plastics producers. Lower feedstock costs would help compete with the Saudis who use the far cheaper ethane, Nedo argued.

The clamour is not likely to subside with four more petrochemical plants scheduled to start production in Saudi Arabia between January and September 1985. Up to 260,000 tonnes/year of linear low-density polyethylene (lldp) will be produced at the Al-Jubail Petroleum Company (Kemya) plant which is due to go on stream at the beginning of next year. Experts say output from that plant alone is enough to undermine prices in a glutted plastics market. But the Saudi Yanbu Petrochemical Company (Yanpet) will start producing 205,000 additional tonnes/year of lldp by January '85 and 90,000 tonnes/year of linear high-density polyethylene (lhdp) a month later. Its ethylene unit (capacity 455,000 tonnes/year) will go on stream at the company's Red Sea coast plant even earlier, in December 1984. Yanpet will also start producing ethylene glycol in March 1985; projected yearly output: 220,000 tonnes.

The Arabian Petrochemical Company (Petrokemya) plant is next in line and will begin operations in mid-1985. Its Jubail plant will only be producing ethylene at the rate of 500,000 tonnes/year. The Eastern Petrochemical Company (Sharq) has set the third quarter of 1985 as its target date to go on stream. Sharq will be producing 130,000 tonnes/year of lldp and 300,000 tonnes/year of ethylene glycol.

While some Saudi officials have publicly and angrily reacted to European calls for restrictions on the Kingdom's petrochemical goods, Saudi producers are adopting different tactics. Mr. Art Ferguson, president of Mobil Polymers International (in charge of Yanpet's marketing) was in Brussels in early October to explain his company's position. In a clear

attempt to dispel fears of price undercutting, Mr. Ferguson pointed out that Saudi Arabian petrochemicals (especially polyethylene) do not have a significant cost advantage. He said although manufacturing costs in Saudi Arabia were lower than in Europe, that advantage was largely offset by higher distribution costs and higher charges associated with initial capital investments. European producers, however, are unlikely to be swayed by the argument as any increase in supplies in an already glutted market could put pressure on prices and trigger a price war.

Last week, a Swiss embassy official in Jeddah said his country welcomed the unrestricted export of Saudi petrochemicals to Switzerland. This statement on behalf of Switzerland (not an EEC member) struck the only discordant note in otherwise unanimous European expressions of doom over the future of their petrochemical industries.

US also worried

Americans have recently joined in the general clamour. A representative of SRI International, a US research institute, warned last week of the negative impact of Saudi Arabia's industry. Dr. William K. Johnson, director of SRI's petrochemical department, told a symposium in Zurich that new Saudi Arabian polyethylene capacity alone accounts for about one quarter of the world's overall export tonnage estimated at 2.8mn. He said the combined annual polyethylene capacity of Saudi Arabia and other new producers could amount to 4.2mn tonnes between 1983-1988. He added this was bound to affect American and European producers.

AIRPORT CONTRACT AWARDED TO BOVIS

Beirut AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 29, 19 Nov 84 p 12

[Text]

Bovis International has won a 103mn Saudi riyal (\$29mn) construction contract to work on a Saudi Arabian airport. The project intended for the Ministry of Defence and Aviation Presidency of Civil Aviation, comprises civil engineering and architectural work at Madinah airport. The thirty-month contract calls for the building of a new control tower and an extension to the terminal buildings, along with improvements in car parks, roads, drainage, sewage and electrical systems. Bovis will provide construction management to the joint-venture of two Saudi Arabian contractors — Adnan Jabbar Establishment and Thonaeyah Co. of Jeddah.

CSO: 4400/47

CONSTRUCTION OF UNIVERSITY CITY PLANNED

Quetta BALUCHISTAN TIMES in English 2 Dec 84 (Supplement) p 4

[Text]

HIS Highness Shaikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan recently allocated an area of 20 sq km in Abu Dhabi emirate for a proposed university city, the master plan of which was revealed last month.

The plan provides for the city to be built in two stages, with the first stage to be completed by 1991 and the second by 1999. On completion of all the proposed facilities, the university city will cater to 24,000 students of both sexes.

The design of the city has already been selected. It was picked from among a large number of entries submitted by some 100 international consultancy companies. The selected entry was designed by a Swedish firm.

In phase I, the different faculty buildings will be built. These include a faculty of Arts for 800 boys and 600 girls, faculty of Management for 1,500 boys and 1,250 girls, faculty of Shariah and Islamic Studies for 600 boys and 500 girls, faculty of Engineering for

1,400 boys and 1,100 girls, faculty of Education for 350 boys and 300 girls, faculty of Agriculture for 95 boys and 75 girls, faculty of Medicine for 720 girls, faculty of Medicine for 720 boys and 600 girls, and faculty of Science for 620 boys and 500 girls. In addition, a higher studies wing for 230 boys and 190 girls will be built.

The allied facilities to be constructed during phase II will include languages centre, a centre for electronic accounting, Gulf Studies Centre, a history museum, a research centre, a mosque, a grand central library, grand conference hall, cultural complex, medical centre, a university printing press, sports and recreation facilities, dormitories, banks and trading places, etc.

By the end of the second phase, the university city will have a staff strength of nearly 4,000 in some 430 departments and sections. These will include 860 teaching staff, 250 assistants, 400 technicians and 2,200 various other administrative and support staff.

The university city will be the crowning achievement of the UAE's educational drive.

Meanwhile, Emirates University continues to be expanded, within its limited ground area, to meet the national educational needs of the tertiary level.

At the graduation ceremony of the third batch of graduates in April this year, Shaikh Nahyan bin Mubarak, President of the university, said among the new projects being launched in Al Ain were libraries and laboratories and the opening of the Faculty of Agriculture.

Shaikh Tahnoun bin Mohammed, Ruler's Representative in the Eastern Region, allocated two of his farms for the benefit of the new faculty.

Among the faculties yet to be established is the medical faculty in cooperation with various hospitals in the country. The first batch of medical students will be enrolled in September. The new semester for 1984-85 will also see the introduction of a degree course in animal husbandry and horticulture at Emirates University.

The university already has about 5,000 students and the new academic year is expected to boost the figure up to 6,000. The number of graduates has increased steadily over the years—473 graduates in 1982, 503 last year and 595 in April this year—in its original faculties of Arts, Science, Education, Management and Political Science, and Shariah and Law.

With the addition of the faculties of Agriculture and Engineering, there are now seven faculties with a total of 30 different sections. The Agriculture faculty already has over 1,000 students.

The Engineering faculty conducts its instruction in the English medium. And for this, the professors at this faculty are bilingual—Arabs proficient in English—to ease the language problems faced by students new to the medium.

The Languages Centre's priority is to train fresh secondary school graduates from Arabic medium schools to cope with English. Adapting to a change in the medium of instruction demands advanced skills in

rapid reading comprehension, and the study material is therefore selected from engineering literature. Even here, it is divided into specialisations like architecture, mechanical, electrical and civil engineering, etc, according to requirements.

Besides the engineering students, the centre also provides intensive courses in English to university graduates preparing to do post-graduate studies in Western institutions. This cuts down the language study UAE students have to undergo at foreign universities before beginning postgraduate courses.

Other courses at the centre include those non-credit tutorials in English and French for students who need extra coaching in addition to their regular studies at the department of foreign languages as well as Arabic courses for non-Arab students who have come to Al Ain on an exchange programme from American and European universities. And in the evenings, there are courses for government employees and members of the public.

UAE OIL PRODUCTION SURVEYED

Beirut AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 30, 26 Nov 84 pp 5, 6

[Text]

Dubai's Margham field gas-processing plant will be formally inaugurated on December 11th, although it has already started, ten weeks ahead of schedule, Opecna reports. Test production began last month, with the new plant turning out 20,000 barrels of condensate and 225mn cu feet of natural gas a day.

The Dubai authorities have never revealed the estimated size of the reservoir, but claim that it contains one of the largest gas fields in the world. Gas from the four wells in the Margham field is being piped through a 65-kilometre line and stored in tanks at Jebel Ali. The first of a number of large compressor units designed to re-inject the gas after the condensate has been extracted was expected to be completed last week.

The Margham discovery was announced in May 1982 on an 890-sq-kilometre concession worked by Atlantic Richfield (Arco) of Dubai Inc. and Britoil.

The satisfactory results of the Margham discovery led to a new burst of oil-exploration in Dubai, with seven new concessions granted between October 1982 and November 1983. Oil industry officials in the United Arab Emirates are predicting increased revenues over the next few months in the Dubai oil sector following the "unprecedented activity" of the past year, Opecna says. Apart from the new concessions, a number of downstream projects are expected to start in 1985.

Dubai's oil income has generally improved in recent years, from \$1.06bn in 1974 to \$4.63bn in 1982. However, this trend was stopped in 1983 when oil exports slumped. Dubai currently exports about 350,000 b/d.

Umm al-Qaiwain

A consortium of four foreign oil companies is expected to begin onshore oil and gas exploration in Umm al-Qaiwain next month, according to the emirate's petroleum department. Sheikh Sultan bin Ahmed al-Mualla, director of the department, said the decision followed the "positive results" of a month-long seismic survey.

The concession, the first awarded by Umm al-Qaiwain, which does not produce oil or gas, will be operated by Texaco, Exxon and Tennoco. The emirate subsequently awarded a second, 60,000-hectare concession to Texaco. The concession is for 25 years, renewable for a further ten years.

Ras al-Khaimah

The Emirate of Ras al-Khaimah, which began oil production only in January, reached a peak output of 26,000 b/d by mid-1984. Production, which has been for domestic consumption, is based on a \$125mn three-well development project operated by Gulf Offshore Ras al-Khaimah Ltd., owned by the Gulf Oil Corporation. New hydrocarbon shows have been reported in an onshore concession worked by Gulf Oil, with Amoco International of the US as a major partner.

Fujairah

Hydrocarbon shows have been reported in southern offshore areas of Fujairah. The exploration and development are being undertaken by North South Resources and International Petroleum.

AFGHANISTAN

PAKISTANI FORCES FIRE ON INTRUDING AFGHAN FORCES

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 4 Dec 84 p 1

[Text] Islamabad (Dispatches)--Pakistani forces opened fire with anti-aircraft guns to beat back a cross-border raid by four Afghan aircraft, the state-run Associated Press of Pakistan said Sunday.

It was the first time in several years that Pakistani forces opened fire on Afghan aircraft, which frequently have crossed the border near villages that shelter hundreds of thousands of Afghan refugees.

Pakistani gunners fired 80 rounds Saturday to chase away four Afghan warplanes that flew 1.5 miles (2.5 km) over the border near Nushki in Baluchistan Province, 520 miles (836 km) southwest of Islamabad, the news agency said.

Afghan aircraft also intruded unchallenged into Pakistan at two other points along the border Saturday, dropping 24 bombs about 430 miles (700 km) north near Arandu and Kesu villages. No damages or injuries were reported.

Pakistan charges the border violations this year are the heaviest since Soviet forces backed a coup that installed Afghan President Babrak Karmal in Kabul in December 1979.

Some 105,000 Soviet troops are backing Karmal against Afghan Mujahideen forces seeking to topple him.

CSO: 4600/138

AFGHANISTAN

MUJAHIDIN REPORTEDLY RETALIATE BY ATTACKING KABUL

Penang THE STAR in English 14 Nov 84 p 17

[Text] Peshawar--Soviet forces are entering their sixth winter in Afghanistan, looking stronger in the countryside but at the price of rising insecurity in the capital Kabul, according to Afghan guerilla sources here.

The Soviet army's 1984 summer offensive has destroyed the village infrastructure which supported the Muslim resistance in many parts of eastern and central Afghanistan and has put heavy pressure on supplies this winter for the first time since the war began, they added.

The price the communists have had to pay for their widespread bombing and crop-burning has been increased rebel attacks on Kabul, which used to be considered a city-state spared from the worst effects of the war.

Rockets are now slamming into Kabul neighbourhoods regularly--a few killed five people and set part of the old town bazaar ablaze nine days ago--and bombings have become more frequent.

The guerillas, who asked not to be named, said they feared the surge in urban guerilla warfare would not compensate for the tactical advantages Moscow's 115,000 troops had won this year in the countryside.

"The war has been deadlocked up until now, but we are beginning to lose the population," said one Afghan whose party assigned him to find ways of keeping peasants from fleeing to Pakistan or Kabul.

"If this continues, we may eventually lose the war because there will be nowhere for the Mujahideen (Islamic warriors) to hide," he said.

Several Afghans said they feared Moscow's strategy might be to reinforce Soviet positions along the eastern border this winter so as to be able next spring to block guerillas and peasants returning in winter from warmer Pakistan.

The 1984 offensive, which started with the Soviet army taking most of the Panjshir Valley north of Kabul, continued through the summer with frequent commando raids that kept rebels on the defensive.

These attacks, and the problems of caring for the thousands of internal refugees they have created, have kept local guerillas from attacking many Soviet and Afghan army supply convoys along the northern highway, the umbilical cord between Kabul and the Soviet Union.

In August, communist troops finally sealed the rebels' main supply route to the Panjsheer and further north after a local tribal chief, who was in government pay but let guerilla convoys pass through his area, left for Pakistan with up to 3,000 men.

The tribe's departure from Sarobi, 60 km east of Kabul, allowed one guerilla party to blow up 40 electricity pylons feeding Kabul, but at the price of closing a vital route for other parties operating further north.

Snow will soon block the passes in Nuristan, a mountainous area between the Panjsheer and the Pakistani border with peaks up to 6,100 metres, and stop all supply through there, sources of Jamiat-I-Islami, the main party in the north, said.

In southern Afghanistan, heavy bombing continues around Kandahar, the country's second largest city, as Soviet and Afghan forces try to create a no-man's land around it, sources in the Pakistani city of Quetta said. Rebel supply routes are all but closed.

One guerilla leader there said the ambush in September of French television journalist Jacques Abouchar showed the Soviet and Afghan armies had a good intelligence network in place to block rebel traffic.

Several parties said an apparent Soviet and Afghan drive to close off main supply routes from Pakistan had not succeeded, but admitted the Soviet commando units were this year more effectively harassing convoys and making supply difficult.

As more refugees from the panjsheer and Shomali valleys north of Kabul and Logar to the south have fled to the capital, more guerillas have started operating there to hit back at Soviet and Afghan installations, the sources said.

Night-time rocket attacks have now become common in Kabul and guerillas with Sam-7 missiles have succeeded in shooting down at least three helicopters and two planes in recent weeks.

Guerilla sources, usually tight-lipped about their weapons supplies, admitted a new supply of rockets, probably Chinese-made, had come about a month ago and there were plenty to keep up the pressure on Kabul.

Asked about the rockets, one source said: "It was a response to the Soviet tactics. They got tougher so we had to get tougher, too."

CSO: 4600/144

AFGHANISTAN

GUERRILLA CHIEF: WE WILL NOT LEAVE THEM IN PEACE

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 3 Dec 84 pp 1, 2

[Text] Peshawar, Pakistan, Dec 2 (AP)--Despite a tougher and more ruthless strategy against Muslim guerrillas, Soviet intervention forces seem more bogged down than at any time since they entered Afghanistan five years ago.

Afghan guerrilla leaders and western diplomatic and military observers here agree the divided guerrilla movement is unlikely ever to force the Soviet Union to withdraw its 115,000 troops against its will.

But western intelligence experts believe the Russians may have lost as many as 20,000 men since the start of their intervention.

"We will never leave them in peace, not if they stay for centuries," said noted guerrilla chief Younes Khalis. "They must regret they ever invaded us."

In the main strongholds of the "Jihad," holy war, Soviet commanders are for the first time using tough new commando units specially trained and equipped for anti-guerrilla warfare in Afghanistan.

Resistance leaders say these airborne commandos move into previously impenetrable mountain terrain after it has been "softened up" by high-altitude carpet bombing.

"We have shown we can survive these mass destruction methods and can hit back harder than ever," said Massoud Khalili, spokesman for Jamiat Islami, a main resistance movement. "Our objective is to go on hitting them so hard that they will have to negotiate a political settlement."

The guerrillas demand a Soviet military withdrawal and the replacement of Soviet-sponsored President Babrak Karmal by a new leader acceptable to them.

Four successive rounds of U.N.-sponsored "proximity talks" between Pakistan and the Karmal regime have revealed no Soviet willingness to accept such a deal.

On the contrary, the guerrillas say the Russians have sharply intensified their war effort since Soviet leader Konstantin U. Chernenko came to power in February.

Khalis, a 65-year-old former Muslim priest who leads the moderate wing of the Hezbi Islami guerrilla movement, described the new strategy in an interview:

New Russian Strategy

"First, waves of TU-16 bombers fly in from bases in the Soviet Union to obliterate our villages. Then the commandos swoop down in helicopters or by parachute.

"We have suffered many such ferocious attacks recently, particularly in the Panjsher Valley. They cause terrible devastation, but they have proved less successful than the Russians must have hoped."

A turbaned, red-barbed mountain warrior with pistols and bandoliers draped over his "kurta" tribal dress, Khalis is the only top guerrilla leader based in Peshawar who regularly crosses the mountains to lead his men.

"We have good intelligence information, and we usually know when and where to expect them," he said. "This gives the Mujahideen plenty of time to get out of the way. The Soviet commandos land by helicopter or parachute. They often find no Mujahideen in the villages, but they destroy everything left standing after the bombing. One aim is to scare the civilians out of helping us."

He said Soviet commanders rely less than before on Karmal's Soviet-led Afghan troops who often desert to the Mujahideen.

Khalis said the commandos--volunteers rather than the usual conscripts--burn crops to deny the guerrillas food and then drive civilian survivors into the valleys.

International relief workers say this Soviet practice has left more than 2 million starvation-threatened "internal refugees" in Afghanistan in addition to the 4 million who have fled to neighboring Pakistan and Iran.

"We estimate that at least one third of Afghanistan's 18 million inhabitants have had to flee from their homes," said Lars Nelson, acting director of the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, a relief organization operating in Peshawar.

CSO: 4600/138

GUERRILLAS REPORTEDLY CAPTURE MORE THAN 100 SOVIETS

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 2 Dec 84 p 5

[Text] Islamabad (Dispatches)--More than 100 Soviet soldiers may have been captured by Afghan guerrillas as they tried to sweep through Mujahideen hideouts near the southern city of Kandahar this month.

They said the soldiers were reported captured in the Argandab region near Kandahar in mid-November and Soviet forces there responded with heavy air and artillery bombardment of the area between November 15 and 22.

None of the freedom fighters groups based in Pakistan has yet claimed responsibility for the capture which, if confirmed, would probably be the largest single seizure of Soviet troops by the guerrillas.

The sources, who asked not to be identified, also reported that several high-ranking Afghan officers were reported killed in Kandahar in recent weeks.

Intense Attack in Kabul

Afghan guerrillas, in their "most intense" attack on the capital since the 1979 Soviet invasion, fired two dozen rockets and mortars at a Russian housing complex and diplomatic buildings in Kabul.

On the battle front, Muslim fighters in Afghanistan's southeastern Kandahar province captured 100 Soviet troops and shot down three MiGs near the town of Arghandab.

In the capital of Kabul, Mujahideen dug into positions in the north and southeast of the city, fired 24 rockets and mortars during a 45-minute attack last week.

Although the casualty toll is not known, state-run Kabul radio and television reported four people were killed and 17 wounded.

According to eyewitness, projectiles making a loud whistling noise came from several directions in what appeared to be coordinated attack.

The Soviet Union, in a rare admission, reported the Mujahideen assault on Nov 26, saying "the bandits fired surface-to-surface missiles of American and Chinese make at Kabul from a long distance."

Soviet authorities previously denied Western reports of guerrilla activity affecting Kabul and other major cities.

An estimated 105,000 Soviet troops poured into Afghanistan in December 1979 to prop up a faltering pro-Moscow government.

Giving details of the attack, the sources said nine rockets or mortars smashed into the Microrayon residential neighborhood, home of most Soviet officials in Kabul.

Another three projectiles landed near the Afghan secret police headquarters opposite the U.S. Embassy while a fourth rocket came down just behind the American missions sports field.

Three others hit the Radio Kabul compound, one smashes into the Iraqi Embassy "removing a chimney stack," while another struck the house of a Japanese diplomat, causing damage to the ground floor.

CSO: 4600/139

CHEMICAL GAS USE REPORTEDLY RECEIVES LITTLE WORLD ATTENTION

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 2 Dec 84 p 5

[Text] The Soviet occupation forces and the Afghan army have stepped up their operations against both the Mujahideen and uncooperative civilians. There is widespread use of chemical and biological weapons. According to a Mujahideen survey, victims have been reported in 20 provinces. More than 114 people have been killed and many more injured this year. On October 1, thirty were killed at Kalakhil village, Bagram district, in Parwan province.

Earlier in September, thirteen Mujahideen were killed near Ghazni city.

Latest casualties have been traced in the provinces of Kunar, Balkh, Samangan and Badakhshan.

Mustard gas is one of the most commonly used weapons in hand grenades. They give off a characteristic heavy yellow gas on impact. Tanks are fitted with special mustard gas shells. Earlier this year, an attack on Kho-i-Khamzargar in Kohistan claimed more than 200 victims, who suffered for months from the poisonous effects of these tank shells.

Phosgene gas, employed in the First World War, is also widely used. It has similar effects to mustard gas with the victims developing rapid skin blisters and nausea. Death from dehydration or due to infection occurs in two to three weeks. This lethal gas was first used in Dihani-Ghoori district in April. Other weapons in the Soviet arsenal include a caustic spray that eats through clothing to cause serious skin burns. In an assault on a Mujahideen hideout in Sar Bagh area of Kohbut this had an instantaneous corrosive effect stripping the victims of their clothes.

In the mountainous terrain, where the Mujahideen enjoy a natural advantage over their Soviet foes, the invading forces cannot fight effectively with conventional means. They use nerve gas agents such as sarin and tabun. Helicopter-gunships are ideal for this purpose as wide areas can be covered safely. These gases have extreme toxicity--inhalation of a few micrograms can kill a man.

The Mujahideen who often seek shelter in caves and caverns are flushed out with carbon monoxide which is a colourless gas that cannot be smelt by humans. It binds on the haemoglobin in the red blood cells that cannot be displaced by oxygen. The victims, therefore, collapse and die of asphyxiation. As the caves provide shelters to civilians during bombing raids, the Mujahideen are not the only ones killed.

Taking a leaf out of the American war manual of Vietnam, the Soviet forces are attacking the environs with defoliants. The use of herbicides is meant to deny the Mujahideen ground cover and eliminate the source of sustenance for them and their sympathisers. Not only orchards, farms and forests are affected but the soil is also being permanently damaged by anti-plant agents. Spraying of fungal agents and parasites are rendering large tracts of land barren, destroying crops and poisoning grass and other vegetation. Consequently, livestock is being affected.

The Soviet and Afghan forces are better equipped and trained to keep themselves safe from the ill-effects of chemical and biological warfare. But the Mujahideen facing a wide variety of chemical weapons are unable to take prophylactic measures.

As in the Persian Gulf War, the use of these diabolical weapons by the aggressors receives little or no attention from the world media. With the recent Soviet reinforcements and their strengthening resolve to apply increasing pressure on the Mujahideen, the war has intensified. The Afghan freedom-fighters, however, are carrying on the fight with the superpower, regardless of the odds against them.

CSO: 4600/139

ARTICLE DETAILS AFGHAN-SOVIET CULTURAL, SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English Nov 84

[21 Nov 84 p 1]

[Text]

The cultural-scientific relations between Afghanistan and Soviet Union, as a part of general relation between the two countries gained shaped and consolidation inorportion with the characteristics of its development.

V. I. Lenin, the founder of the first socialist state of the world while preparing the principles of foreign policy of the Soviet Union in 1921, gave directives:

"Our policy in the East is not a policy of aggression, but a policy of peace and friendship which is part of mutual friendship.

Since our desire is to utilize our utmost capability in helping the friendly Afghans for progress and development, we are ready to help the state of Afghanistan in all peaceful measures, possible for us."

Thus, the socialist Soviet Union became ready to render assistance to the independent Afghanistan for acceleration of the growth of productive forces, foundation of an independent economy and for overcoming

the the social and cultural backwardness.

In 1925, the Soviet Union inspite of passing through under the conditions in which difficult conditions, offered, economic, military and cultural aids to Afghanistan.

Stress was also made on aid in these spheres, on the occasion of conclusion of the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Cooperation on February 28, 1921, between Afghanistan and Soviet Union. Hence, all these promised aids were delivered to Afghanistan till 1923.

Installation of a small Radio Station in Kabul as well as the establishment of a meteorological school for training of national cadres of Afghanistan were also included among these aids. These were the first specimens of mutual cooperation between the two countries, in the fields of culture and science.

The next significant step taken for the expansion of relations between the two countries, was the visit to Soviet Union by King Amanullah Khan in May, 1928. During this visit, further

attention was paid to the expansion of relations between the two countries in the scientific and cultural fields, and agreements were concluded. However, these agreements could not be materialised due to the collapse of Amani government by the reaction attached to British imperialism. Following the collapse of Amani government and coming to power by Nadir Shah, the grounds for mutual relations between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union became narrow, due to the reactionary essence of Nadir State and its dependence on British imperialism. This stand of Nadir was the continuation and the natural outcome of British policy for weakening the relations of Afghanistan with the Soviet Union that tried through Dobi, its special envoy, to prevent the conclusion of the 1921 treaty and issued "Crozh" ultimatum in accordance of which Afghanistan ought to put end to its relations with the Soviet Union. But it was decisively rejected by the Amani state.

After the Second World War, which ended with the bright victory of socialism and the Soviet Union, the balance of forces changed at the international arena and the people's movement for freedom and democracy

intensified. The relations between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union also entered to a new stage aimed at re-expansion of relations between the two countries, and, thus numerous agreements such as the Agreement on Borders of 1946, the Agreement on Barter and Payments of July 1950, the Protocol on the Extension of the validity of the Treaty on Neutrality and Mutual Non-Aggression of December 1955, the agreement on construction of two mechanized bakeries of January 1954, the Agreement on Transit of June 1955) were concluded. The very foundation of this new stage of the relations, in the cultural and scientific fields was the Radio-Telegraph Agreement between Afghanistan the Soviet Union of April 1947, which brought about regular telegraphic relations including the press links between the two countries. These aids were rendered in 1939 and in 1941 in order to help Radio-Afghanistan and Bakhtar Information Agency.

The epoch after 1954 was the era of fundamental expansion in the Afghan-Soviet relations. It is during this period that the relations with the Soviet Union found new grounds based on the will and intention of Afghan people.

[22 Nov 84 pp 1, 4]

[Text]

The agreement on mutual cooperation between the government of Afghanistan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the expansion of economic

relations and rendering long-term credit to Afghanistan by the USSR dated January 27, 1954, is a major example of this era. This agreement marks the begi-

ning of broad economic, technical and cultural co-operation between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union.

The expansion of economic and technical cooperation between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union specified the need of expansion of cultural relations between the two countries particularly in the field of training national cadres of Afghanistan, for the interest of socio-economic development of Afghan people. Thus the first group of Afghan students' consisting of 4 students were despatched to the Soviet Union in 1957 for higher education.

On March 4, 1965, an Agreement on Cultural and Scientific Cooperation was concluded between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union on the basis of which cultural relations between the two countries were to expand in all fields.

In accordance with this agreement, which was to be renewed after every two years, the Soviet Union made commitment to render assistance to Afghanistan in the fields of culture and art, education, higher education, health, sports, different scientific researches, and in conformity with succeeding agreement, both sides agreed to cooperate with each others' friendship associations and social organisations.

From this era onwards the regular cultural relations between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union begun and developed permanently.

To simplify the study of Afghan-Soviet relations in cultural and scientific fields

during this era the following points are to be evaluated:

1—In the field of sciences, education and higher education:

The assistance of the Soviet Union to Afghanistan in the fields of education and higher education from the very beginning has mainly been directed to train scientific and technical cadres, who could serve the socio-economic development of the country in various fields.

For instance in accordance with the agreement of 1965, despatch of Afghan students to the Soviet Union for education in different scientific and technical fields has been regularly continued.

In order to develop and facilitate scientific and cultural relations, in 1949 a protocol on equation of documents of secondary, professional and higher education and scientific degrees, was concluded between the two countries. As a whole, in the years 1965 to 1978, over 750 Afghan experts in the fields of science and higher technology were trained in the Soviet Union.

This figure is more than half of the total scientific and technical cadres trained abroad before the revolution.

Similarly, during this era a large number of military cadres were sent to the Soviet Union for education in order to materialise the modernisation of the army of Afghanistan.

After the April Revolution, the Soviet Union has expressed readiness to train more Afghan students. At

present around 7,500 Afghan students are studying in the Soviet Union and the number of first batch of the graduates reached 500 in 1983.

Similarly, the country of Soviets has rendered basic assistance in improving the material bases of the system of scientific and technical teaching in Afghanistan. The major share of the Soviet Union in this field is the establishment of Kabul Polytechnic Institute.

The Kabul Polytechnic Institute as a centre of sciences and an example of Afghan-Soviet friendship and Cooperation, the cornerstone of which was laid in 1963, was presented as a gift to Afghanistan in 1967 for the educating Afghan students. And, thus this institute started functioning with nine departments. Over 50 Soviet lecturers including professors and assistants teach in this institute.

The first batch of 159 graduates of the institute was presented to the society in 1972, and till the victory of the April Revolution, 871 engineers in different

fields had graduated from the institute in six batches.

After the April Revolution, educational activities of the institute has expanded to a great extent with the assistance of the Soviet Union.

Since 1979 all fields of education have been promoted to the level of master degree, moreover the number of the departments has increased to eleven. Faculties of electro-mechanic, construction, geology and mines as well as the preparatory faculty have been established in the framework of the institute. Each of these faculties having its own teaching staff including Afghan and the Soviet lecturers is rearing the young generation of scientific and technical cadres who have mission to introduce the fundamental transformations in all economic fields. In the course of six post-revolutionary years as many as 1084 engineers have graduated from the institute in six batches and during the current year the institute will present to the society 211 graduates with master degree.

[24 Nov 84 p 1]

[Text]

In addition to these, in order to raise the scientific level of Afghan experts night courses of Master Degree and courses of preparatory were arranged where in the year 1983, 51 Afghan experts received diplomas of Master Degree from the various specialized branches and five persons are defending their scientific works.

The main aspects of the activities of Soviet experts in the Polytechnic Institute are the scientific researches in different fields and preparation of books and teaching materials for Afghan students. These teaching materials have great effect in the education of Afghan students and their preparedness based on the latest

gains of science and technology.

Likewise, in order to train technical cadres, two main centres of secondary grad University of the Soviet professional education were established in Afghanistan with the assistance of the Soviet Union. The work of construction of the complex of Oil and Gas Technicum of Mazar-e-Sharif and the construction of Auto-Mechanic Technicum of Kabul were completed in 1971 and 1974 respectively and were put at the disposal of Afghanistan as gratis aid.

These two technicums equipped with most up-to-date training and technical equipment, started functioning with 100 Afghan and 55 Soviet lecturers.

So far 374 and 722 technicians have graduated respectively from the Auto-Mechanic of Kabul and the Oil and Gas Technicum of Mazar-e-Sharif in eight important technical fields.

After the revolution, particularly its new and evolutionary phase, the Soviet Union has shown readiness for further cooperation in training Afghans in the field of technology. Thus, in accordance with the protocol concluded between the Ministry of Higher and Vocational Education of the DRA and the State Committee for Technical and Vocational Education of the Soviet Union, an agreement was reached for the creation and development of the system of technical and vocational education and secondary professional education for training skilled workers and professional and technical ca-

dres.

Based on this, the work of establishment of six technical and professional schools were started in Kabul and provinces of the country in 1982. Right now, 600 young Afghan workers are being trained by 43 Soviet experts in nine technical fields in these schools. In order to complete the material and teaching bases of the technical and professional schools, the Soviet Union granted over 500 tons of materials and training equipments to Afghanistan.

In 1983, the first batch of 65 graduates of the Kabul Technical School No. 1, was presented to the society. In 1984, as many as 500 workers will graduate from these schools and till 1986, these schools will present another batch of 1,500 graduates to the society. It is worth mentioning that with the materialisation of the envisaged programme of Afghan-Soviet cooperation on establishment of 11 technical and professional schools in the country the possibility will be created for the planned training of skilled workers in over 35 fields for all walks of the national economy.

Likewise, based on a separate agreement, from 1975 to 1982 1,300 workers were sent to the Soviet Union for education in different technical and professional fields, and in 1983, the first graduates i.e. 188 young workers returned home after completing their education in technical and professional schools of the Soviet Union and started their work.

In addition to the preparatory branches of workers, established in 1983 by counting on the experience, should specifically be stated. These branches will have positive effect on the social composition of the institutions of higher education of the country in the interests of the working people.

At present around 700 workers are busy with their education in these branches.

After the April Revolution, the Soviet Union has extended necessary cooperation to the Kabul University. For instance, at present 49 Soviet experts cooperate in the fields of teaching, scientific research-

es, renovation and rearrangement of teaching process and preparation of lecture notes. With the assistance of the Soviet Union, the Institute of Chemistry and Laboratories of the department of Russian language were equipped and over 12,000 volumes of books were donated to the laboratories of the university. Similarly, the new forms of cooperation came into being among the various faculties of the university, which will have great role in the development of higher education of the country, for instance, such relations exist between the Bayazid University of Afghanistan and the Volgograd University of the Soviet Union.

[25 Nov 84 p 1]

[Text]

In addition to these, in the field of training of teachers and educational cadres for the schools, programmes are undertaken to raise the level of their professional and theoretical knowledge. For example, a Master Degree course, which was established in 1979 within the framework of the Higher Teachers' Training Institute and has presented 275 students so far, is among the aforementioned courses.

Similarly, in 1981 the Pedagogy Institute of Kabul having 25 experts, was established for training teachers and educational cadres of teachers' training institutions in 10 fields. Moreover, the Soviet Union has contributed in compilation of text-books for schools and the maintenance of laboratories of schools, and helped in ensuring material and teaching bases of literacy campaign.

2—JOINT RESEARCH ACTIVITIES:

Joint research activities, which have taken place with the assistance of the Soviet scholars, have a valuable place in the cultural-scientific relations of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union.

Among the most basic aspects of Afghan-Soviet research activities, the two fields, scientific research of geological-physics and the historical research archaeology are outstanding.

The joint and regular research activities of Afghan and Soviet geologists began within the framework of Afghan-Soviet agreement in order to specify the reserves of natural resources, which would be the infrastructure for the development of heavy industry in Afghanistan. These activities included the exploration of mines and exploration of petroleum and gas in the northern part of the country.

As a result of lengthy research works of Afghan and Soviet geologists and after a numerous fruitful preliminary works the first map of useful minerals of the country at a scale of 1:1000 000 was printed in 1972, and thus big resources of coal, iron, copper, fluoride and useful minerals of the country were identified. Similarly, as a result of exploration activities on petroleum and gas of the north in an area of 113,000 square kilometres, the recovery of 12 million tons of petroleum on a vast area, was estimated and the estimation of the remaining areas is continuing. Besides, areas having natural gas were specified in around 10 localities and as a result of these surveys, a complete geologic map of Afghanistan at a scale of 1:500 000 was prepared in 1977.

...
This prolonged and joint research work has yielded profound economic and cultural fruits, for instance, as a result of these researches the export of gas to the Soviet Union, which constitutes the major source of income of the country, has started since 1978. In the proceedings of these cooperations around 75,000 skilled Afghan workers have been trained.

The research works related to this field are continuing with the establishment of modern laboratory complexes with the Soviet assistance having 500 experts and skilled personnel. These laboratories have the capacity of 225,000 tests.

The Soviet scholars have persistently taken part in scientific and research works as regard with the history, culture and sciences of the country. Participation of Soviet scholars in international seminars including the three-round internal seminar on Koshan Studies, held in Kabul in 1975, 1978 and 1982, the international seminar of Khoshal Khatak, held in Kabul in 1979, and the preparatory work of the international seminar, held on the occasion of the inauguration of the international centre of Pashto-study in Afghanistan in 1975, are the outstanding examples of this cooperation.

Similarly, the Soviet scholars have attended national seminars such as the seminar on the 400th death anniversary of Pir Roshan (1974), the seminar on the Mohammad Hotak (1978), the seminar on the 1000th birth anniversary of Avi Cina Balkhi (1979), the seminar on Mia Fakhruallah Jalalabadi (1979), the seminar on Amir Ali Sher Nawaie (1980), the seminar on Shaikh Bostan Barith (1981), the

seminar on the revolutionary literature, held on the eve of the fifth anniversary of the April Revolution (1983), the seminar on the 500th birth anniversary of Zahiruddin Babur (1983), the seminar on Makhdom Qulf Feraghi, the poet of Turkman people (1984) and so on.

[26 Nov 84 pp 1, 2]

[Text]

Reciprocally, Afghan delegates also attended international gatherings on culture held in the Soviet Union such as the symposium of "traditional musics of the peoples of the Near and Middle East in Samarkand, the conference of Writers of Asia and Africa in Tashkent and the fourth exhibition of "scoff on the struggle for peace".

Besides, in order to have ever extensive scientific cooperation, mutual coordination was agreed between the Academy of Sciences of the DRA and the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union, which is considered as an important step on the development of joint research and scientific works between the two countries.

Among other valuable research works of Afghan and Soviet scholars, the activities on the field of archeology are worthy of appreciation.

These joint activities started in accordance with the 1969 agreement, concluded for perfecting the atlas of archeology of northern parts of Afghanistan. According to this agreement, which was extended in 1970 and 1978, a joint board of Afghan-Soviet archeologists was created.

As a result of excavation of Afghan and Soviet archeologists, six tomb located in Tella Tapa of Sheberghan with 21,418 historical relics most of which were gold, were discovered and delivered to Kabul-Museum in 1978.

3—IN THE FIELDS OF HEALTH AND SPORT:

The Soviet Union has rendered a great deal of assistance in preventive and curative medicines to Afghanistan. The Soviet experts have allsidedly taken part in preventive medicine, which is the basic problem of public health in Afghanistan including the programme of control and eradication of malaria and lashmaniasis in Afghanistan.

In accordance with the agreement, concluded between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union in 1971 and extended for another round in 1978, a seven-member team of Soviet experts came to Afghanistan to participate in the programmes for eradication of malaria, and the Soviet side supplied

the equipment and medicine needed for the purpose as gratis aid. The Soviet team started its all-sided scientific studies on malaria and for the first time in order to fully eradicate mosquito, one million amporzia—type fish were imported to the northern parts of the country—Kunduz and Imam Saheb for multiplication purposes. The Soviet team rendered great assistance in training the technical personnel of Afghanistan and in scientific and technical studies in this field, and prepared guide books for the eradication of malaria.

Likewise, the Soviet scholars have actively taken part in the programme of control and eradication of lishmaniasis in Afghanistan, and worked out the operational plan for the purpose in 1978.

Likewise, in accordance with the agreement on health and veterinary, concluded between the two countries in 1963, the Soviet Union helps Afghanistan in the campaign against the animal communicable diseases and prevention of the circulation of animal diseases on the soil of either sides in order to strengthen the trade and economic relations between the two countries.

In curative medicine: The Soviet Union has had the permanent cooperation with the health insurance department of state officials and employees and sent experts, equipment and medicine to this department.

.....
Likewise, the 400-bed hospital of the Academy of Medical Sciences of the Army, which is one of the well-equipped and most modern hospitals in the region and a centre of medical research, should be noted as the brightest example of cooperation between the two countries in the field of health. This hospital the construction work of which was completed in 1975, started its functioning with the help of Soviet experts and right now a complete team of Soviet experts is cooperating in this hospital.

After the April Revolution, the assistance of the Soviet Union to Afghanistan has gained more expansion, and the Soviet Union has sent big teams of experts (150) to the health insurance of state employees, the vaccine and syrum making institution, the central polyclinic and other health institutions.

Similarly, the Soviet Union has agreed to finance the construction of a blood bank, the building for the health insurance of state employees, reconstruction and equipping the complex of vaccine and syrum production institution and the construction of a 300-bed hospital in Kunduz. In addition, after the April Revolution the Soviet Union has paid further attention in training medical cadres in the country.

A group of Soviet advisers entered the country in November 1980 in order to render consultative assistance in organising the teaching process in the

state medical institute. Due to the proposals of the Soviet advisers, new branches necessary for teaching process, were created in the institute.

With the assistance of the Soviet experts a new six-year teaching plan for the faculty of curative medicine (instead of its former seven-year plan) and a new five-year plan for the faculty of stomatology were prepared in 1981.

Likewise, a protocol on mutual coordination was concluded between the state medical institute of Kabul called after Abu Avni Cina and the medical institute of Soviet Tajikistan in 1980.

Athletes of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union have a long record of mutual friendship. Donation of sports equipment and tools, use of instructions of Soviet trainers and visits of sport teams to the country of each other are the favorite traditions of this friendship.

After the April Revolution, the assistance of the Soviet Union has expanded in improving the sport in Afghanistan. In accordance with the cultural protocol concluded between the National Olympic Committee of the DRA and the Committee for Sports and Physical Training of the Soviet Union for 1978-1983, the Soviet Union rendered different assistance to the National Olympic Committee of the DRA, availing the provisions of this protocol, so far athletes and 23 trainers of Afghanistan visited the Soviet Union, and the National Olympic Committee has received sport equipment and tools at the cost of one million Afghanis on gratis aid basis.

4--ON THE FIELDS OF MASS MEDIA, CULTURE, ART AND SOCIAL ORGANISATIONS:

Cooperation between the two countries in the fields of radio, television and cinematography is expanding. In 1982 the "lotos" collecting and relaying unit, which functions through the satellite and has the possibility of directly receiving the main TV programmes of the Soviet Union and the exchange of information with most of the countries included in the "intervision" system, was given to Afghanistan as a gift. This unit has started its functioning since then.

The DRA television relays through this unit the telecast programmes of the Soviet Union every day.

Similarly, the Soviet Union has accepted to finance the construction of three TV studios with their centres, branches and necessary equipment.

The Soviet Union has delivered two editing and copying studios of radio along with necessary equipment and other technical necessities of radio including a set of OBI radio to the State Committee for Radio-TV and Cinematography.

Afghan delegations attended in the seventh film festival of Asian, African and Latin American countries, held in Tashkent in 1982, 13th international film festival, held in Moscow in 1983 as well as the festival held in Tashkent in 1984. In the festival of 1984 of Tashkent, the Afghan film "Farar" (escape) won the gold award.

With the help of the Soviet Union, during the last two years, on the occasions of Afghan-Soviet friendship weeks, 15 weeks of film screening were organised in which around 200 films were shown. Likewise, the Soviet Union gives a large number of feature and documentary films to the DRA television. Besides, the country of Soviets has also rendered assistance to the State Committee for Radio-TV and Cinematography the cinema equipment and technique.

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Cooperation between Bakhtar News Agency and Tass Agency has also expanded allsidedly. The starting point of this cooperation is the agreement concluded by the two agencies on December 19, 1960. Based on this agreement the Soviet Union has assisted the BIA with modern equipment. This agreement which is continuously extended, has opened extensive grounds for mutual cooperation between the two information agencies.

Exchange of art troupes between the two countries is the friendly traditions between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. The relations in the sphere of art have further developed after the April Revolution. Every year many art troupes including the dance and musical troupes, drama and circus teams of the two countries visit each other which is fruitful in the further development of cultural ties between the peoples of the two countries. As regard with the art drama, in addition to other assistance the Soviet Union has accepted to repair and reconstruct Afghan Nendary in a modern structure.

From among the significant cultural assistance of the Soviet Union, the assistance to rehabilitate the national museum of Afghanistan, repair of a part of the relics of museum and inauguration of the Bakhtar hall in the national museum of Afghanistan are outstanding. Preservation of cultural heritage of Afghan people enjoys great value.

Learning the Russian language by Afghan youth is also worth mentioning in the cultural assistance of the Soviet Union. First courses of Russian language were established in the then Ministry of Information and Culture of Afghanistan after the conclusion

of the agreement on cultural and scientific cooperation in 1965 between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. Over 3,000 persons had graduated from these courses before the April Revolution.

The Soviet House of Science and Culture was inaugurated in Kabul on November 11, 1982. Now, this house has been changed into a biggest cultural centre and the most significant scientific, artistic, cultural and political gathering place. In the course of last two years, more than 500 scientific, artistic, cultural and political functions have been convened in this centre. This house has become the main centre of gatherings of journalists, writers and artists of the country. Right now, exist in this cultural centre are the club of DRA journalists, the club of writers named "Gorki", clubs of chess and musics. The house also carries our learning programmes in the fields of Russian language, painting and so on.

The relations of social and friendship organizations are also a form of mutual cultural cooperation between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. In the gravity of these relations is the Afghan-Soviet friendship association, which was established in, and later was included in the framework of the Peace, Friendship and Solidarity Organisation of the DRA in 1979. The Afghan-Soviet Friendship Association is the organizer of the convocations of reminiscences in the history or relations between the two countries. Initiated by this association, a large number of functions of commemorations and friendship weeks have been convened in both the countries.

Similarly, the unions of creative intelligentsia of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union have regular relations based on the protocols of cooperation among wh-

ich are the protocols on cooperation with the Union of Soviet Cinematographers (1982-1986), the Union of Architectures of the Soviet Union (1983-1985), the Union of Soviet painters (1984-1986), the All Soviet Theatre Association (1984-1986), the agreement on cooperation with the Union of Writers of the Soviet Union (1981-1984)— and the agreement on cooperation with the Union of Journalists of the Soviet Union (1980-1985).

AFGHANOLOGY IN THE SOVIET UNION:

In assessing the cultural and scientific relations of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, imperfect tableau will be drawn if the vast work in the field of Afghanology taken place in the Soviet Union, is not considered. The research work on Afghanology in the Soviet Union conducted by the Institute of East Studies of the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union, has yielded rich gains in the fields of researches on history, economy, culture and languages of the people of Afghanistan, and, this enjoys exceptional importance under the conditions in which the bourgeois theoreticians have avoided every type of real assessment of issues related to the history and the culture of Afghan people and have persistently endeavo-

ured to distort the process of socio-economic development of Afghanistan in their own interest.

The gains of research on Afghanology in the Soviet Union, which have been published in books, scientific pamphlets and research papers in more than 1,000 titles, are the great treasury of research work on Afghanistan. These gains, which are in accordance with the possessed sources by Afghan researchers, have paved the ground for the first time for presenting the picture of the contemporary history of Afghanistan, the characteristics of the existing socio-economic relations in Afghanistan and the gains of historical development of the country in a scientific and accurate manner.

CSO: 4600/133

BRIEFS

STRICT SECURITY FOR KARMAL--NEW DELHI (IRNA)--Security measures have been tightened around the residence of Afghan ruler, Babrak Karmal following the recent intensification of guerilla activities of Afghan Moslem Mujahideen against joint forces. An Afghan Moslem Mujahideen source in New Delhi, reporting this also said that all the roads leading to the presidential palace are blocked and traffic is banned there. The source added that in addition to security officials escorting the Afghan ruler to various places, a helicopter would accompany him as well and would supervise the situation from the air. Meanwhile, eyewitnesses said that three Soviet advisors were killed in Makrurian, Kabul, last week. Soviet forces stationed around Kabul are scared of the Mujahideen's attacks at night and, therefore, would make untargetted gunfire from their barracks. Due to these shootings last week, damages were inflicted on the Qale' Zaman-Khan region near Kabul. [Text] [Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 2 Dec 84 p 1]

CSO: 4600/148

UK SIGNS AGREEMENT TO FUND POWER PROJECTS

Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 12 Nov 84 pp 1, 8

[Text] Bangladesh and United Kingdom signed in Dhaka yesterday two separate project grant agreements valued at 25.280 million pound sterling equivalent to Tk 88 crore 48 lakh approximately, according to an official handout.

Under the first agreement, the Government of United Kingdom will provide 15.824 million pound sterling equivalent to Tk 55 crore 38 lakh approximately to finance the Greater Dhaka Power Distribution Project Phase II.

The objective of the project is to improve, rehabilitate, strengthen and extend the electric power system within the Greater Dhaka area and to cater for the anticipated load growth in the period 1982-87. The government of UK had earlier provided 27.2 million pound sterling for Phase I and 9.100 million pound sterling for Phase 1A of this project.

Under the second project grant agreement the Government of United Kingdom will provide 9.456 million pound sterling equivalent to Tk 33 crore 10 lakh approximately to finance a second gas turbine generator at Ashganj to operate alongside the existing gas turbine provided by the British government earlier.

The objective of the project is to bridge part of the anticipated generation gap and give Bangladesh Power Development Board greater flexibility of operation.

The agreement was signed by Mr T G Streeton, British High Commissioner in Bangladesh and Mr A Z H Khan, Joint Secretary, ERD on behalf of their respective governments.

CSO: 4600/1161

PRESS TOLD ABOUT SOVIET-BANGLADESH RELATIONS

Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 12 Nov 84 pp 1, 8

[Text] Relations between Bangladesh and the USSR are moving towards 'improvement and normalisation', a Soviet diplomat said in Dhaka yesterday, reports BSS.

Briefing newsmen in connection with the observance of 67th Great October Revolution in Russia, Mr I Klimenko, Charge d'Affaires of USSR in Bangladesh, however pointed out 'normalisation must have to be two-way traffic'.

He said, we are ready to develop our relations with Bangladesh on the basis of respect for the principle of sovereign equality and added that Soviet Union always refrained from interfering in the internal affairs of other states'. Mr Klimenko said peaceful co-existence has been the cornerstone of our foreign policy since the foundation of our state.

Giving an account of Soviet assistance to Bangladesh and bilateral cooperation from 1972, Mr Klimenko said since the first day of establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries 'we've started the mutually beneficial cooperation in different fields'. Soviet help in clearing Chittagong port, establishment of fishing fleet, installing power generators, setting up electrotechnical plant and assisting Bangladesh in the exploration of gas and hydrocarbon are examples of beneficial cooperation, he said.

Mr Klimenko expressed his belief that there are prospects for furthering bilateral economic contacts. He said both sides are now studying cooperation of a number of projects including another thermal power station with a capacity of 400-420 megawatt, further expanding the capacity of Ghorasal Power Station to 950 megawatt and reconstruction of some sections of the railway and bridges. A team of Bangladesh experts will leave for Moscow soon to discuss the prospects of expanding the cooperation, he added.

Referring to trade relations, Mr Klimenko in his prepared text described it as 'stable and developing on a mutually beneficial and balanced basis.' From a modest turnover of 24 million US dollars annual barter in 1972, the two-way 13th barter protocol between Bangladesh and USSR has reached 56 million pound sterling (67 million US dollar) in 1984. He said the past experience in the trade field indicate that there are still 'possibilities and reserve for successful development of trade' to our mutual interest.

To another question, Mr Klimenko said, we usually supply spare parts as per stipulation of the agreement. He said we try to fulfil agreement and 'so far received no complaint from Bangladesh'.

Speaking on the international significance of the Russian revolution, Mr Klimenko said like millions around the world, many people in Bangladesh celebrated this festive occasion to pay their tribute to the efforts of the Soviet people in building a new society.

CSO: 4600/1161

BANGLADESH LAWYERS HOLD RALLY ON 9 NOVEMBER

Resolution, Speeches

Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 10 Nov 84 pp 1, 8

[Text] The lawyers of the country at a rally yesterday in Dhaka announced that they would boycott the courts for an indefinite period from November 18 to press home their six-point demand that included withdrawal of martial law, restoration of the fundamental rights and the High Court Division of the Supreme Court to its original form.

The announcement came in resolutions adopted at the first ever rally by the lawyers at the Baitul Mukarram square in the afternoon. The lawyers came to the venue in a long procession.

Held under the auspices of the Co-ordination Council of the Bar Associations, the rally was attended by the representatives of the 78 bar associations of the country. Mr. Shamsul Huq Choudhury, President of the Supreme Court Bar Association and Convenor of the Co-ordination Council presided over the meeting.

Prominent among those who addressed the rally included Dr Kamal Hossain Syed Ishtiaque Ahmed, Khondker Mahbubuddin Ahmed, Mr. Maudud Ahmed, Mr. A. N. M. Yusuf, Mr. S. A. Bari, Abdus Shaheed Lal, Mr Habibur Rahman Khan.

The rally in a resolution

called for transfer of power to an interim neutral government for holding elections with a view to handing over power to an elected democratic government and expressed solidarity with the five-point demand of the opposition political parties for restoration of democracy.

The rally also adopted resolutions condemning the killing of two former Presidents Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and Ziaur Rahman and demanding freedom of press and right of appeal

against judgements of the Martial Law courts.

In his presidential address, Mr. Shamsul Huq Choudhury bitterly criticised the decentralisation of the judiciary and said the present government has, in fact, torn the judiciary into pieces in the name of decentralisation. In this regard he mentioned that there were Martial Law governments in the past but none of them had interfered with the judiciary.

Extending his support to

the opposition movement on five-point demand, Mr. Choudhury said the elections should be held under an interim government to ensure free and fair polls. Only an elected government could solve the problems facing the nation, he added.

Dr. Kamal Hossain said the lawyers' movement could not be isolated from the current political movement launched by the major opposition parties for restoration of democracy and rule of law. He said the legal practitioners wanted their demands to be met along with the implementation of the five-point national demand. He said the people were now united as they were in 1971 for the realisation of their lost democratic and fundamental rights.

Dr. Kamal who is also a member of the Awami League presidium, criticised the removal of judges of the Supreme Court by the Martial Law government and said such actions had done tremendous damage to

the judiciary. Independence of judiciary, rule of law and fundamental rights of the people could be ensured only when democracy returned to the country, he observed.

Speaking on the occasion, Syed Ishtiaque Ahmed accused the military government of snatching away the writ jurisdiction of the High Court and the Supreme Court thus denying the rights of the people. He said it was an irony that the person who had grabbed power overthrowing an elected government was now clamouring to establish democracy in the country.

Mr. Ahmed said the people would realise their fundamental and democratic rights and nobody could any more deprive them of these rights. Their movement was to realise the six-point demand and not any monetary gains, he said.

He also alleged that the country under the Martial Law regime had been flooded with corruption and injustice.

Addressing the rally, Khond-

ker Mahbubuddin Ahmed held the Martial Law government responsible for creating the chaotic situation in the country and said by decentralising the judiciary the military government wanted to perpetuate its rule against the will of the people.

He said in the name of decentralisation of judiciary, the present government had reached corruption to the doorstep of the people instead.

Addressing the rally, Mr. Maudud Ahmed, who is also a central leader of BNP, said the lawyers would continue their movement till realisation of the demands.

He also expressed solidarity with the opposition political parties on the five-point demand and said only democracy could ensure rule of law.

Mr. S.A. Bari AT said the writ jurisdiction was denied so that nobody could challenge the arbitrary actions of the military government.

Mr. Gaziul Huq read out the resolutions at the rally.

Text of Resolution

Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 12 Nov 84 p 3

[Text]

The following is the sixteen-point resolution adopted at the lawyers-cum-public meeting held at Baitul Mukarram in Dhaka on Friday ranging from assassination of Indira Gandhi to local issues concerning the restoration of democracy in the country.

1) The meeting in a first and foremost resolution condemned the brutal assassination of Indira Gandhi, the great leader and Chairman of the Non-aligned Movement. It expressed its deepest sympathy to the bereaved family and the people of India.

(2) The meeting recalled the great contribution made by

Indira Gandhi, the Indian Prime Minister to the cause of Liberation War of Bangladesh. It recalled the visit of Indira Gandhi to Bangladesh in 1972 at the invitation of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the warm reception accorded to her by the people and the speech she made at the Suhrawardy Uddyan. All these, it said, were a precious treasure in the heart of the people of Bangladesh. But the Bangladesh Television instead of projecting the happy memory of her visit to Bangladesh had given wide publicity to a personalised visit of an individual to the Indian capital during the funeral.

The meeting condemned it as an attempt to tarnish the image of Bangladesh outside world and asked the Television authority to refrain from projecting any individual suiting his interest.

The meeting in a resolution observed, this Martial Law regime has suspended the constitution and curbed the independence of judiciary and fundamental rights achieved at the cost of millions of lives.

The High Court benches had been set up at the districts in the name of decentralisation of the judiciary and it has put the litigants in severe financial strain. On the other hand by setting up courts at the upazila level

they have destroyed the system of judiciary in the country.

The lawyers community of the country in 1982 registered their first protest against the highhandedness of this illegal government and took steps to organise the democratic forces in the country against this illegitimate regime. The lawyers community adopted phase-wise programme of holding demonstration, public meeting and boycotting court from November 18 for an indefinite period as a part of their struggle for restoring democracy in the country.

They are determined to lead the movement to its pinnacle of glory.

Today's meeting in order to establish elected government replacing the military one and to restore independence of judiciary has been putting forward the following resolutions :

a) To revive the constitution including the fundamental rights incorporated in it.

b) Holding of election to the Parliament under an neutral caretaker government and handing over power to elected government by ending martial law.

c) Restoration of High Court to its original form repealing martial law regulation and revival of writ jurisdiction of the High Court for the sake of natural justice.

d) Withdrawal of munsif and magistrate courts from the upazila level.

e) Repeal of all ordinances imposed by the Martial Law Government amending Civil Procedure Code, Criminal Procedure Code and Penal Code.

(f) To abolish the nominated Bar Council formed by the Government under Martial Law regulation.

4) The lawyers community in a resolution adopted in the meeting announced that they will launch court boycott programme for an indefinite period to press home six-point demands. The anno-

uncement was made on behalf of Coordination Committee.

5) Today's meeting expressed its thanks to the 15-party alliance, Seven-party combine, Jamaat-e-Islami, Chhatra Sangram Parishad, Jatiyatabadi Chhatra Dal including all students organisations, Sramik Karmachari Oikkya Parishad, and cultural front who had extended support to the struggle of the six-point of the lawyers community. In turn they reciprocated their total support to their democratic struggle.

6) The meeting expressed its total support to the movement of repealing Drama Control Act of 1876 launched by Group Federation of Theatres. It also extended its support to Federation of Film Societies for its effort to restrict the projection of plagiarised films in the national media.

7) The meeting extended its total support to the 11-point movement of Chhatra Sangram Parishad for the sake of restoring democracy and introducing people's-oriented education system.

8) Freedom of Press is essential for survival of a nation. Censorship and black laws restricting the press freedom are often used by the autocratic rulers to prolong their administration. It demanded immediate withdrawal of martial law censorship and all black laws. In this context they said, the banning order on Dainik Desh, Khabar and Ittehad must go.

9) In another resolution they demanded the right of appeal to the High Court Division for those people who are convicted under the martial law regulation.

10) They demanded the resignation of this Martial Law government for spending crores of money in unproductive sector. This Government, according to them, had made the economy dependant on the imperialist countries. Consequently the unemployment had reached a new high and price spiralling hit a new peak.

11) This Government, panicked by the growing mass movement, had let loose reign of terror in the country and unleashed the politics of assassinations only to undo the democratic movement in the country. Selim and Delwar were crushed under the wheels of the truck and Moizuddin, a leader of national stature was assassinated.

The meeting appealed to the people to organise resistance against the fascistic rule of this autocratic regime.

12) The meeting observed: The August 15 is a black day in the annals of our history. On this day the symbol of our Liberation War Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was assassinated along with his family members by the stooges of the Imperialist power. Not only this, the local agents of the imperialist power opened the way of military rule by assassinating the elected head of the government.

The four leaders of the Liberation War were assassinated in the Dhaka Central Jail during this time. The killers had made open confession of

their guilt. In spite of their confession the Government had failed to commit them to trial. But on the contrary, many of them had been provided jobs in the foreign mission. The meeting demanded the trial of the killers of Bangabandhu and exemplary punishment to be meted out to them.

13) The meeting expressed its deep respect to those workers, students and politicians who laid down their lives for the cause of democracy in the country.

14) The meeting demanded the immediate release of M A Ansari, a member of Jhenidah Bar Association, along with others who have been put behind the bar by the Martial Law regime.

15) The meeting observed one minute silence to pay respect to the departed souls of two veteran journalists Muzibur Rahman Khan and Ali Ashraf and the members of the legal profession who died recently.

16) In the last resolution the meeting condemned the assassination of former President Ziaur Rahman.

PAKISTAN EMBASSY DENIES ENCOURAGEMENT OF SIKHS

Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 9 Nov 84 pp 1, 7

[Text] New Delhi, Nov 8--The Pakistan Embassy here today strongly denied reports appearing in a section of the Indian Press suggesting that the Government of Pakistan was in any way encouraging Sikh pilgrims visiting Nankana Saheb in connexion with Guru Nanak's birthday, to indulge in anti-India activities.

General Zia, the Embassy said, had assured Indian leaders here that the pilgrims, whether from India or other countries, would not be allowed to carry on hostile anti-India activities. This continued to be the policy of the Government.

The Embassy stated that the two Governments had consulted each other before hand in order to prevent, as far as possible, the misuse of this purely religious occasion for political purposes.

As a result of these consultations, the Government of Pakistan took certain steps, namely (a) in respect of pilgrims from India, the Pakistan Embassy issued visas only to those whose names had been provided by the Government of India; (b) in respect of pilgrims from other countries who did not require visas to enter Pakistan, efforts were made to discourage leading political activists from coming to Pakistan. President Zia himself stated this while he was in New Delhi; and (c) instructions were issued to the official media in Pakistan not to publicise any political statements made by the pilgrims. Appeals were also made to the non-official media.

According to the Pakistan Embassy, appeals have been made by the Pakistan Government to the pilgrims to restrict their activities to religious rites and to refrain from political activity. The President has personally met a group of pilgrims selected by the leader of the Indian jatha, and appealed to them to use the occasion only for the performance of religious rites and not to indulge in any political activity which could cause misunderstanding.

The Government of Pakistan, the Embassy said, was conscious of the "sensitive time" at which the pilgrimage was taking place and would certainly not like to see anything happen which might negate its policy of seeking good relations with India. President Zia forcefully reiterated this policy while he was in New Delhi, the Embassy said.

The Embassy hoped that the positive efforts being made by the authorities in Pakistan would be appreciated and attention would not be focused solely on stray news items and statements of a negative nature. It was impossible in such situations to totally prevent these, the Embassy added.

Mr Ganga Singh Dhillon and Mr Jasbir Singh, nephew of the late Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, is among the 1,500 or so "Khalistan" activists currently on a "pilgrimage" to Pakistan, adds PTI.

Mr Dhillon was reported to have visited Nankana Sahib yesterday for about an hour where the militant Sikhs held an anti-India convention. Inflammatory speeches aimed at inciting Sikhs in India were made by Mr Jasbir Singh and others.

Nearly 2,000 "yatrees" (pilgrims) from India visiting Pakistan to participate in the birth anniversary celebrations of Guru Nanak have been maintaining a low profile.

The three-hour convention at Nankana Sahib saw speaker after speaker exhorting Sikhs and Muslims to join hands against "Hindu imperialists." The convention hall echoed with pro-Khalistan and anti-India slogans, according to reports.

The Indian Embassy in Islamabad has already lodged protests with the Pakistan Foreign Office against the publicity being given to self-styled Khalistan leaders.

CSO: 4600/1169

RAJIV REPORTED PLANNING CHANGES IN FOREIGN OFFICE

Madras THE HINDU in English 21 Nov 84 p 9

[Article by G.K. Reddy]

[Text]

NEW DELHI, Nov. 20.

The Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, is reported to be unhappy with the calibre of Indian diplomatic representation in many key places and he has been hinting of the need for exercising greater care, especially in making political appointments to such posts.

His unhappiness over the behaviour or performance of some of the heads of missions is being taken as an unmistakable indication of his resolve to take some steps after the elections.

Apart from a progressive decline in the quality of persons chosen for these appointments, the Government has not set the right standards for ensuring that they function efficiently with the necessary dedication. It is likely that more career diplomats are going to be assigned to important countries in future in preference to the normal run of politicians who have to be accommodated as part of the grace and favour system.

Advised to resign: The High Commissioner to London, Mr. Prakash Mehrotra, has been advised to resign not merely because his son had been accused of shop-lifting in a country where such charges have been frequently levelled against many coloured people, but also due to his alleged lack of interest or involvement in his work there. As one with political ambitions, he was keen on getting back into Parliament, although he was hardly a few months in London.

But the Government cannot blame the poor performance of many Indian missions only on the bad choice of political appointees, since those in power have been playing favourites even with career officers irrespective of their ability or aptitude. The ambassadorship in Washington, for example, was left vacant for almost a year after Mr. N. A. Palkhivala left and Mr. K. R. Narayan was appointed in his place.

But, fortunately, there was no such inordinate delay in appointing Mr. K. S. Bajpai, the present ambassador, who had been doing some excellent work from all accounts in the most difficult circumstances. The Government had, however, no justification at all for keeping the post of High Commissioner to Canada vacant for over an year, when there should have been an experienced head of mission on the spot to deal with the Sikhs' problems there.

Nurul Hassan may leave: The Government will have to find suitable persons immediately after the elections to fill the posts of the High Commission in London and ambassador in Paris, and perhaps also in Moscow since the present incumbent, Dr. Nurul Hassan, has been toying with the idea of a political assignment at home. At one stage, a very senior IFS officer with a distinguished record was sounded about the Moscow posting on the assumption that Dr. Nurul Hassan might want to leave before long despite his good equation with the Soviet Government.

It is customary in many countries to appoint distinguished public men to important diplomatic posts, but in India it has been misused on many occasions to dump unwanted politicians in prominent world capitals who ended up by doing immense damage through their personal angularities or inexperience. But quite a few non-officials have also proved to be excellent ambassadors over the years with the result that the main criticism has been directed at the poor choices made rather than the practice of offering diplomatic assignments to leading public men.

BACKGROUND TO AKALI COMMITTEE DISSOLUTION TOLD

Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 8 Nov 84 pp 1, 7

[Text] Amritsar, Nov 7--The Akali Dal (Longowal) appeared to be heading for a split as the five Sikh head priests in a surprise move dissolved the five-month-old 21-member ad hoc committee of the party and dismissed its convenor, Mr Prakash Singh Majitha, reports PTI.

The head priests appointed a former senior vice-president of the party, Mr Surjan Singh Thakedar, as convenor of the new ad hoc committee which will consist of 18 presidents of the districts units. More members will be included in the committee later on, a statement signed the the priests said.

The statement said that the action had been taken considering the present crisis in the Sikh Panth.

The head priests reinstated the Amritsar (urban) district unit of the party and its president, Mr Harbhajan Singh, who was expelled from the primary membership of the party by Mr Majitha yesterday.

The head priests announced that the meeting of the Akali Dal fixed for November 11 will be held as scheduled.

The district presidents, sitting and former M.P.s and MLAs, SGPC members, presidents of the State unit of Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Delhi and Chandigarh and convenors of the different wings have been called for the meeting to discuss the "present situation." The head priests will address the meeting.

Although no specific reason was given by the head priests for the dismissal of Mr Majithia, it was reliably learnt that it was their attempt to suppress the move in the party ranks to replace the detained party president, Sant Harchand Singh Longowal" and dislodge the SGPC president, Mr G.S. Tohra, in the annual presidential election of the body on November 30.

Another reason given for the dismissal of Mr Majitha was his failure to accompany the seven-member Akali team to visit Delhi to assess the situation.

The head priests were also reported to have taken strong exception to the dismissal by Mr Majitha of the president of the Amritsar district Akali Jatha, Mr Harbhajan Singh.

The matter was discussed by head priests for several hours yesterday before the head priests announced their decisions, this morning. The head priest also met many Akali leaders present in the city.

Although some Akali leaders hailed the action of the head priests, others criticized it as "undue interference" in the affairs of the Akali Dal.

The head priests today summoned the Akali leader, Mr Akshi Jagdev Singh of Delhi to the Akali Takht on November 12.

The head priests have asked him to explain his action in allegedly releasing a "distorted version" of their telegram to the President, Giani Zail Singh, on the violence in certain parts of the country as published in newspapers.

Jathedar Kripal Singh, head priest of the Akal Takht, in a signed statement disowned the telegram released by Mr Bakshi Jagdev Singh and described it as "incorrect and fabricated."

CSO: 4600/1167

RAJIV SCORED FOR REFUSAL TO MEET SANJAY MANCH MP

Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 8 Nov 84 p 7

[Text] New Delhi, Nov 7--Mr Rajiv Gandhi's meeting with the Opposition leaders was not as uneventful as yesterday's reports had one believe. Apparently, the Prime Minister did not permit the Manch representative to join the parleys which he had with Mr Charan Singh and leaders of other political parties.

Mr Jaipal Singh Kashyap, M.P., who was among the Opposition leaders who had started out from the DMKP office for 1, Akbar Road was allowed into the house. But when it came to the Opposition leaders being allowed into Mr Gandhi's room, Mr R.K. Dhawan walked up to Mr Charan Singh and told him that the Prime Minister did not want to see Mr Kashyap.

According to Mr Kashyap, who addressed a Press conference at the Sanjay Vichar Manch office here today, Mr Dhawan told him that the Prime Minister was allergic to the Manch "and would not meet the Manch member of Parliament in the delegation." An embarrassed Mr Kashyap inquired why he had not been informed about it before, since a list of the Opposition leaders seeing Mr Gandhi had been submitted in advance.

The other leaders, some of them already ushered into the room, waited till Mr Charan Singh, who led the delegation, spoke to Mr Kashyap.

Mr Kashyap, according to himself, told Mr Dhawan that as he was heavy with grief, he was leaving the P.M.'s house in peaceful protest. He had come to voice popular grievances and was not "fond of Mr Rajiv Gandhi's face."

Subsequently, Mrs Menaka Gandhi protested to Mr Charan Singh that the Opposition leaders had allowed such an indignity to be heaped on one of the M.P.s. As an elected representative of the people and a member of the political party he had as much right to see Mr Gandhi as any of the others. If the argument was that the Sanjay Manch was not a recognized party, then it could be said that neither Mr Chandrajit Yadav's Janavadi Party nor Mr Bhim Singh's Panther's Party were recognized.

Mr Charan Singh, who had obviously tried to spare himself and the other leaders a scene at the Prime Minister's house yesterday sent a letter to Mr Rajiv Gandhi today protesting against his behaviour yesterday.

"I personally feel that what happened was unfortunate and that the composition of any delegation cannot be determined by the person who had agreed to meet the delegation," Mr Charan Singh said. He said that as soon as the delegation had reached Mr Gandhi's house, "an important member of your personal staff approached me and told me that the Prime Minister was not willing to meet any member of the Rashtriya Sanjay Vichar Manch."

The delegation, Mr Charan Singh said in his letter, was meeting him (Mr Gandhi) for a public cause and, therefore, he had desisted from lodging a protest there and then.

Mr J.N. Mishra, senior general secretary of the Sanjay Manch who was present at Mr Kashyap's Press conference, said the Manch condemned the arbitrary and discriminatory conduct of the Prime Minister "who does not seem to have the guts to face the Manch." Mr Gandhi obviously knew that the Manch representative would tell him to his face that he and henchmen like Mr Arjun Das were responsible for the violence which started from Safdarjang Hospital at the behest of the latter who, according to him (Mr Mishra), was allegedly noticed ordering the Lieutenant-Governor and the Police Commissioner near the AIIMS to "avenge Mrs Gandhi's death at all costs."

Mr Rajiv Gandhi should know, Mr Mishra said, that as Prime Minister he had to meet everyone, let alone speaking to a representative of an Opposition Party "and that too a member of Parliament." "His (Mr Gandhi's) behaviour stinks of uncalled-for bias against the Manch and smacks of immaturity and inexperience detrimental to the Prime Minister's august office."

Mr Karpoori Thakur, the former Bihar Chief Minister and Mr Satya Parkash Malaviya, M.P., and Mr Ram Vilas Paswan, M.P., general secretaries of the DMKP, in a separate statement strongly disapproved of the discriminatory conduct of the Prime Minister in not meeting the RSVM representative.

"If he had any differences with his late brother, Sanjay Gandhi, or any personal differences with his sister-in-law, Mrs Menaka Gandhi, he should not have allowed this to come in the way of his duties and responsibilities as a Prime Minister. Let him not forget that he is not just Rajiv Gandhi but the Prime Minister of the country," they said while condemning the whole episode.

CSO: 4600/1167

BANGARAPPA-LED PARTY TO MERGE WITH CONGRESS-I

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 9 Nov 84 p 1

[Text] Bangalore, November 8--The Bangarappa-led Karnataka Kranti Ranga today decided to merge with the Congress unconditionally.

Mr J. Bangarappa said the decision to merge with the Congress was unanimously endorsed by the parliamentary board and the executive of the party at a joint meeting this morning.

The merger itself, he said, was a mere formality. The regional outfit, originally set up by the late Mr Devaraj Urs, had been an electoral and legislative ally of the Congress since January 1983.

Mr Bangarappa announced he would meet the Prime Minister, Mr Rajiv Gandhi, in a day or two to communicate the decision of his party.

With the merger of the Kranti Ranga, the strength of the Congress goes up from 80 to 86 in a house of 225.

"It is only the Congress that can take the nation on the path of progress. In order to strengthen the hands of Mr Rajiv Gandhi, we have decided to give up our separate identity and merge with the Congress," the resolution said.

Although Mr Bangarappa said that every one of the members who participated in the meeting today welcomed the merger, sources in the party said some members had reservations on an outright merger and favoured, instead, an electoral understanding. The majority, however, plumped for the proposal made by Mr Bangarappa.

The merger of the Kranti Ranga with the Congress has been on the cards for some time. Mr Bangarappa has had meetings with the late Prime Minister, Mrs Indira Gandhi, and Mr Rajiv Gandhi on several occasions in the last one year.

Since the beginning of the Janata rule in Karnataka in 1983 the Kranti Ranga had joined hands with the Congress, particularly in the legislature. In the biennial elections to the Rajya Sabha and the legislative council, the two parties voted together.

Today's merger decision marks the return of Mr Bangarappa and his followers to the Congress after two years.

The former Socialist leader had joined the Congress during the emergency in 1976. When Mr Devaraj Urs broke away from Mrs Indira Gandhi in 1979, Mr Bangarappa, who was a minister in his cabinet, left the company of Mr Urs to head the state unit of the Congress.

Mr Bangarappa joined the Gundu Rao ministry in 1980 but was asked to resign in December that year following his attacks on the ministry from within. It was in the middle of 1982 that he left the Congress bitterly criticising Mrs Gandhi for promoting people like Mr Gundu Rao. He joined the Kranti Ranga soon after.

In the 1983 election to the legislative assembly, Mr Bangarappa campaigned on behalf of the Janata-Kranti Ranga combine. The Kranti Rangai, in fact, decided to merge with the Janata soon after the elections to form the government. When the leadership of the legislature party slipped out of his hands, Mr Bangarappa maintained he was still a member of the Kranti Ranga and dissociated himself from the Janata.

CSO: 4600/1168

AGENCY REPORTS MULTIFACETED R&D ON MATERIALS

Madras THE HINDU in English 21 Nov 84 p 17

[Text] India can now produce metallic glass, a new class of material poised for revolutionising the electrical industry. Powder metallurgy products are routinely made in laboratories and a private company in Hyderabad will soon produce these on a mass scale. Composite materials technologies have been developed indigenously for producing composite materials incorporating carbon fibre for aircraft and space industry. Special aluminium alloys developed in India are replacing expensive copper cables and copper, nickel and cobalt have been extracted through hydro-metallurgy from polymetallic nodules dug from the seabed. In the last few years India has made significant achievements in the field of metallurgy, the backbone of industrial, civil and military activities.

Research in metallurgy in India is being carried out at the National Metallurgical Laboratory, Jamshedpur, the Banaras Hindu University, Indian Institute of Science in Bangalore, the Defence Metallurgical Research Lab (DMRL) in Hyderabad, the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) in Bombay and in various universities and institutes of technology besides R&D units in the private sector. Special alloys and materials needed for aircraft and defence equipment are produced in a specially established factory in Hyderabad, known as MIDHANI (Mishradhatu Nigam).

Metallic glass

The first ribbons of metallic glass rolled out of the laboratory scale spin melt unit at BHU in 1978. Since then a few other laboratories have started work on metallic glass. Two years ago projects by eight research groups were funded by the Department of Science and Technology with the objective of developing a commercially viable technology for producing types of metallic glass for applications in transformer cores. Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited is involved in the research and development and hopes to commercially exploit this technology in the near future.

The nosecone of rockets made by Indian space scientists use a technology for reinforcing plastics with glass fibre. Fifteen research groups from universities and national laboratories under a project funded by the DST

have been carrying out for over nine years research and development of newer fibres and composites under this project. Technologies have been developed for producing glass, carbon and organic fibres.

Notable achievements include development of E-glass and C-glass compositions; ceramic bushings to replace expensive platinum-rhodium for drawing glass fibres; process for producing aramid fibre similar to Kevlar (of DuPont), process for producing continuous carbon fibre from special grade PAN fibre and a variety of processing techniques such as filament winding, pultrusion and products like impeller vanes, silos and slotted screen pipes.

The aluminium alloy conductor NML-PM 215 developed at the National Metallurgical Laboratory has helped sizable savings of copper. This alloy in the form of wire rod is being produced commercially at Bharat Aluminium Company in Korba. Indian Cable Company in Jamshedpur is producing NML alloy wires meeting the specifications of the Railways. A multistrand overhead conductor made from this alloy is being evaluated by the Ministry of Defence. At the Central Glass and Ceramics Research Institute in Calcutta, a facility has recently been set up for producing on pilot scale glass wires for optical communications.

Defence labs' achievements

Indian metallurgists have made significant contributions towards the development of materials for the defence forces. Notable among them is the technology for making composite armour for battle tanks. The armour made of ceramic sandwiched steel composite armour called Kunchan armour is adjudged to be one of the best in the world and is to be used in the main battle tank being indigenously developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation. DMRL has also developed light-weight ceramic armour against small arms fire and monolithic steel armour for infantry combat vehicles to be produced in a factory near Hyderabad. Another major achievement of defence metallurgists is the development of armour piercing anti-tank projectile, an alloy material for use as penetrators. A Rs 70-crore factory to produce these projectiles is being set up at Tiruchi.

Scientists are also undertaking research on brake pads for various types of air force and civilian aircraft. The DMRL has already developed the brake pad assembly of MIG-21 aircraft wheels comprising a bimetallic stator and a friction material rotor. The development was necessitated by an acute shortage of the Russian component in the Air Force inventories. The bimetallic stator and the metallic-ceramic friction rotor are being produced at Hindustan Aeronautics, Ltd., Koraput, and HAL, Hyderabad, respectively. The latter is also planning for a production of 10 lakh brake pad rotor assemblies per annum in the near future.

DMRL is in fact one of the best equipped laboratories in the world. The structural metallurgy laboratory has optical microscopes, transmission and scanning electron microscopes, X-ray diffractometers, an X-ray fluorescence spectrometer and a sophisticated electron microprobe analyser with computer output. Among the latest acquisitions is a scanning Auger

electron microprobe. The mechanical metallurgy laboratory is also comprehensively equipped: Instron, a hot torsion testing machine and a whole range of devices for fatigue and creep testing. A closed-loop servohydraulic universal testing machine has just been acquired. The non-destructive testing laboratory has ultrasonic flaw detectors, magnetic track detectors and instruments for gamma-ray and X-ray radiography.

Analysis of chemical composition of even microscopic amounts of sample materials can be made to a few parts per billion by instruments that include atomic absorption spectrometers, an inductively coupled plasma emission spectrometer, automatic recording spectroscopy, Echelle D.C. arc plasma spectrometer, a computer controlled oxygen and nitrogen analyser and analysers equipped with digital display for detecting carbon, sulphur and hydrogen.

Powder metallurgy

The powder metallurgy laboratory is complete with a full range of presses and furnaces and full facilities for making dies. It can boast of a large-size argon atomiser, cold isostatic and hot isostatic presses suitable for development of production scale processes in powder technology. The hot isostatic press which would be the pride of a powder metallurgy research laboratory anywhere is the only one of its kind in the country. It can produce components directly from powder almost in finished form, bond dissimilar materials, heat defects in metal casting or give a fresh lease to used-up components like turbine blades that had to be replaced and discarded earlier. Among the other proud possessions of the gas turbine materials group are a 'burner rig' that can simulate temperature conditions in a gas turbine and a plasma coating unit for protective coating of components against hot corrosion. Soon to be installed are two multi-kilowatt laser units.

There is a vigorously active group working on ceramic materials for applications in electronics and high temperature structures. DMRL has an automatic press, an extrusion press and high temperature furnaces to synthesise ceramic components for special applications.

Facilities exist for melting magnetic materials in bulk quantities, pressing and heat treatment of these materials in powerful magnetic fields and for evaluating the magnetic properties of the final products. There are also facilities for investment casting of turbine blades and other precision components. DMRL can now by directional solidification make fully columnar cast superalloy and even single crystal blades for turbo-jet engines. The laboratory is now on the way to successfully developing the technology for investment-cast, directionally-solidified internally cooled turbine blades for a new aircraft planned for defence production in India.

Titanium in large batches

DMRL is also working on the development of high temperature and high strength titanium alloys that could reduce the weight of jet engines, making them more efficient and is all set to produce titanium metal in large batches using indigenous know-how in its demonstration plant.

Casting of titanium was once considered difficult if not impossible because of the molten metal's aggressive nature. DMRL scientists are trying to break through this barrier by directly casting titanium alloys into the required shapes. The latest forming techniques which are cost effective and energy saving are superplastic forming and diffusion bonding. The laboratory has identified a titanium alloy that can be formed superplastically and has designed and built a special diffusion bonding set-up.

The laboratory has developed the technology for liquid forging of various aluminium alloys, copper alloys and ferrous alloys. The process has been developed for manufacturing several intricate components. The technology is in the process of being transferred to Bharat Earth Movers Limited for manufacturing chosen components used in earth moving equipment. This will be the first such instance of a major manufacturing facility being set up for liquid forged components which will doubtless generate awareness of this manufacturing technology in the country.--PTI Science Service.

CSO: 4690/1189

ANALYST REPORTS BEGINNING OF ELECTORAL PROCESS

Madras THE HINDU in English 21 Nov 84 p 1

[Article by G.K. Reddy]

[Text]

NEW DELHI, Nov. 20.

The President, Mr. Zail Singh, issued the statutory notification today setting in motion the electoral process for completing the Lok Sabha poll within the prescribed time limit, and the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, was among the very first who filed their nominations in different States.

As a sitting member from Amethi constituency, he flew this morning to Sultanpur in Uttar Pradesh to complete this formality before getting totally preoccupied with the finalisation of the names of the remaining Congress (I) candidates.

The Congress (I) Parliamentary Board has been burning a lot of midnight oil battling with the lists to complete this task in time, while the Opposition leaders were racing against time to arrive at some electoral adjustments before November 27, the last date for filing nominations. The Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka Chief Ministers, Mr. N. T. Rama Rao and Mr. Ramakrishna Hegde, arrived here to play the role of elder statesmen and help the crusty old men of the badly-divided Opposition parties to rise above their personal animosities and over-reaching ambitions.

Dearth of ideas: A sad feature of these parliamentary elections has been that almost all political parties, including the ruling Congress (I), seem to have run out of ideas. They seem to be groping in the dark, not knowing how to capture the imagination of the people. The Congress (I) is banking heavily on the sympathy wave to see it through these elections, while the Opposition parties project themselves as a credible alternative capable of governing the country again.

In this welter of confusion, the Congress (I) strategists are hoping to transform this poll into a referendum on Indira Gandhi as a matriarch who suffered martyrdom, whose legacy can be sustained only by her son, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, who deserves a mandate of his own to uphold her heritage.

The Opposition parties, on the other hand, are afraid of either decrying the achievements of the dead mother or questioning the competence of the son to shoulder the tremendous

responsibility and fill the big void created by her assassination.

New broom effect: The new men in positions of power or influence are talking of a new beginning after the elections with the new Gandhi at the helm, determined to give the country a clean Government. The new publicity line that is being put across, holds out the promise of a major cleansing operation to make the new broom effect felt at all levels of the party and the Government by administering a political and psychological shock treatment to the many undesirable elements that had managed to get into pivotal positions.

The new breed of Congress (I) politicians, the rising stars in Mr. Rajiv Gandhi's firmament, have been hinting of many far-reaching changes after the elections, partly to foster the feeling that the outcome is already a foregone conclusion, that the new Gandhi would romp back with a big landslide. But otherwise they do not appear to have any idea of what exactly he could do to shed the ugly hangovers of too much bureaucracy, widespread inefficiency and rampant corruption.

Unconvincing argument: The argument that is being advanced by some apologists that Mr. Rajiv Gandhi has been left with not enough time to give a new look to the Congress (I) by selecting bright and promising new candidates is not cutting much ice, since Indira Gandhi had entrusted the task of looking around for better talent long before these elections. The very fact that the PCC (I) chiefs are suggesting the names of several odious characters indicates that the big talk of a Rajiv touch to purify the spirit of the Congress (I) is seen as no more than an electoral gimmick at best.

The next four or five days will denote how far the new Prime Minister is prepared to go in making a conscious effort to induct into the next Parliament a more talented set of persons who could be utilised for improving the quality of Government. If the great majority of sitting members manage to get Congress (I) ticket, under whatever pretext or for whatever reason, it will only mean that Mr. Rajiv Gandhi is not going to jettison unwanted elements anymore than his mother did to fulfil his promise of a clean, honest and efficient administration.

CORRESPONDENT INTERVIEWS CHIEF ELECTION COMMISSIONER

New Delhi PATRIOT in English 24 Nov 84 p 5

[Interview with Ram Krishna Trivedi by John Dayal--date and place not specified]

[Text] A month from today, 38.9 crore voters will choose the eighth Lok Sabha. There will be more than 4.29 lakh polling booths, some high in the hills, many on islands, and most of them in villages. "Our electorate may be uneducated, it may be illiterate. But it is certainly politically aware and very mature...And if they are able to send out their representative in a free and fair manner, I think it is good for the health of Indian democracy," says Mr Trivedi.

Excerpts from the interview:

Q: Can we tape this interview...?

Trivedi: Yes, of course. We must make use of modern electronics...

Q: Why did the Election Commission then not use the electronic voting machine this time?

When we are thinking in terms of modernisation all over and all around, there is no reason why we should not have introduced the electronic device, particularly when it was altogether indigenous. Indian scientists had produced the prototype. And everything was going to be produced indigenously, by our own public sector undertakings. And the cost was not too much. I thought this was just about the time we should start the electronic device.

There are several other advantages also. One, the financial advantage. Because over a number of years, about 10 or 15 years, we would have saved considerable money by way of printing cost, ballot paper, administrative arrangement and a reduction in the total electioneering period. Right now, we have to provide 21 days. You have to keep it longer because the ballot paper has got to be printed, which takes at least a week. If the electioneering could be completed in 14 days, to that extent every party, every candidate, every one would have reduced their expenditure. The

administrative expenditure would have been reduced because the total requirement of forces, of personnel, all that would have been completely eliminated. This would have been a better arrangement.

Q: Could you give a historical perspective of various electoral reforms introduced in the country since Independence? What are the successes achieved?

The Constitution, supplemented by the Representation of the Peoples Act, takes care of whatever is needed in the field of election. Article 324 and six Articles thereafter relate to elections in the country. Then you have the Representation of the People's Act 1950 and the Representation of the Peoples Act 1951. There are various rules, the electoral registration rules, the conduct of elections rules...these broadly provide the framework. Within that framework I think everything has been covered ever since 1950-51. We became a Republic in 1950. The first elections were held in 1952. From that time onwards, broadly the system has remained the same. That is to say, we have the Parliamentary form. We have the "first past post" system as they call it. That eliminates the proportional representation system, eliminates the list system, eliminates every other system which is being followed elsewhere. The only thing which we have basically accepted is the parliamentary form, the bi-cameral system in some places, voting by ballot, and finally the "first past the post" system.

This was at the inception of the Republic and these four broad parameters continue so far.

The first report with major recommendations was of 1970-71. Of course, the Election Commission has been submitting reports after every general election. That was the pattern. Earlier on we had simultaneous elections in 1952, 1957, 1962 and 1967. The four reports cover the Parliament and the Assemblies. It was only in 1967, for the first time that the situation changed. In every sense of the term, 1967 was a watershed in the election history of the country. You had the SVD government in Uttar Pradesh. With some people crossing over, the problem of defections also started. Thereafter, the entire system was distorted.

There was President's Rule for eight or nine months in the State and then the elections were called. It also did not work. Then further elections were called. The result was that the entire pattern was derailed, as it were.

Another development was in 1977 when the Janata Government came to power. They wanted the nine Assemblies where the Janata had a large number of votes to seek a fresh mandate. Therefore, 10 Assemblies were dissolved. The Supreme Court upheld the order of the Government. This was repeated in 1980.

Actually, that was one of the reasons why it is indicated that there should be simultaneous elections. If you are going to have Lok Sabha elections, to be followed three or four months later by elections to the Assemblies,

you might as well have them together. You get to know the mandate of the people straightway. But of course, the Commission cannot order this. It has to be a political decision.

The Commission did recommend that such States as are within six months of the Lok Sabha elections may be taken for simultaneous elections.

Q: What was the major recommendation of 1971 report?

That was primarily about changes in the Representation of the Peoples Act to remove procedural lacuna. It was not a major recommendation. Procedures like the one followed for counting of votes. The earlier procedure was taking up counting, polling station-wise. Instead of that, it was suggested to mix the ballots. Another was on the use of local scripts.

Q: Were any of these implemented?

Some of them, the minor ones, were implemented. Instead of mixing up the ballot papers, we reverted back to the old polling station device. Actually, today the system we are following is what we were following in 1952. Polling station-wise, because the mixing up and then separating of the ballots caused a lot of confusion. It delayed the counting considerably.

It was only later in 1976-77 that some major recommendations were made: recommendations like funding of the elections and introduction of a system which might be a combination of the "first past the post system" and the list system.

Q: And the major recommendations?

Gradually, every one realised that money power was becoming important. The second was that the really honest politicians were somehow being elbowed out in the process which the political parties were following. Therefore, it would have been necessary to do something whereby the costs were reduced, at the same time the mood of the electorate got fully reflected. Analysis had shown that governments were formed with minority votes. The Congress, for instance, never got into power with more than 50 percent of the votes polled. It was below 50 pc. This has been the pattern with respect of State Assemblies also. Except perhaps one Assembly election where there was a high polling and 51 pc or 52 pc were scored by the ruling party. Otherwise, by and large, it has always been less than 50 pc of the votes polled.

Q: Were these reforms implemented?

No, I am afraid. None of them. They are still pending with the Government. In 1978 and 1980, there were some more recommendations. In 1980, the recommendations related to the delimitation of the constituencies even though the Constitution has provided that there shall be no change until 2000 A.D.

It would be necessary at least to retain the number of seats but make adjustment in terms of growth of population, in terms of development of urban areas, concentration of population as a result of industrialisation and also with regard to the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes seats.

The recommendation was that if a seat has been allocated or reserved for the scheduled castes or scheduled tribes for a period of 15 or 20 years, it need not continue to be reserved, because the general pattern is that if you have 18 or 19 percent population of scheduled castes or tribes, you reserve that seat. The remaining 80 pc are not represented. Those 80 pc seems to think that they are being ignored..

The other was the recommendation against defection, for instance. The Congress had also initially stated that they were in favour of having an anti-defection law. The Janata, of course, said that they were even more keen to have anti-defection law. Actually, the anti-defection law has come up before the Parliament thrice—twice by the Congress and once by the Janata. And every time it did not see the light of the day. Nothing happened. All that I can say is that ultimately it was because of some compulsions—primarily political—which prevented the acceptance of such an important legislation.

Q: What do you think are electoral reforms that are the most imperative, needed right away?

Actually, my first major recommendation and which was never made by any one so far earlier, was that we must first of all have a definition of a political party.

Q: Will you elaborate on this?

So far, there is no law which says what a political party is. The only order which exists so far is in the election Symbol Orders. This is not the law. It is Election Commission's direction relating to symbols, and it says: A political party may get registered, then how it will be recognised and how they will be allotted the symbols. That limited parameter alone has been covered by that symbol order. What I said was like the West German system, you must have a definition of the political party.

Q: How should the political party be defined:

The political theories indicate what political parties are. Those are the academic definitions. Those could be accepted. Or, even in practical terms, you can say that any organisation or association of people with a political mandate with a clear-cut political objective getting together for advancing political consciousness and for advancing their own political interests and so on. One could work it out within the system. After all, the Constitution and the Representation of Peoples Act provide what actions an organised body has to take. You can certainly work out definitions in terms of that. The Government and political parties will have to get together to arrive at some sort of consensus.

What I was interested in was that such parties which are covered by that definition alone should be registered. That is only to prevent mushrooming of parties. Some five people join together and they are the leaders: they don't have one follower yet it becomes a political party. They don't even die a natural death. They continue. When you have several political parties which have split; one split, two splits, three splits, and yet they continue as political parties.

The main objective is that ultimately we should evolve a system whereby multiplicity of parties, or multiplicity of candidates which is becoming a problem, is eliminated. In course of time, Independents get absorbed in the political parties and you don't have anything like Independents.

The point is that if you have a law, then in the first part, one eliminates the non-serious candidate as also multiplicity of parties. Then you will have really seriously contending parties with clearcut political objectives who come to you and say this is our manifesto, this is our mandate; if you feel that you should go for these objectives, then vote for us otherwise you vote for someone else. That is what they could have done.

Q: After the political parties are defined, what next?

Not only that the political party should be defined and registered by the Election Commission, it should also be accountable for the funds it raises and the expenditure it incurs. These accounts should be auditable. This is basic, because I think that a stage has come when we should know how the funds are raised.

I am not bothered about the funds for other political activities. I am only concerned with the elections. As far as funds for the elections are concerned, I think it is about time that we should know how the funds are raised by the parties. There are certain laws, but every one knows that these laws are generally violated.

What you are saying is that Rs 1.5 lakh is for the candidate, but at the same time you have another provision saying that the political parties may spend anything and it is not counted towards the individual's ceiling. If it is not counted towards individual's ceiling, then what is the use of having a ceiling at all? You can spend Rs 50 lakh for a candidate and yet retain Rs 1.5 lakh as a ceiling. What does it mean? It really means nothing.

Another is the Company Law definition saying that not more than Rs 25,000 shall be contributed by a company to political parties. Every one knows that the money is being raised from the companies, and yet no one is able to do anything. The rule is being violated.

This bar on the company should be withdrawn. Because everyone knows that money has got to be raised, elections have got to be fought: and Rs 25,000 is hardly an amount which can really be allowed to remain, considering the expenditure today. I said the bar should be removed. The only conditions

were two: (1) It should be on the basis of accountability, that is to say, everyone should be able to say that this is the amount received from such and such company. This can be done only when the accounts are open for inspection by the nominee of the Election Commission and (2) as the Federal Election Commission does in the US. It is only the companies making profits which should be permitted to contribute. Those should not contribute which are running at a loss. And, of course, no public sector undertaking will contribute to any party.

Q: Can public sector organisations contribute to the election funds?

Strictly speaking, and technically speaking, they can contribute up to Rs 25,000. There is no bar. They can contribute to any one. But the public sector should be completely banned from contributing because it will be relatable to the ruling party.

Q: There was also a proposal for the State to finance the elections.

My view is slightly different from the view held by my predecessor (Mr S.L. Shakhder). He had said that there should be a 100 p.c. funding of the expenditure. Personally, I do not agree. As far as the State fundings are concerned, it should only be in kind, not in cash. The German experiment stated 3.50 Deutch Mark per vote polled by the party. That is the amount made over to that party. There are a large number of parties in West Germany also. So each gets in terms of their voting percentage.

We cannot fund the entire election expenditure because, in the first place, it would be difficult to work out the norms in such a big country. Then you have Assembly elections. If you agree to the Parliamentary elections, you have to agree to the Assembly elections. And considering the expenditure which is taking place, it will be far too much of a burden on the State Exchequer in a poor country like ours.

Indirectly, the State is already bearing the cost, in the sense that the entire administrative expenditure in any case being borne by the Government.

Q: What are the reforms needed: What reforms do you suggest?

The major reform, as I said, was (1) with regard to the political party, (2) with regard to State funding in a limited way, and that also in kind, (3) the introduction of anti-defection law because that, I think, is an important thing, and, (4) the strengthening of the Election Commission.

Q: What is that?

At the moment there are four constitutional authorities which are mentioned in the Constitution. These are the Supreme Court, the Union Public Service Commission, the Comptroller and Auditor General and the Election Commission. The three other bodies have their funds charged on the Exchequer. They are not voted. The funds of the Election Commission are voted. That is one difference.

In terms of staff, the Election Commission cannot appoint any staff. All these other agencies can appoint their own staff. They are the master of their own empire. And the Government cannot interfere there.

When you treat all these bodies as constitutional authorities their functions and powers should be identical, in order to make them independent. The precise reasons why the electoral reforms have not taken place is that our recommendations merely stay recommendatory. That is one of the main problems. Ultimately, of course, in these matters Parliament has the last say. But then in practical terms, what it means is that it is the Government of the day which decides, and then, of course, all sorts of considerations do come in. Of course, they will be in the larger interest because they have the mandate. That has to be accepted. But then the main point is that the Election Commission itself should be put at par with the other constitutional authorities.

Q: Apart from the need for electoral reforms, what are the specific problems that the Commission faces because of the scale and dimension in which elections are held in India.

Let us frankly admit that you have now an electorate which is far more politically conscious than it was in 1952, or even 10 years ago. They have come of age. Then you have better organised parties than there were in 1952 and so on. In fact, this process of consolidation started in 1967 when if there were viable parties, then they formed the government. When I say viable parties, it only means that they are in a position to form a government and alternative to the existing parties. That process started only in 1967. Even at the Centre it was effective in 1977. Viability actually has improved as far as political parties are concerned. You have the Marxist Government in Bengal. It has been functioning for long. In Kerala, there was a Marxist Government. There is the ADMK Government in Tamilnadu and the Telugu Desam in Andhra Pradesh. It is a very good sign for the development of healthy Parliamentary system.

Also, the political parties have become more vigilant and they are conscious of their rights. They know where and when things gone wrong.

Then, the increase in the electorate itself, numerically speaking. I was dealing with only qualitative aspects earlier. As against only 18 crore of electorate in 1949-50, today you have 39 crore, which certainly is a very large number. That simultaneously means more polling stations. Now, as against only about 1.5 lakh to begin with--the number of polling stations we had in 1947--today you have 4,50,000 polling stations!

The number of personnel required, the number of security arrangements, complexity of the situation, law and order situation in various States which has been changing from time to time. Communications have also improved with the result that anything happening in Nagaland today is reflected in Kerala. If something happens, say a candidate is murdered in Andhra Pradesh, there is an immediate repercussion in Meghalaya and other places!

In view of improved communication, increased interest of the electorate, the increased number of the electorate, the improvement in the organisation of political parties, their greater vigilance, and in view of the increased complexity of political questions, the task of the Election Commission has relatively become extremely difficult and complex.

A: Does it mean that there is a watch on the Commission to keep it impartial, or the pressure is on it to be partial to someone?

I will say there is increasing vigilance over the activities of every single agency down the line, from the Election Commission down to the lowest electoral registration officer, with the result that the number of complaints the number of allegations before the election, during the preparation of electoral rolls, after the preparation of electoral rolls, during the delimitation of constituencies, during the conduct of the poll and so on, have increased considerably.

Then you don't have that sort of formula earlier of having merely a moral sanction. Now you have moral sanction in terms of code of conduct. You have a code of conduct for the ruling party, a code of conduct for a political party as such. All these are purely on the moral plane. But people have become so vigilant that the moment a transfer takes place today, I have half a dozen telegrams from Bihar saying that this is what has happened.

On the one hand, the Election Commission has no authority except issuing directions. We have said, don't make transfers. But if they do it, I don't have any sanction. That is precisely one of the recommendations that I have made. I said that as far as the code of conduct is concerned, there is a breach which should be treated as "a corrupt practice" under the law. If someone commits a breach, then he suffers the risk of disqualification because it becomes a corrupt practice.

Q: What are the fresh guidelines on security forces, for use of police?

I don't suppose we have any guidelines regarding security forces. That was the only precedence laid down in Garhwal--the forces were inducted from outside. It becomes a matter serious enough for the cancellation of the poll. That is the only instance which has happened so far.

In every election, I think troops from the neighbouring areas have been used. Bilateral arrangement has been always there. Some police force moves from Tamilnadu to Andhra Pradesh, from Andhra Pradesh to Pondicherry, from Maharashtra to Karnataka. During my last discussion I was told that several such arrangements which will have to be made. I said, go ahead.

Q: On the question of booth capturing...

That is one of the latest things which has come up during last few years. Let us be clear what it means. One is what they call 'rigging.' The other is what is called the 'booth capturing.'

As far as the rigging is concerned, what happens is that the allegations are that it is the ruling party which compels certain devices to be adopted whereby the candidate's interests are advanced. That is rigging.

As far as booth capturing is concerned, it can be done by ruling party or by any other party. What it means is that a particular person interested in a particular candidate goes and captures the booth and either runs away with the ballot box, or takes hold of the ballot papers, puts the mark there and puts them into the box; then tells the presiding officer that he will be shot in case any report is made or if he makes any mention in the diary.

Fortunately, I must say that in spite of the allegations, this is the best of knowledge restricted to a very limited area in Bihar. It did happen, they say, at some places in Bengal. But not on a large scale. And maybe in some parts of eastern UP or in Haryana. I mean these are the only States which have so far been mentioned.

When this came to my notice some time ago, I said during the byelections that we are going to enforce certain things which will absolutely eliminate chances of rigging or booth capturing. We laid down broad guidelines--seven or eight of them--saying that this is what should be done.

To begin with, polling personnel should be mixed. The security forces should be mixed. No one should be permitted to enter the polling stations without a regular authorisation from the Election Commission. Even Ministers should not be permitted to move around on the polling day. No licensee or any one carrying arms should be permitted to take them into the booth.

Even the licensee should be asked to keep away their arms if they move around in the constituency. And then the presiding officers should maintain an hour-to-hour diary, not waiting for the end of the day. They should be connected with the wireless network. If anyone appears with a gun or something, well he should be in a position to contact the mobile party.

Chandi was the place we started. Then in three other byelections in Bihar, we introduced the same thing. In fact we issued general instructions to other places also.

There might be a stray incident where someone might appear and run away with the ballot box. This can happen. I am quite sure that the security forces can take care of it.

This is also one of the reasons why I recommend one-day poll. It is not everyone who is doing this. There are goondas, who do it one place today, and move on to another place the second day. Depending on which party they belong to, they even move one State to another. They can be stopped in a one-day poll. If at all they do anything, it will be in one small area only.

What is the problem relating to disputes on symbols and the problem the Commission faces due to the splitting of parties?

The intention of the law is that a party should be so firm that barring exceptions, by and large, once formed it will continue to be a political party and retain its identity if split occurs. Some sort of a political device may be found whereby it would be possible to eliminate such splinter groups unless it is a sizable percentage of the people who become a party out of an existing party, it would not be recognised as a political party.

Q: Then there would be the case of recognising which is the parent party and which is a new party?

Those can be taken care of. To begin with they will not enjoy the status of a political party unless it is proved that they have a sizable following, that they also agree to follow the principles which are laid down, and that they have a separate manifesto. What happens today is that a new Telugu Desam comes up and says our manifesto is word for word the same. Can you give us another symbol? Now how do you do that? You call it the same party. You have the same article of association, the same constitution and you want another symbol. How can that be? There are five people at the top and they constitute a new party. It is impossible for me to determine how they represent a majority unless they prove it. I said, "you have not proved it on the floor of the House. How do you expect me to accept you as the Telugu Desam? I can't do that." Similarly about Maharashtra Gomantak Party. Mrs Sushila Kakodkar and the others first went to the Congress, then out of it. They came back and then they went to Maharashtra Gomantak Party. They said, "now you accept us." They went to the meeting on one day where unity efforts were going on. Then they filed an application saying that "we have split and therefore we should be recognised as Maharashtra Gomantak Party." I did not agree to that, I said, "no. Show me how you are in a majority on the party side, on the organisational side. Show me how you are in a majority on the legislative side. And it is only then that I can think in terms of changing the name or changing the symbol for your party."

Q: A large number of symbols are still frozen. The original Congress symbol is among them.

A: Yes. The pair of bullocks with the yoke is a frozen symbol. Actually, they can come back and ask us because now the dispute has been settled. My predecessor decided on a particular group as a 'real' Congress. And, therefore, it is called the Indian National Congress. They use the Hand now.

Q: What are the issues relating to delimitation of constituencies? What are their major problems?

There is a constitutional amendment saying that until 2001 AD no delimitation will take place. The existing seats are frozen. My suggestion which I have sent to the Government is that you may freeze the seats, but where administrative changes have taken place, some new districts have been formed, some areas have gone from one place to another, new growth centres

have come up on administrative grounds and in areas where scheduled castes and scheduled tribes have been represented for more than 15 to 20 years, there a change should be amended. A law was brought forth at the last session of the Parliament saying that this delimitation could take place, without changing the number of seats. But somehow it was withdrawn at the last minute. My recommendation was accepted. In fact when I was on the Delimitation Commission in Jammu & Kashmir, that was one of the first principles that I insisted upon and they accepted it.

Q: The Chief Election Commissioner's post has been held by some great men. Mr Sen-Verma was a scholar. Mr Shakhder was a parliamentary expert. What has been your experience?

It is an extremely challenging job, because as I said everyone has become extremely vigilant. Somehow I find that the election Commission does not have the authority to implement many of the things which it says. It could occasionally be frustrating though I must say that by and large, even on the basis of moral sanction, we have been able to get the States to agree to many things. After all, I do not have even one person working directly under the Election Commission. And I am supposed to hold all these elections involving 2.5 million people. I do not have even one person on the security anywhere. The headquarter staff is limited to only 120 people. Imagine the task which is generated.

During the Assam days, I was exposed to every possible danger. And I did not ask for anything. I said, well if something has to happen, let it happen. How does it matter?

Q: When are Punjab and Assam likely to go on polls?

Well, I am very keen on the revision of the rolls...Of course, as you know, Assam is far more complex than it appears on the surface. About Punjab, in October when I went out for a brief while, at that point of time I had thought if things continued to improve--and that was the view of the State Government also--there will be no problems whatsoever in holding the Punjab elections. But, unfortunately, this thing, not the assassination alone, but the aftermath where something happened in Delhi, UP, Madhya Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh could have a fallout in Punjab immediately. It might create a law and order problem. Therefore, the State Government felt that it could be risky at this stage.

Q: As CEC, you preside over a major instrument of a functioning democracy. What is your opinion about democracy surviving here....

I think it has a bright future, and it is reinvigorating itself with every election. I think it is a very good sign, as I said earlier, that the electorate has become extremely aware politically.

It may be uneducated, it may be illiterate, but it is certainly politically aware, very mature. It knows where its interest lies. And this is what democracy is about.

If they are able to send out their representatives in a free and fair manner, I think it is good for the health of the Indian democracy. I am very hopeful that the democratic system will continue, and will continue to be alive and kicking.

Q: You say it is a passing phase?

Hopefully. I can only pray that this is a passing phase. I am not supposed to make a political comment, but as a citizen, I do certainly feel that it is dangerous for a political system to have anything to do with violence. Therefore, it should be condemned by anyone who has the interest of India at heart. Any one who has the interest of democracy at heart should outright condemn violence.

Democracy implies discussion of all your problems across the table. The counting of heads and not the breaking of heads. I should think that all enlightened public opinion in the country will rise as one person and condemn violence all over.

CSO: 4600/1190

CLANDESTINE RADIO 'REVEALS' DETAILS OF KUWAITI HIJACKING

GF151100 (Clandestine) Radio Nejat-e Iran in Persian 0330 GMT 15 Dec 84

[Text] Dear listeners. We begin our second newscast with a special report on the Kuwaiti airbus disaster.

The revelations of the hijacking plan indicates that even about the mode of killing the passengers of the Kuwaiti airbus there was a difference of opinion among the leaders of the Islamic regime. One of Radio Nejat-e Iran's correspondents who followed the hijacking of the Kuwaiti plane from close quarters has obtained interesting information regarding the nature of this criminal plan and its international reaction.

It has been uncovered that on 16 October and 21 November, a mullah named Ahmad 'ali Rowhani travelled to Lebanon on behalf of Musavi Kho'iniha, the deputy speaker of the mullahs' Majlis, to disburse funds and give necessary training to a handful of terrorists.

A group of ruling mullahs had earlier decided in Tehran that the plan for the hijacking of a Kuwaiti aircraft should take place as a suicide operation and all the passengers and crew of the airplane and the hijackers would be killed. Our correspondent added: Four of the orthodox, extremist Shi'ites of Lebanon named Sami' Davud, 'Omar Nasir, Khalid Nasir, and Abu Saleh and two Iranian terrorists were chosen for this criminal scheme of the Khomeyni regime. These individuals traveled to Dubayy a few days before the hijacking by Ahmad 'ali Rowhani. In Dubayy, this terrorist group was able to board the Kuwaiti Airbus with the other passengers, taking advantage of the formal program for the arrival of the British royal family members in Dubayy. They then directed the plane to Theran.

But at Mehrabad Airport in Tehran, another group consisting of Sheykholeslam, the deputy secretary of the regime's Foreign Ministry; Mohtashempur, Khomeyni's envoy to Syria; Mirsalim, 'ali Khamene'i's security adviser; Jalal Farsi and Mohsen Reza'i took over the operation.

Our correspondent added: The (?prevarication) of the murderous regime began on the 3d day of the hijacking after interference by all the factions of the ruling mullahs' clique--that is, by the opponents and supporters of the suicide program. Finally, with the intervention of supporters of Montazeri

and Hashemi-Rafsanjani, it was decided that only two Americans should be killed and one other should be tortured. The group directing the operations who had earlier prepared the hijackers for the suicide operation violently opposed this faction and finally the representatives of both sides went to Khomeyni, who was just recovering with difficulty from his heart attack 2 weeks ago, to obtain instructions. Ruhollah Khomeyni, who had approved and confirmed the suicide plan personally and from the very beginning, agreed to Montazeri's suggestion after hearing reports from the two sides. He issued orders to end this sanguinary scheme on the 6th day.

In his latest report on the Kuwaiti Airbus disaster, our correspondent said: All the radio-telephone conversations by the regime authorities in the control tower and all the buildings of the airport have been taped by a special satellite and other foreign communications and the text will soon be disseminated. In this way, there will be no room for denial by Ruhollah Khomeyni, Hoseyn Musavi, Hashemi-Rafsanjani, and 'ali Khamene'i of their role with the terrorists and this shameful scheme by the mullahs' agents.

CSO: 4640/195

IRGC COMMANDER: ARMY READY FOR 'COUP DE GRACE' ON IRAQ

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 2 Dec 84 p 2

[Text]

SARI, Mazandaran— Ground Forces Commander Colonel Sayyad Shirazi said here Friday that Iran's Armed Forces are ready to inflict "a crucial blow upon the rotten and frail body of the Baathist-Zionist government in Iraq at any expedient time."

The commander who was talking to IRNA on the occasion of the nationwide week in recognition of the services of Basij troops in and behind the battlefronts emphasized that the Iranian combatants have a high morale.

Shirazi expressed confidence that Iran's Armed Forces would shortly "realize the goals of the Islamic Republic in relation with the imposed war."

The Ground Forces commander is here for installing Colonel Gol-Afshan as a new commander of the 30th Army Division in Mazandaran province. Upon arrival, he was welcomed by local officials.

Meanwhile Commander of the Islamic Revolution's Guards Corps Mohsen Rezaie told a group of Basij troops of the IRGC in Hamedan that the Islamic Republic is determined to continue the war until such time as "the aggressor" is punished.

He expressed confidence that Iran's Moslem people would triumph in their fighting by Islamic values.

The IRGC commander

who was talking on the occasion of the seventh day of a week observed nationwide as a tribute to the Basij forces said also that the Superpowers are panicked by a growing fervor for Islam in such countries as Afghanistan, Lebanon and elsewhere in the rest of the Moslem world.

He said "the world arrogance" looks upon the Islamic Republic as being its inveterate enemy since they know that revolutionaries in other parts of the Moslem world are inspired by what is happening in Iran.

He also reminded that as much as the Superpowers and the world's big powers have extended aids to Iraq's Saddam Hussein, such liberal aids have availed him not.

Commander Rezaie said by their bold operations in Maymak earlier this month, Iran's Moslem combatants had demonstrated "an example of the determination of a people inspired by Islam."

Leader of the Friday Mass Prayers of the city Hojjatoleslam Musavi, governor general of Hamedan province Saleh and a group of the Basij and IRGC officials and a number of Majlis deputies were present at the ceremonies at Azadi Stadium of Hamedan.

Also, another report said on the last day of the Basij (mobilization) Week, cadres of the Islamic Revolution of Iraq

participating in a conference in Tehran, together with members of the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution of Iraq (SAIRI) met with the Head of the Experts Assembly of Experts, Ayatollah Meshkini, in Qom.

During the meeting, Ayatollah Meshkini reminded the audience that they were (God willing) going to take over the affairs of a country in future and therefore they should gain mastery over their passions.

He also stressed upon the need for maintaining unity as a main factor for victory over Saddam, and said disputes and differences should be set aside.

Ayatollah Meshkini said that they should step up efforts to materialize the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, ultimately achieving the downfall of Saddam.

Ayatollah Meshkini assured them of victory so long as they fought for their faith. He also said that Saddam's fall would not be achieved by mere slogans.

CSO: 4600/151

NO HOSTILE ACTS AGAINST IRAN WILL BE ALLOWED BY TURKEY

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 4 Dec 84 p 1

[Text]

TEHRAN, (IRNA) — Deputy Foreign Minister in Charge of Political Affairs Hussein Sheikholeslam said here yesterday that during his visit to Ankara last week Turkish officials had promised that they would not under any circumstances allow their territory to be used for any hostile act against Iran. He said also that the Turkish officials were also considering Iran's request for extradition of a group of Iranian drug traffickers earlier arrested by the Turkish police.

The Turkish government recently gave word to the Iranian government on the arrest of a group of nine Iranian counterrevolutionaries wanted in Iran on various charges, among them an attempted bombing of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB).

While on an official visit to Ankara last week, Sheikholeslam also presented to the Turkish President Kenan Evren a message from the Iranian

President Ali Khamenei. Earlier the Turkish president had sent a message to the Iranian president. The Foreign Ministry official said also that during his visit to Ankara he had also met and held talks with the Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal and with ranking officials of the Turkish Foreign Ministry.

Sheikholeslam said that during this talks with the Turkish officials he had also reaffirmed Iran's position in relation with the war, and recalling Iraq's repeated deployment of toxic and chemical weapons against the Iranian people and its bombardment of civilian areas in Iran as well as its blatant attacks upon ships in the Persian Gulf he had reiterated that the return of peace to the region was dependent upon Saddam's fall from power. He said also that the Turkish officials had assured him that despite recent rumors they had not entered into the Iraqi territory.

CSO: 4600/150

PAKISTAN CALLS FOR LONG-TERM COOPERATION WITH IRAN

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 4 Dec 84 p 2

[Text]

TEHRAN — Pakistan has called for a long-term cooperation with Iran, IRNA reported.

Islamic Republic of Iran's Prime Minister Hussein Musavi received the Pakistani Minister of Agriculture, Fazil Jangua, here Sunday and discussed agricultural activities of the two countries.

In the meeting, the visiting Pakistani official called for long-term cooperation between the two countries.

Musavi spoke about Islamic foundations in the Pakistani society and expressed the hope that this identity will find greater expression in the daily life of the Pakistanis.

The Iranian Minister of Agriculture Abbasali Zali was also present at the meeting.

Meanwhile, Fazil Jangua visited the Agricultural College and the Institute of Serum Production in Karaj yesterday and discussed possibilities of exchange of students and experts between the two countries.

Jangua who expressed satisfaction at visiting the medical institute said the two countries should cooperate in serum production.

Also, the visiting Pakistani Minister of Agriculture, met with the Head of Iran's Environment Protection Organization, Akbar Mirza Taheri, Sunday.

The Pakistani minister expressed the hope that his country would use the experiences of the Islamic Republic in environmental protection.

Mirza Taheri said he hoped the Pakistani minister would closely familiarize himself with the post-revolutionary achievements of the Islamic Republic.

He also said Iran's approach to its environment issues was inspired by Islamic standards.

Meanwhile, Lahore daily "Nawa-i-Waqt," in a recent article said that the restoration of diplomatic ties between the US and Iraq has revealed the sympathy of the US Administration and the Western bloc for Iraq in its imposed war against Iran.

The US Administration, which used to have Iraq in its list of countries which supported terrorism, has now resumed political relations with it.

The article further referring to aids being channelled to Iraq, said that countries such as Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia continue to provide the Iraqi regime with financial aid to continue its fight against the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Meanwhile, the US-built AWACS planes, based in Saudi Arabia, are not only providing the Iraqi regime with military information about Iran, but also transferring this information to Washington, it added.

The newspaper referred to the recent operation of the Iranian forces in taking back Meimak heights from the Iraqi forces as a great victory and added that it was achieved despite a heavy build up of Iraqi forces in the area.

FORMER EVIN OFFICIAL REPORTEDLY REFUSES NEW POST

GF190734 (Clandestine) Radio Nejat-e Iran in Persian 1630 GMT 17 Dec 84

[Text] Asadollah Lajvardi has finally asked Khomeyni to imprison him in a cell in Evin prison. According to our correspondent in Tehran, Asadollah Lajvardi, the butcher of Evin prison, was appointed deputy minister of information and security of the regime of Mullahs by Ryshahri in Mir Hoseyn Musavi's Cabinet reshuffle, but he has refused this post.

Our correspondent adds: Lajvardi, who, because of his harsh and cruel torture of political prisoners, does not dare leave the prison--which is his office and his home--has refused the regime's post of deputy minister of espionage and reportage for fear of assassination by the opposition. Asa dollah Lajvardi, who used to have a carpentry shop in Tehran's bazaar, was put in charge of the terrifying Evin prison 3 years ago after the assassination of Kachu'i and [word indistinct].

In his recent meeting with Ruhollah Khomeyni on the birthday of the prophet, he asked Khomeyni to order him imprisoned in (?a solitary cell) in order to become exempt from the post of deputy minister of security for the Mullah's regime. Our correspondent adds: Even though he no longer has any position in Evin prison, Lajvardi has yet to leave his former offices and residence within the prison.

CSO: 4640/194

NVOI ASSAILS IRANIAN REGIME'S CALL FOR ISLAMIC UNITY

TA141344 (Clandestine) National Voice of Iran in Persian 1730 GMT 13 Dec 84

[Unattributed commentary: "The Voice of Colonialism From the Mouth of the Islamic Regime's Leaders"]

[Excerpt] Dear compatriots: The last act of the unity week puppet show was staged when authorities and leaders of the Islamic government were received in audience by Khomeyni, the grand caliph. The curtain rang down with Mr Khomeyni's detailed remarks, and the puppet show ended.

However, in his lengthy speech, the leader of the oppressed uttered not a word about the need for unity among Islam's different sects. Many people, including the supporters of Islamic unity, were puzzled as to why instead of publicizing Islamic unity, the gentleman devoted all his remarks to sermonizing about the (?presence) of war and bloodshed, and to justifying aircraft hijacking. He even failed to say a word about the need for unity between Shi-ites and Sunnis. We can find the solution to this puzzle in the collection of Mr Khomeyni's statements and writings, as well as in the 6 years of activity of the Islamic government based on these statements and writings. Mr Khomeyni places the Sunni among the infidels, and considers killing and massacre of them obligatory, a pious act, and a blessing for mankind.

Today, the majority of the world's Muslims, as well as the majority of Iranian toilers, revolutionaries, and patriots, realize the true (?role) which leaders of the Islamic Government of Iran call Islamic unity. They know that the main aim of this Islamic unity on the international level is to form an alliance among reactionary and dependent regimes, such as Pakistan, Turkey, and Iran's Islamic regime, under the mask of Islam and the direction of America and Britain, in order to confront national liberation movements and to conspire and carry out subversion against progressive Islamic countries, and against the camp of peace, socialism, and progress throughout the world.

However, the ominous and counterrevolutionary role of Islamic unity in our own homeland, Iran, is to erect an artificial Islamic barrier against toilers and patriots, and to foster enmity and hostility between them, in order to prevent the formation of a united front of revolution and progress against the united front of the counterrevolution and reaction.

Our people are aware that the only way to achieve liberation from the domination of the dictatorial fascist-theocratic regime and imperialism is through unified and united combat and struggle by all toilers, revolutionaries and patriots--whether Muslims or non-Muslims, Shi'ites or Sunnis--until final victory.

CSO: 4640/193

FATE OF GURKHA TROOPS IN HONG KONG SAID UNCERTAIN

Melbourne THE AGE in English 28 Nov 84 p 11

[Article by Mark Baker]

[Text] THEIR legendary courage has saved the bacon of old England in dozens of campaigns around the world. They have fought as British soldiers since the Battle of Sambhar in 1817. Tens of thousands of them died in the world wars. Their infantrymen have won 28 Victoria Crosses.

Now one of the most celebrated alliances of British military history is under threat. But, after surviving innumerable bloodbaths, it is the peace that endangers the Brigade of Gurkhas.

When Britain returns the colony of Hong Kong to China in 1997, the Nepalese soldiers who have served as a part of the British Army for 168 years will be without a home and the indications are that their ranks will be disbanded.

Hong Kong has been the headquarters of the Gurkhas since 1971 and 4500 of them have the job of guarding the border with China against illegal immigrants. The Sino-British agreement on Hong Kong will both dispose of the last British-controlled territory in Asia and end the principal reason for Britain's continued recruitment of troops from the Himalayan kingdom of Nepal.

Britain still maintains a battalion of Gurkhas in Britain and provides another battalion on contract to the Sultan of Brunei, but once Britain no longer has military commitments in Asia it will no longer need the Gurkhas. While the British authorities have not made a firm decision on the matter yet, they have indicated that the sentimental attachment is unlikely to be enough to save the alliance.

The strange partnership began after British troops took a drubbing at the hands of the Gurkhas during the days of the Raj. Between 1814 and 1816 the forces of the British East India Company fought two long and bloody campaigns against incursions by Gurkhas.

The British were so impressed by the skill and tenacity of the wiry Gurkhas--whose fighting trademark was and still is the lethal, curved kukri knife--that after the peace was made and Nepal's independence was guaranteed, four battalions were raised to fight with the forces in India.

They proved their loyalty to the British in winning some decisive Victories during the Indian Mutiny and went on to wage the struggles of the British Empire in Burma, Afghanistan, the North-east and north-west frontiers of India, Somaliland, Malta, Cyprus, Malaya, South Africa and China.

During World War I Nepal put its entire military resources at Britian's disposal and 200,000 Gurkhas fought in Europe, North Africa and the Middle East. Their fame was reinforced at Gallipoli where they captured a major strategic position from the Turks, later known as Gurkha Bluff.

In World War II 40 battalions of Gurkhas fought in the British Army--a total of about 175,000 men--with another eight battalions of the Nepalese army. Gurkhas won seven VCs in the Burma campaign alone.

The price of the Gurkhas' loyalty in both wars--neither of which directly threatened their kingdom--was more than 43,000 casualties.

At the partition of India in 1948 four Gurkha regiments became an integral part of the British Army, forming the Brigade of Gurkhas, and six other regiments stayed with the new Indian Army.

The Brigade of Gurkhas, relocated in South-East Asia, fought for 12 years against communist insurgents during the Malayan emergency, in the 1962 Brunei revolt and then for four years against Indonesian forces in Borneo.

By 1966, with its military commitments in the Far East greatly reduced, Britain slashed the strength of the Gurkha Brigade from 14,000 to 7000. With Britain's withdrawal from Singapore in 1971, most of the Gurkhas were moved, again, to Hong Kong.

Since Hong Kong was sealed off to migration from mainland China in late 1980, the four Gurkha battalions stationed in the colony have shouldered the main work of policing the border fence. China has made it clear that after 1997 the People's Liberation Army will be responsible for the defence of Hong Kong.

The British Government says no decision has been made about the future of the Gurkhas. It has confirmed that discussions are under way with the Nepalese Government on the issue, but refuses to give any details.

A crucial problem is that without the base of Hong Kong Britain will lose the main link the chain of selection, training and deployment in Asia in which about 500 young men are recruited each year from the alpine villages of Nepal.

The disbanding or reducing of the Gurkha Brigade would have a serious effect on the fragile economy of Nepal: the country's main sources of foreign exchange are tourism (\$US17 million), the Gurkhas (\$14 million) and jute (\$11 million).

While Britain can run its Gurkha regiments for a third of the cost of the "whiteface" units--and Gurkha soldiers get about half the pay of their British equivalents--the British army has fostered an elaborate industry in Nepal with pensions, medical services, schools, retraining for retired soldiers and jobs in the vast recruiting network.

Fighting for Britain has also become a way of life for many Nepalese. There are many families that can turn out the men of three generations who have fought for the Gurkha Brigade and who are still on the British payroll.

There are many champions of the Gurkhas in Britian, in Parliament and especially in the defence forces, who will fight hard to preserve the tradition. But the intelligence suggests the toughest of all the campaigns is looming.

CSO: 4600/153

IDEOLOGY COUNCIL QUESTIONNAIRE CRITICIZED

Karachi DAWN in English 10 Dec 84 p 12

[Text] Karachi, Dec 9--Begum Ra'ana Liaquat Ali Khan has said that in view of the Dec 19 referendum seeking a mandate for the Islamisation process, "it is imperative that the Islamic system should be clearly defined, and it should be stated once and for all that women will have rights equal to those of men before the law."

In a statement here on Sunday, Begum Liaquat took exception to the questionnaire sent to APWA by the secretary of the Council of Islamic Ideology saying that it "seems to be designed to degrade women in the name of Islam and postulates that Islam has given a subservient status to women." Such an impression is contrary to facts, she said.

Begum Liaquat, who is the founder-President of APWA, stressed that in Islam equal rights have been conferred on men and women alike to earn "rizq-i-hilal" and, besides, women have been accorded rights and status by the progressive movement which brought Pakistan into being.

"Her (woman's) position was left in no doubt by the founder of the homeland, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, and no one should attempt to whittle away her dignity or deprive her of the opportunities to work for the progress of the nation," she urged.

CSO: 4600/145

STEPS IN ISLAMIZATION OF ECONOMY ANALYZED

Karachi DAWN in English 13 Dec 84 p 7

[Article by Sultan Ahmed]

[Text]

ISLAMISATION of banking in Pakistan is relatively easy as the national banks and investment finance institutions are in the hands of the Government. And they have to follow the government lead not only readily but also zealously.

The issue is the foreign banks, particularly those of U.S. origin with their rigid rules, which are forbidden from becoming partners of the institutions they are lending to and operating on the basis of sharing of profits and loss. They need fixed returns on their lendings so that they can pay their depositors and share holders.

That is possibly what made the governor of the Bank of England tell Arab bankers in London recently that he cannot consider a pattern in which both the principal and interest could be at risk as legitimate banking.

So Western banks operating in Pakistan have to make use of the six models of lending for commercial purposes and four for investment, while they may not believe in Qarz Hasna or lending at zero per cent interest to individuals. So there is now an array of 12 instruments of lending in place of the single direct interest bearing lending.

Western style

But while Pakistani banks at home will operate on Islamic basis, their branches outside the country will follow the Western style of banking. And the Government's external transactions, too, will be on the basis of interest payments as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank or Asian Bank does not operate on the basis of profit and loss sharing. So Pakistani bank executives will have to be adept in both the forms of banking. Otherwise mobility of the staff between the external and domestic branches will be blocked.

Disabusing Pakistanis of the prevailing notion, Prof. Ahmed Elnaggar, Secretary-General of the Association of 28 Islamic Banks, who delivered the annual Zahid Hussain Memorial Lecture this week under the auspices of the State Bank of Pakistan, said interest-free banking was not exclusively Islamic. Christianity and Judaism, too, abhorred interest. Christianity did not acknowledge interest as legitimate until 1951, he said. Nor would elimination of "Riba" alone make banking Islamic.

This is a view shared by Mr. A.G.N. Kazi, Governor of the State Bank of Pakistan. He says that Islamic banking has to do far more than eliminate Riba. It has to bring

about freedom of choice for the individual within certain limitations, offer equality of opportunity to all citizens, prevent exploitation of man by man, and engender economic growth.

These are salutary goals, and the very basic principles of welfarism in modern societies. And they are the ideals of far too many official institutions in our midst. But they remain goals, and have not become reality? Will there be a radical change in this regard with the introduction of Islamic banking? Will there be a revolutionary change in the outlook, working style and basic psychology of the banking executive and staff?

There are those who argue that the alternative to a high interest economy with all the havoc it plays is not solely an economy without interest all. It could also be an economy with a low rate of interest, as in Japan where it is 5.5 per cent, or as in Switzerland and Holland where it is 7.5 per cent, or West Germany where it is 8 per cent. But when interest high or low is abhorrent in its very concept or simply by that name, it has to be banished from such societies.

Alternative

Another alternative can be to have both forms of banking simultaneously, leaving it to the people and banks to choose what form they prefer. Dr. Elnaggar says that in Egypt where Islamic banking co-exists with the normal form they have a deposit of 2 billion dollars, which is far larger than our PLS deposits.

He says that Islam believes in maximum profit, a view not shared by many others, and that Islamic banking can make 60 to 70 per cent profit annually readily. In his address he mentioned only *Qarz Hasna* and *Musharika* by name. Clearly Pakistan is far ahead in this regard with 12 models of lending.

But the basic question is when people, even the well educated are not able to comprehend the direct interest bearing banking system easily, can they understand the 12 models of which will come into vo-

gue now? Can they be judicious enough to understand the relative merits of each instrument and make the best use of it?

Can the bank staff too be really educated in this regard and be helpful to the borrowers? This poses a serious challenge both to lenders and borrowers. Hence it would have been far better to begin with a simple process, and have fewer instruments at the initial stage. But we have chosen to begin in a very elaborate manner.

Mr. Qazi says the new concept will liberalise the system and the return on deposits will be linked to the profitability of the banks. And there will also be a direct relationship between return given on deposits and the return obtained from industry. This is indeed proper; but how it will be achieved of

It has been stressed by Mr. D.M. Qureshi, Managing Director of Bankers Equity, who is one of the proponents of Islamic banking, that under that the system the banks cease to be lenders and become partners. That means that if the profitability of an industry on which a bank invested a good deal of money goes down, it will become more alert and scrutinise the reasons for that promptly and suggested and enforced the necessary remedies.

If lenders now become partners of the industries, should not depositors, too, become partners of the banks they are saving their funds. Profitability of a bank depends on its efficiency, economic management, and honest administration. Without such qualities the profits of banks can go down sharply and losses increase, and make the depositors suffer.

In such a context, if a man who can buy a Rs. 10 share of public limited company can ask a dozen questions at its annual general meeting about its management and financial transactions, should not a man who deposits a few hundred or thousand rupees have the same kind of voice in the affairs of his bank? Partnership under the new system should be of a two-way kind, and not safeguard the lendings of the banks alone.

Normally a bank should be able to do well with a difference of 2 per cent between the average borrowing and lending rates. But in Pakistan the administrative cost of the banks is so high they need a four per cent margin, and yet they are not able to make significant profit. So depositors who become partners of the banks because of the PLS operations have the right to keep a sharp eye on the operations of their banks and keep the cost really down.

This also raises the issue of emoluments of bank executives in Islamic banks? Should they be given the kind of rich perquisites, like Honda Accords and expensive houses as they are now when they become real Islamic bankmen? Anyway, as Islamic banking enters into its second phase from January 1 the administrative economy and operational efficiency of the banks have to be improved radically. How well that will be done remains to be seen.

Investments

Meanwhile, Mr. Kazi and other officials who underscore the varied virtues of Islamic banking, are not taking any chance when it comes to fixing the returns on loans to be given for trading or investment purposes. The rates fixed for export financing now are the same as there have been hitherto — 2 per cent for export of indigenous machinery, 3 per cent for other exports and 9 per cent for the sale within the country of indigenously manufactured machinery. Service charges announced are the same. There are minor variations, like in place of penal interest there will be a fine now.

Evidently the real transformation of banking is going to long quite a while. It will in reality be a slow, step by step business. Mr. Qureshi cautions that the new system will have to be shaped "within the hard realities of the present socio-economic setup which are upsetting.

STUDY SHOWS GDP, GNP GROWTH RATE MODEST

Karachi DAWN in English 13 Dec 84 Business Supplement p I

[Text]

ISLAMABAD, Dec. 12: The 22nd edition of the Pakistan Basic Facts 1983-84, has been released by the Economic Adviser Ministry of Finance, here on Tuesday.

The document provides all the necessary data to evaluate the performance of various sectors of the economy both in the historical context and across the countries. It also presents full year data for 1983-84. Besides statistical tables, it includes comprehensive charts and graphs.

The main findings in brief are: During 1983-84 despite adverse climatic factors and the resultant heavy shortfall in the cotton crop and cotton based activities the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Gross National Product (GNP) recorded the respective growth rates of 4.5 per cent and 4.6 per cent which, in turn, highlight the strength of the economy against national setbacks. Commodity sector witnessed an increase of 1.6 per cent whereas services sector grew at 8.0 per cent. Consequently the share of commodity sector in Gross Domestic Product declined from 55.5 per cent in 1982-83 to 54.0 per cent in 1983-84, while that of services sector rose from 44.5 per cent to 46.0 per cent over the same period. Per capita income stood at Rs. 4,530 which is higher than the per capita income of 47 per cent population of the world.

Negative growth

Owing to unfavourable weather, agriculture registered a negative growth of 4.6 per cent in 1983-84. This resulted from decline in the production of three crops. Viz: cotton, wheat and rice. The worst affected crop was cotton, where production fell by 40 per cent to only 2.9 million bales. The production of wheat and rice dropped by 11.9 per cent and 3.0 per cent respectively. The agricultural strategy of the Government aims at increasing the output alongwith a fair return to the growers.

The manufacturing sector grew by 7.7 per cent and its share in Gross Domestic Product increased to 17.6 per cent from 17.1 per cent in 1982-83. While the production of ghee, sugar, cement, fertilisers, chemicals and cigarettes showed significant increase, the output of cotton yarn, cotton cloth and mild steel products declined. Industrial investment increased by 5.9 per cent, while the private sector investment rose by 24.0 per cent reflecting certain revival of private sector confidence, the public sector investment fell by 12.9 per cent.

Price index

The wholesale price index increased by 10.5 per cent, the con-

sumer price index by 8.4 per cent and sensitive price indicator by 10.0 per cent. The main contributory factors were short fall in agricultural supplies, speculative hoarding and consumption orientation of the society.

Lower exports

The pressure on the balance of payments, which had subsided considerably in 1982-83, re-emerged in 1983-84 largely because of lower exports of cotton and cotton based manufactures and decline in net capital inflows from abroad.

The rate of monetary expansion slowed down considerably during 1983-84 owing to a rise of 11.4 per cent in monetary assets compared to the rise of 25.3 per cent in the preceding year. The monetary and credit policy of the Government continued to be directed towards achieving the twin objectives of price stability and optimum growth.

The revenue receipts increased from 75.732 million in 1982-83 to Rs. 61.467 million in 1983-84. The share of revenue receipts in Gross National Product stood at 18.2 per cent as compared to 16.7 per cent in 1982-83.

During 1983-84, 695 new primary schools, 74 middle schools, 77 high schools, 14 colleges and 3 professional schools were opened. As a result total enrolment increased by 341,000 new admissions at all levels.

The experience of 1983-84 has established the strength and resiliency of the economy to weather severe shocks without significant deterioration in living conditions of the population. There is, therefore, every reason to believe that with effective policy intervention and continued efforts, firm foundations now exist to build a secure and prosperous future for the nation.—APP

CSO: 4600/147

SWITZERLAND OFFERS EASY TERM CREDIT

Karachi DAWN in English 10 Dec 84 Business Supplement p I

[Text] Karachi, Dec 9--Switzerland has offered a soft-term mixed credit of 80 to 90 million Swiss francs to Pakistan and negotiations are currently underway to finalise terms for the proposed credit.

This was disclosed by Joseph Koch, Acting Consul-General of Switzerland during a news conference addressed at Karachi Press Club today by Mr Nikolay Toschkoff, an official of Swiss Office for Development and Trade.

He said part of the credit, to be supplied by the Swiss Government, will be on zero interest basis and a part to be supplied by the Swiss private sector will be at a low interest rate.

Disbursement areas

Replying to a question, Mr Koch said, it will be premature to say for what specific projects the credit will be utilised. He said in the case of credits like the one being negotiated between Pakistan and his country, it solely depends on the recipient country to select the areas for disbursement.

He also disclosed that during the period 1983-84, Switzerland invested around Rs 130 million in Pakistan. He said he was happy to say his country had been investing in Pakistan, particularly in the fields of pharmaceuticals, and has helped Pakistan to establish three institutions, including Pakistan Design Centre and Pak-Swiss Precision Instruments Institute.

He said Pakistan and Switzerland were working in close cooperation and he was sure that in future this cooperation will increase.

Textile field

Earlier, Mr Toschkoff said there was scope for cooperation between the two countries in the textile field.

He was also hopeful that the volume of trade will increase but stressed that in order to increase the volume of Pakistani exports to Switzerland, Pakistani exporters must make efforts to supply high quality goods.

Mr Toschkoff particularly underlined the importance of research and development and said his country was spending some 2.4 percent of GNP on research and development.--PPI

CSO: 4600/145

IDB MAY FINANCE DRAINAGE PROJECT

Karachi DAWN in English 13 Dec 84 Business Supplement p I

[Text]

LAHORE, Dec 12: A three-member Islamic Development Bank (IDB) mission, currently on a visit to Pakistan, held a meeting with Mr N.C. Syed, acting member (Water), WAPDA here this morning and examined the possibilities of financing Left Bank Outfall Drain Project.

Member (Water), WAPDA while informing the IDB mission about the background and details of the project, stated that LBOD was currently the second biggest project after Kalabagh Dam in the country. He said that multi-million LBOD project involved constructing a big canal to carry saline water to the sea to save the agricultural land from waterlogging and salinity. He added that WAPDA was keen to complete the project as early as possible. He informed the mission that a part of LBOD had already been completed.

Mr. Hassan Jeng, head of the project division of the IDB showed keen interest in the LBOD project. The mission after holding discussions with Member (Water), WAPDA left for Karachi in the evening enroute Hyderabad. The IDB mission will hold further discussions including technical aspects of the project with WAPDA's General Manager (Water), at Hyderabad on Thursday and will also visit the project area.

CSO: 4600/147

REFERENDUM TERMED 'FRAUD ON PAKISTANIS'

BK141535 Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 4 Dec 84 p 8

[Editorial: "Fraud on Pakistanis"]

[Text] General Ziaul Haq's abrupt decision on a referendum clearly exposes the failure of his prolonged and tortuous efforts to devise some formula that would enable him to continue in office by consent. It has been a long 90 days since 1977 when the Pakistani army chief seized power, promising to restore civilian governance within that period. He has tried to tinker with the constitution, framed super laws, set up a reforms commission, appointed a nominated Majlis-i-Shoora [Advisers Council], made every effort to buy the support of political parties while, at the same time refusing to countenance their formal existence, and repeatedly promised elections. What all these laborious stratagems revealed was that in spite of his unquestioned supremacy, the general was still anxious for a certain legitimacy. It has now become clear that not even the parties of the obscurantist Islamic right are prepared to endorse his rule. The disturbances in Sind and elsewhere and the ultimately unsuccessful campaign launched by the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy may have established that the Pakistani Opposition is still not strong enough to challenge the Martial Law authorities; but this in itself does not make the government any more acceptable.

It must also have been galling for General Zia to discover that while he continues to drag his feet on elections, the new government in Delhi has not pleaded crisis conditions to avoid its democratic obligations. While there may be no direct connection between the two situations, the Pakistani public could not but fail to take note of this latest manifestation of the resilience of India's parliamentary traditions. Mr Rajiv Gandhi's announcement may, therefore have been a contributory factor in Islamabad, though, truth to tell, many authoritarian rulers find it expedient sooner or later to by-pass the legislative process and political establishment to appeal directly to ordinary people. This the general plans to do with a heads-I-win-tails-you lose question that leaves the opposition and electorate no room for manoeuvre, and which guarantees the outcome in advance. By making it compulsory for everyone over 21 to take part in the exercise, General Zia has pre-empted the opposition's predictable support for a boycott; the presidential order forbidding any questions about the conduct of the referendum will only strengthen the conviction of official rigging on an extensive scale.

Even without these repugnant precautions, the exercise would have been little more than a farce. As the MRD has already pointed out, a theocratic Muslim nation cannot possibly object to "Islamization." But this need not mean that Pakistanis approve of the Martial Law regime or its policies. By linking the two factors, General Zia has only made it impossible for respondents to express political dissent without appearing to be "un-Islamic." Nor is there any evidence that the "Islamization" for which he demands approval is in any way intended to further what is described as "the smooth and orderly transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people." On the contrary the restrictions imposed on normal political activity; the persistent evasion of elections and the setting aside of local government polls when it seemed certain that Pakistan People's Party nominees would sweep the board only proved that General Zia has little intention of ever willingly relinquishing authority. This is only confirmed by the suggestion that favourable results will be regarded as sanction for another 5 years in office. Even the loaded question does not stipulate this and the interpretation would be as arbitrary as the entire process. In fact, what is being perpetrated on the Pakistani people is a fraud only thinly camouflaged in procedural propriety. It will not make the government any more respectable, and the opposition may well conclude that the only hope now of restoring democracy lies in a violent confrontation.

CSO: 4600/155

COUNTERING ALLEGEDLY FALSE PROPAGANDA PRAISED

GF191720 Lahore JANG in Urdu 14 Dec 84 p 3

[Editorial: "Timely Contradiction of False News"]

[Text] Pakistan has refuted the news published in the NEW YORK TIMES that there has been some understanding between Pakistan and the CIA over the question of the supply of arms to the Afghan Mujahidin through Pakistan. The Pakistan Embassy in the United States has explained in a letter to the paper that no such agreement has been reached and Pakistan is not prepared to become a conduit for arms to the Mujahidin. The Pakistani envoy said that Pakistan's policy on this question was quite clear and that the President of Pakistan, General Muhammad Ziaul Haq, has recently explained to foreign correspondents that the Mujahidin resistance movement will not be allowed to use Pakistani territory for its activities.

There is no truth in the NEW YORK TIMES report as the Pakistani envoy has explained in his letter, and Pakistan's policy on this issue has been quite clear from the very beginning. Nevertheless, the American and the European press which is mostly controlled by the Jews, has been blaming Islamic countries, especially Pakistan, for various things. Moscow and Kabul had been drumming up these accusations for a long time but world opinion cannot be deceived by such inept efforts. The Karmal regime has been violating Pakistani air and land space for a long time, taking shelter under these accusations. Afghan aircraft have bombarded Pakistani territory hundreds of times. It is not only Pakistan which is facing such a situation. There are a number of other Muslim countries also which are suffering the same way. However, the way Afghanistan's independence and sovereignty has been crushed and the misfortune which Afghanistan has been thrown into cannot be traced in history. As a result of this, 3 million Afghan nationals have taken refuge in Pakistan, and there are about a million in Iran. If those affected by this tragedy raise their voice in protest for their rights, for their religion, and for the liberation of their homeland, then no legal or moral restrictions to prevent them from doing so.

Pakistan has from the very beginning adopted a policy of caution and it shouldered its responsibility of accommodating and feeding these refugees only because of Islamic brotherhood and human sympathy. Pakistan has nothing to do with the military activities of the Mujahidin and it is on this account that it

has been looking for a peaceful political solution to the Afghan issue. Pakistan is fully cooperating in this effort. Even though Pakistan had no hope of a solution to this problem through the Geneva talks, yet is wholeheartedly took part in them. Pakistan wants an honorable solution of this problem in light of the resolutions passed by the United Nations, COI and the nonaligned organization which may be acceptable to the Afghan people.

The resolutions passed by these bodies can become a guarantee for the safe and honorable return of the refugees and also a guarantee for the restoration of Afghanistan's nonaligned status. These resolutions can also lighten the load of Pakistan in looking after these 3 million refugees. A peaceful solution to this dispute is in the interest of Pakistan because it is this dispute which has brought clouds of danger to its western borders. The huge amount that Pakistan spends on these refugees could, on their honorable return to their homeland, be spent on the welfare of the Pakistani people.

Pakistan wants to keep the situation peaceful in this region. No clash or confrontation is in the interest of Pakistan. Therefore, Pakistan is not in a position to undergo any agreement which could threaten the peace of the region. After Pakistan has contradicted this false report, there should be no room left for a misunderstanding.

CSO: 4656/52

REFERENDUM RESULTS ANNOUNCED, SATISFACTION EXPRESSED

BK201559 Karachi Domestic Service in Urdu 1500 GMT 20 Dec 84

[Text] The nation has supported President Mohammad Ziaul Haq with an overwhelming majority in the historic referendum. By casting affirmative votes on a large scale in the national referendum, the people have endorsed the president's Islamization policies and exercised their opinion in favor of continuing this process and for a smooth and orderly transfer of power to the elected representatives.

According to provisional results received by the Election Commission from all parts of the country, about 96 percent of the votes were cast in the affirmative. This indicates that by overwhelmingly exercising their right to vote, the people have given a mandate to the president to run the administration of the country for 5 more years so that he can be able to implement his programs and policies. More than 62 percent of votes were cast in the referendum. The results were announced in special bulletins in special national programs. Our representatives, who visited a number of polling stations in various areas of the country, said that an extraordinary zeal and enthusiasm was found among the people on the day of the referendum. Despite severe cold in certain places, the people exercised their right to vote, in favor of enforcing the Islamic system in the country.

The Election Commission has expressed satisfaction at the fact that the national referendum was held in a just and fair manner. The commission spokesman said in Islamabad today that the Election Commission has received no report of any irregularity at any place in the country.

The federal cabinet will meet in Rawalpindi on Monday under the chairmanship of President Mohammad Ziaul Haq.

CSO: 4656/52

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JAN 24, 1985